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ABSTRACT  
Wittgenstein’s claim: anytime something is seen, it is necessarily seen as 
something, forms the philosophical foundation of this research. I synthesize theories and 
philosophies from Simondon, Maturana, Varela, Wittgenstein, Pye, Sennett, and Reddy 
in a research process I identify as a paradigm construction project. My personal studio 
practice of inventing experiential media systems is a key part of this research and 
illustrates, with practical examples, my philosophical arguments from a range of points of 
observation. I see media systems as technical objects, and see technical objects as 
structurally determined systems, in which the structure of the system determines its 
organization. I identify making, the process of determining structure, as a form of 
structural coupling and see structural coupling as a means of knowing material. I 
introduce my theory of conceptual plurifunctionality as an extension to Simondon’s 
theory. Aspects of materiality are presented as a means of seeing material and immaterial 
systems, including cultural systems. I seek to answer the questions: How is structure seen 
as determining the organization of systems, and making seen as a process in which the 
resulting structures of technical objects and the maker are co-determined? How might an 
understanding of structure and organization be applied to the invention of contemporary 
experiential media systems? 
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PREFACE  
In some sense, the subject of study in this dissertation is myself. Or perhaps a 
better way of framing my meaning is to say that my topic of research was highly 
motivated by my own observable patterns of thinking, making, researching and writing. 
This work, and my methodology may be considered, at least in part, to be 
autoethnographical (Knowles & Cole, 2008). In the process of evolving my research, 
defining this research in the form of a dissertation proposal, and ultimately translating 
this, with significantly more transformations, into a dissertation, I wrote folders full of 
outlines, concept maps, literature reviews, partial chapters, introductions and conclusions. 
All of them, excepting a final few, felt like false starts. The trails of ideas either 
terminated prematurely in a tangle of brambles, or much more frequently, bifurcated and 
trifurcated into an exponentially expansive network of paths, leaving me just as lost as I 
was in the brambles. In the months, then years, of this process playing out, I kept 
returning to the form of thinking that brought me to this PhD program in the first place: 
thinking through making. I found continual comfort, focus and mental stimulation while 
in the flow of conceiving, designing, building and programming new systems. In this 
tangible work I found a solidity of function, a unity, an "internal resonance" (Simondon, 
1958, p. 13) that was hidden to me in my writing efforts. I began to look at the process of 
making, and ultimately the nature of human-made objects as the subject matter for my 
research. I discovered, with helpful guidance from my committee, theories of enaction 
and embodiment, philosophies of craftsmanship--and, importantly, the field of 
mechanology. From these foundations, I was able to stop looking for what research to do 
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and write about, and finally recognize that I had been conducting a form of research all 
along. Henk Borgdorff (2006) describes how such a practice may be seen as research, 
Art practice qualifies as research if its purpose is to expand our knowledge and 
understanding by conducting an original investigation in and through art objects 
and creative processes. Art research begins by addressing questions that are 
pertinent in the research context and in the art world.  Researchers employ 
experimental and hermeneutic methods that reveal and articulate the tacit 
knowledge that is situated and embodied in specific artworks and artistic 
processes.  Research processes and outcomes are documented and disseminated in 
an appropriate manner to the research community and the wider public. 
(Borgdorff, 2006, p. 23) 
 This document presents a synthesis of, and extension to theories on the nature of 
human-made objects and the process of making them. I present this research with a focus 
on the materiality of my contemporary media practice. As this dissertation evolved I 
recognized that it, like my other studio products, was a system that I was building and 
that all my prior research, making and writing was an essential part of this ‘paradigm 
construction project’. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation I seek to answer these research questions: 
How is structure seen as determining the organization of systems, and making 
seen as a process in which the resulting structures of technical objects and the maker are 
co-determined? How might an understanding of structure and organization be applied to 
the invention of contemporary experiential media systems? 
 I contextualize the generation of these questions within this introduction, starting 
with these observations on the process of making, from my point of observation as a 
maker and as an observer of other makers. Media artists often start with a desired 
interaction, behavior, or other dynamic functionality in mind. They go about 
programming, wiring, constructing and networking their system with functionality as 
their guiding vision. Other media artists start with specific materials, which might include 
code, electronics, language and other intangible materials, and work to define the forms 
and relationships between these materials. Either path may lead to a system that satisfies 
the primary end goals of the creators, but both approaches may have significant 
compromises. A strictly function-oriented approach may result in the desired function, 
but with an arbitrary form. A strictly form-oriented approach may result in the desired 
form, but with an arbitrary function. Of course neither approach is typically, if ever, 
strictly adhered to. In almost all cases, some attention is given to both form and function; 
though this attention is likely to toggle between these concerns. Rarely is the focus 
simultaneously on form and function. At a high level, this is the purpose of the research 
represented by this dissertation: to present a paradigm in which form and function are 
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seen as an integrated whole, and to see experiential media systems as systems constituted 
of these integrated wholes. I propose that such a paradigm will reveal new ways of seeing 
existing media systems, and may inspire modes of thinking and creating that do not 
isolate form and function as independent, relational variables, but see them as mutually 
defining variables. 
The astute reader will protest that form and function are widely accepted and 
treated as an integrated whole, particularly in the field of architecture. I would argue that 
for many, especially those media designers without traditional art, design or architecture 
backgrounds, this integration may be more of a principle than a practice, but this is not 
my main point. I will clarify my meaning and use of terminology. I specifically introduce 
this topic using the terms ‘form’ and ‘function’ because I believe that these terms and the 
phrases ‘form and function’ and ‘form follows function’ (L. H. Sullivan, 1896) will be 
familiar and meaningful to most readers and that this initial understanding will serve as a 
bridge to my intended meaning.  
The phrase I use in this dissertation to describe the integrated whole akin to that 
described in terms of ‘form and function’ is ‘structurally determined system’ (Maturana 
& Varela, 1980; Maturana, 1987, 2002). As a transitional step, one may consider the term 
‘form’ to be replaced with ‘structure’ and ‘function’ with ‘organization’. These terms are 
not interchangeable and the differences will emerge throughout the body of this text, but I 
find the relations and distinctions between them quite useful in deepening my 
understanding of all of these terms. I derive this terminology and theoretical meaning of 
‘structurally determined systems’, ‘structure’ and ‘organization’ from the biological and 
philosophical writings of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1980; 1987, 2002). I 
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extensively cite Maturana’s 2002 summary of these ideas (2002) to capture his 
contemporary take on the subject matter, but recognize, as Maturana himself notes, that 
the origins of these ideas date significantly further back and represent collaborative 
thought and effort. 
The story told in this dissertation starts with the asking of a profound and 
ultimately very fruitful question: 
In November 1960, a first year medical student asked me the question "What 
began three thousand eight hundred million years ago so that you can say now 
that living systems began then?" I realized that at that moment I could not 
properly answer that question." (Maturana, 2002, p. 6) 
Maturana's (2002) quest for an answer to this question led to a significant 
epistemological and ontological shift in his thinking, and ultimately to his concept of 
autopoiesis as a characterization of living systems (Maturana, 2002, pp. 5–6). To answer 
the initial question posed to him, Maturana realized he had to answer the more 
fundamental question of: "What should happen in the manner of constitution of a system 
so that I see as a result of its operation a living system?" (Maturana, 2002, p. 5). A 
question in this spirit gradually took form in my mind as I reflected on my own 
production of experiential media systems. In a first iteration of this thought process I 
directly appropriated Maturana's (2002) words, asking: "What should happen in the 
manner of constitution of a system so that I see as a result of its operation an experiential 
media system?" Maturana’s statement was likely originally written in Spanish (Maturana, 
2002, p. 23) and if not, certainly reflects this linguistic foundation. With additional 
thought, my emerging research question evolved to ask, “How do the relations of 
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structure and organization, within and between systems, affect how we see the nature of 
these systems and their interactions?” This question, while central to my topic, is a 
reiteration and fusion of questions asked by Maturana (2002) and Simondon (1958). My 
research question is: How is structure seen as determining the organization of systems, 
and making seen as a process in which the resulting structures of technical objects and 
the maker are co-determined? I ask as a secondary question to focus this research to my 
domain: How might an understanding of structure and organization be applied to the 
invention of contemporary experiential media systems?  I apply these questions to natural 
and technical objects, and modes of making. I consider how the results of these 
investigations may apply to a wide range of material and immaterial systems. 
Fundamental to the essence of Maturana’s (2002) question, quoted above, is the 
phrase, "I see as". At a superficial level, this implies a subjective and individual 
exploration. At a more significant level, "I see as" implies a philosophical stance, a 
recognition that one can only see something as something (Wittgenstein, 1953). Varela 
and Maturana’s (1980; 2002; 1978) theory of structurally determined systems, which will 
be examined in depth in this document, defines these systems as organizationally closed. 
By this logic it is not possible to directly know an external system. If direct access is not 
possible, is there another means of knowing another? Structural coupling will be 
presented as a response to this question (Maturana & Varela, 1980; Maturana, 2002; 
Varela & Goguen, 1978). 
This dissertation will start with a definition of structurally determined systems. 
This definition opens up questions of the mechanics of information and perception. These 
mechanics are seen as a process called ‘structural coupling’ (Maturana, 2002). After 
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laying the groundwork for a general understanding of structurally determined systems, I 
show how man-made systems may be seen as structurally determined. This is done 
initially from a theoretical perspective, introducing Mechanology (Simondon, 1958), or 
the science of machines. Finally, I show that the practice and products of making can be 
seen as structurally determined. Projects from my own practice as a creator of art and 
experiential media systems illustrate the theory in practical examples. These examples are 
spread throughout the document, but feature prominently in the final portion. Throughout 
these examples I emphasize the materiality of these practices. I conclude this dissertation 
with a discussion of aspects of materiality and show how systems of all types can be seen 
in terms of these aspects of materiality. I identify the entirety of my research and writing 
process as a paradigm construction project and see the resulting document and media 
systems as snapshots of this dynamic process. A paradigm implies a point of observation. 
I stress that this point of observation is not singular or fixed, but is instead manifold and 
dynamic.  
My primary research questions unfold into a series of questions, forming the 
structure of my dissertation. These questions start with those asked by Maturana (2002): 
How does structure determine the organization of a system? Is the organization of a 
system maintained when the structure of that system changes? How can organizationally 
closed systems interact with systems external to themselves? Questions asked by 
Simondon (1958) continue this sequence: Can technical objects be seen as natural 
objects? How can technical objects be seen in terms of their evolution? How can margins 
of indetermination in structurally determined systems be seen as opportunities for 
information transfer? My questions which follow, are strongly informed by Maturana’s 
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and Simondon’s theories and philosophies, and underpinned by Wittgenstein’s (1953) 
paradigm that when we see something, we always see it as something (Wittgenstein, 
1953): How can making be seen as a structural coupling between a maker, her tools and 
her media? How does making result in a co-determination of the structure of the maker 
and the technical object produced? How can a maker know their material? How can 
structure and organization be employed as material computation? How can making and 
invention be seen as either industrial or artisanal modes of production? Are distinctions 
between modes of production still valid? In what ways do these modes of production 
inform and complement one another? How can my material practice illustrate and reveal 
the theoretical constructs of the philosophical basis of this dissertation? Can conceptual 
function be considered alongside physical function as an integral part of a structurally 
determined system? How can aspects of materiality shape the paradigms through which 
immaterial systems are viewed? 
Significance of Problem 
Excepting extremely rare examples, we are never separated from technology. 
Even the most basic, natural clothing we wear represents an embodiment of technology. 
As technology and society has progressed, our relationship to technology has evolved. 
Technology is less of a tool we consciously turn to for specific needs and occasions and 
more of a constant companion that we form a partnership with and coevolve with 
(Simondon, 1958). For this reason, finding a means of understanding the nature of 
technology is important, whether we are directly involved as a creators of technology or 
merely as a participants in the culture that technology shapes. 
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In the absence of genuine invention, technology tends to evolve slowly in a 
predictable linear progression. I use the phrase 'genuine invention' to refer to a conception 
of invention as a creative act requiring a "conditioning of the present by the future" 
(Simondon, 1958, p. 62). In other words, that which is invented cannot yet exist because 
the conditions for its viable existence do not yet exist.  Imagination, which requires a 
sensitivity to the technicality (Simondon, 1958, p. 87) of the media with which one 
works, provides a cognitive scaffolding that allows invention to take place (Simondon, 
1958). Simondon says,  
Imagination is not only a faculty for inventing or creating images beyond the 
bounds of sensation. It is also a capacity for perceiving in objects qualities that are 
not practical, qualities that are neither directly sensory nor wholly geometric, 
qualities that have to do neither with pure matter nor pure form but belong to the 
in-between level of systems. (Simondon, 1958, p. 87) 
Sensitizing ourselves to the technicality of our media is essential to produce 
breakthrough inventions and experiential media systems. 
My personal connection with the subject matter of this dissertation is through my 
practice as a media artist and engineer. At an immediate level, this connection is to the 
media itself: the physical material, electronic circuits, mechanical systems, and software. 
At an experiential level it is about discovering and defining relations between these 
materials. In a word, this can be called “making”. But it would be naïve to assume that 
this individual experience of interaction with material happens in a vacuum. There is a 
context for all of this, a context of culture. Any material I use, any form I create, has a 
cultural history and impact. It is never only one thing seen from one perspective but 
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always a plurality. Even in the experience of an individual, William James (1912/1976) 
identifies a simultaneous objective and subjective reality (James, 1912/1976).  McLuhan 
identifies the medium as the message, connecting everything to the culture in which it is 
created, and seeing that what is created transforms culture (McLuhan & Fiore, 1967). In 
this dissertation, through a review of literature and from personal experience, I identify 
aspects of materiality. I show how these aspects of materiality, seen in terms of their 
structure and organization, are of practical concern in a range of application domains, and 
speculate on their application in still more domains. Broadly speaking, I show how the 
work I present here may be applied to a study of what may be called “the materiality of 
culture.” 
Scope of Research 
The primary foundation for this theoretical perspective of experiential media 
systems as structurally determined systems (Maturana, 2002) is my own personal 
experience making and interacting with such systems. This foundation is subjective, in 
the sense that it is my individual experience, which cannot be directly experienced or 
verified by others, but is also simultaneously objective in the sense that, in James’ words, 
“experience plays the part of a thing known, of an objective 'content'” (James, 1976). My 
points of observation are but a few of the manifold points of observation of experiential 
media systems. In stepping back from the pure phenomena of making and experiencing 
the systems through interaction, and looking at these systems as systems, I am in effect 
approaching them from a diagrammatic perspective (Wittgenstein, 1953). By this I mean 
that I’m seeing the products and my experience from an abstract perspective, in the same 
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sense that Wittgenstein suggests when he explains a picture-object (the original text 
includes an illustration of simple hand-drawn face),  
Here it is useful to introduce the idea of a picture-object. [This illustration] 
For instance would be a 'picture-face'. In some respects I stand towards it as I 
do towards a human face. I can study its expression, can react to it as to the 
expression of the human face. A child can talk to picture-men or picture-animals, 
can treat them as it treats dolls. I may, then, have seen the duck-rabbit simply as 
a picture-rabbit from the first. That is to say, if asked "What's that?" or "What do 
you see here?" I should have replied: "A picture-rabbit". If I had further been 
asked what that was, I should have explained by pointing to all sorts of pictures of 
rabbits, should perhaps have pointed to real rabbits, talked about their habits, or 
given an imitation of them. (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 194) 
By considering my work in terms of philosophical perspectives I am seeing my 
work as a picture-object.  In this diagrammatic representation I can't help but, in 
Wittgenstein's (1953) terms, notice aspects that I may or may not have noticed before. As 
Wittgenstein emphasizes, through this aspect dependent perception, when I say I see 
something, I am necessarily “seeing it as” something (Wittgenstein, 1953, pp. 194, 195, 
202, 213). What I see it as depends, in Maturana's (2002) terms, on my structure at that 
instant (Maturana, 2002, p. 6). 
The major conceptual framework of this research, built on the foundations of my 
material practice, consists of philosophies of perception, information, material culture 
and technology. The work of this dissertation is finding convergent threads from these 
literary works, and from the knowledge from my material practice, and stitching them 
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together into a larger cohesive fabric. My experience, as an artist, engineer, maker and 
scholar has determined my structure at the point of encounter with these bodies of 
knowledge and my structure changes, I learn (Maturana, 1987, pp. 74–75), as I am 
structurally coupled with these bodies of knowledge. Maturana (1987) emphasizes this 
meaning, stating,“languaging occurs in the concreteness of the doings of the observer in 
his or her actual living in the praxis of living itself”(Maturana, 2002, p. 32). The 
praxical knowledge, which I define as embodied knowledge that emerges through active 
engagement with the world and resists translation into symbolic representation, that I 
have from making experiential media systems, in significant part, determines what 
aspects of these philosophies I am drawn to, and reciprocally, the philosophy I study 
reshapes my perception of these media systems and my process of making them. It is in 
this way that I say that my reflection on my own creative process and products forms the 
foundations for this research and motivates this paradigm construction project. While it is 
useful to consider the application of this theory to processes and products significantly 
outside the scope of my personal experience, I do so only speculatively. 
The philosophies and theories that I synthesize and expand on through this 
research constitute general principles. As such the theoretical content of this dissertation 
may inform any field of study or practice. However, my synthesis and interpretation of 
this theory is a product of my cognitive structure and organization as an individual. In 
more general terms, I see this theory from a certain perspective because of who I am, and 
who I am is a result of what I do. 
I come to this research first and foremost as an artist. I am academically and 
professionally trained as a sculptor. My medium as a sculptor has evolved over the years 
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and includes: wood, metals, plastics and other static materials; and electronics, 
mechanics, computation and other temporal and spatial media. For all of these media, I 
possess some level of engineering knowledge that allows me to effectively engage 
creatively with that media. This knowledge is not discretely divided into classes 
applicable only to a single form of media, but exists as an amorphous, mutually 
informing body of knowledge. Something that I learn from one specialized practice 
inevitably is applicable to another. I would not even draw a boundary between this media 
knowledge and what might be called "daily life" activities. Pruning a tree or cooking 
dinner is just as much informed by and informs my media practice. In other words, I do 
not approach this subject matter entirely from any specific domain. I do however 
illustrate the theories presented here with specific practical media examples, primarily 
with systems of my own individual or collaborative production, but also including works 
of others in related domains.  
In this document I use the phrase ‘experiential media system’ to refer to a general 
category of interactive media as envisioned by ASU’s School of Arts, Media and 
Engineering. As stated on the school’s website, “The school's mission is to provide 
groundbreaking research and education on experiential media that integrate computation 
and digital media with the physical human experience.” (Arts Media and Engineering, 
2015). As practiced in the School of Arts, Media and Engineering (AME), experiential 
media may take many forms. Media systems may be instantiated as websites, multimedia 
performances, medical therapy systems, and many other forms. A few of these forms are 
primarily what are commonly called ‘digital media’, but many extend to include the 
human body and/or physical media. The work I primarily produce in the context of my 
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AME research incorporates physical hardware with digital computational systems. The 
physical aspects of my work are fundamental to their function. I include a discussion in 
the “Open Questions” appendix of this document on the topic of the materiality of code. 
This discussion speculatively explores the application of theories founded on the concept 
of structural determinism (Maturana, 2002) to purely computational media, but my 
primary expertise and interest resides in systems in which a physical structure is an 
essential component. As I discuss experiential media systems in this document, I do so 
with these sorts of systems in mind and from the point of observation as a maker of 
physical-digital media systems. 
Given the fact that the paradigm presented in this document is generated through 
the production of experiential media products produced by myself, as an individual 
(building on the works of many others), or by small collaborative groups, and that these 
products and practices primarily originate from an academic environment, the findings of 
this research would be most directly valid for individuals and groups that share some or 
all of these attributes; however the work may also be of significant value and validity for 
philosophers and theoreticians studying creativity, invention, mechanology, or any of the 
other subjects and fields that this research draws on, particularly for those who primarily 
approach the making of experiential media systems as outsiders. 
Organization of Dissertation 
Chapter 1, Introduction, begins by introducing the dissertation topic and presents 
arguments for the significance and scope of the research. This chapter introduces my 
personal studio practice as a foundation for the paradigm construction project presented 
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in this dissertation. I state that the philosophies and theories presented in this research 
serve as the conceptual framework for this paradigm construction project.  
Chapter 2, Methodology, describes my research methodology. I begin by 
contextualizing my methodology with an overview of the historical evolution of my 
research. I emphasize the nature of my research and how this led to me not using research 
methodologies that I initially pursued. I describe alternative perspectives on what 
constitutes research. I describe the abductive research methodology that I ultimately 
employ in this dissertation, emphasizing the strengths of this form of logical inference. I 
present thesis statements but emphasize that these are theories generated from the 
research, not starting questions.  
Chapter 3, Literature Review, begins with an introduction of the major 
philosophers and theorists that I cite throughout this dissertation. I then present other key 
individuals who represent the cultural and artistic foundations of this research but are not 
featured in the main body of the dissertation. The Background chapter concludes with an 
extensive section on haptic systems, haptic musical interfaces and the perceptual fusion 
of multimodal information, contextualizing much of my practical experiential media 
system development work. 
Chapter 4, Structure Determines Organization, introduces Maturana’s (2002) 
theories of structurally determined systems and structural coupling, which are key to the 
paradigm I develop through this dissertation project. I draw attention to Maturana's 
epistemological stance which requires him to "create a living system, either conceptually 
or practically in the laboratory" (Maturana, 2002, p. 6). I emphasize structure and 
organization as the fundamental defining features of structurally determined systems. I 
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introduce Maturana’s concepts of organizational closure and interactional openness in 
defining the nature of structurally determined systems. This chapter explains how 
structural coupling can facilitate communication between organizationally closed systems 
(Maturana, 2002, pp. 16–17). In the context of this topic, parallel concepts from 
Simondon's (1958) mechanological theory and Reddy's (1979) linguistic theory are 
compared and explored. 
Chapter 5, Determining Structure (In Theory), begins with an introduction of 
Gilbert Simondon's (1958) mechanological theory. The "technical object" is defined and 
discussed in depth in terms of its evolutionary stages and their associated characteristics 
(Simondon, 1958), including hypertelia, concretization and abstraction. The second major 
section of chapter 5 looks at connections between the biologically based theory of 
Maturana (2002) and Simondon's (1958) mechanological theory. The questions of how 
communication may be seen to occur and what makes a system viable are at the center of 
these discussions. 
Chapter 6, Determining Structure (In Practice), considers the theoretical 
constructs described in the previous chapters from the perspective of the maker. This 
chapter starts with a consideration of roles humans can play in their interactions with 
technical objects (Simondon, 1958). I discuss the modes of production of technical 
objects as seen by Simondon and consider how these modes may complement and blend 
with one another in contemporary practice. I consider the nature of workmanship and the 
roles constraints play in the regulation of making. I argue that making can be seen as 
structural coupling, consider what it means to ‘know material,’ and present examples 
from my practice to illustrate the theory I present in this document. I introduce my theory 
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of conceptual plurifunctionality as an extension to Simondon’s general theory of 
plurivalence/plurifunctionality. I conclude with a consideration of aspects of materiality 
showing the applicability of these aspects to material and immaterial systems in a wide 
range of domains. 
Chapter 7, Conclusion, summarizes the major concepts developed through this 
dissertation project. I emphasize the generation of research questions through the 
abductive research methodology employed in the execution of this project. I discuss 
future research paths that this paradigm construction project illuminates. 
Throughout this document, I make extensive use of mechanological terminology 
and concepts from Gilbert Simondon's (1958) 'Du Mode d'existence des objets 
techniques' (The Mode of Existence of Technical Objects) (Simondon, 1958). Since an 
official English translation of this work has not been published and he is not widely cited 
in philosophical literature outside of a narrow, largely Continental, tradition, I will do my 
best to provide a clear introduction to the concepts and terminology that I build on. My 
advisor, Dr. Sha Xin Wei, introduced me to Simondon’s ideas and provided the 
unpublished translation of Simondon’s work that I cite. I do not claim to be a Simondon 
expert and cannot read his work in his native French language, so my interpretation of his 
work may not be wholly consistent with that of others. I am confident however that what 
meaning I have extracted from his work, resonates with me and is consistent with the way 
I see my thinking process as a maker and user of machines.  
At the outset of this document, I want to make a statement regarding linguistic 
gender bias. Much of the source material for this dissertation contains phrases and terms 
that linguistically have a male gender bias. Examples include: the Latin phase, Homo 
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faber (man as maker) (Sennett, 2008); the craftsman (Sennett, 2008); and workmanship 
(Pye, 1968). A quick search of Simondon's (1958) "On the Mode of Existence of 
Technical Objects", a key reference in this document, reveals no uses of the words 
"woman" or "women". "Man" features prominently as a general and generic term for 
either an individual human or humanity as a whole. While the subject matter of these 
texts, and of my work, is not directly about gender in any way, I find the linguistic bias 
somewhat troubling, however in the interest of clarity and consistency, I typically use the 
same terminology in the material I am quoting when discussing this material. In writing 
independent of these sources I strive for neutral and balanced language. 
When I think about the community of makers in my life: my professors, my 
students, my colleagues in fine arts, sciences and engineering fields, I identify a highly 
diverse group of men and women, of various ages, races, and sexual orientations. The 
terms craftsmanship or workmanship do not honor this diverse community. In another 
dissertation I might take this on as battle to fight. In this instance, please simply know 
that I do not use such terms thoughtlessly and that they do not reflect a personal bias. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
I employed an abductive research methodology in the research and writing of this 
dissertation. I emphasize the utility of this methodology and provide examples of the 
application of abduction in scientific research later in this chapter.  
The production of generalizable, transferable knowledge can take many forms. As 
a PhD student, I’ve been introduced to a wide range of research methodologies. The 
range of research methodologies applicable to Arts, Media and Engineering research is 
likely broader than would be typically applied to a more historically established and 
narrowly focused research domain. Coming from a fine arts background, I experienced 
all of these structured methodologies as a new way of seeing, understanding and sharing 
the work I was doing. I recognize in retrospect that my fine arts work did take place with 
a research methodology, but one that was implicit and informally defined.  
The process of formulating my dissertation research project was a long and 
complex journey. Early in this process I identified certain characteristics of media 
systems as fundamentally motivating: tangibility, real-time responsiveness, mechanically 
dynamic, and featuring a synthesis of real and simulated physics. I explored a range of 
application areas to capitalize on these characteristics, including: education, motivational 
systems, physical fitness, and artistic performance. From these explorations several core 
subject areas emerged. Prominent among these were: immersive media, embodied 
knowledge, haptic information channels, and material computation. 
At the point of formally proposing my dissertation research project I had settled 
on conducting research on the importance of various modalities and applications of haptic 
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information for musical performance with a hybrid physical-digital musical instrument. I 
proposed a mixed-methods research methodology that would include quantitative sensor, 
actuator and audio synthesis engine state data; coded qualitative performance data; and 
in-depth personal interviews with the participating musicians. My dissertation committee 
was generally supportive of my overall research questions and of the creative importance 
of my proposed project, but they also recognized fundamental limitations in the general 
knowledge that could be persuasively claimed from my planned research. The primary 
problem was that with a completely novel interface I had no way to establish a baseline 
for learning or performance. There were, by definition, no experts to define such a 
baseline and certainly not time for even one, let alone a statistically significant number of 
such players to mature. I could have run the studies as proposed and probably would have 
made some interesting observations, but these observations would only have had any 
validity for this individual instrument and these performers. I could have dramatically 
limited the variables in the system to produce a study that closely matched prior haptic 
feedback, or other, studies, and in so doing expand the generalizability of my research. 
However I was not interested in this path because the very complexity that made my 
system challenging to evaluate from traditional scientific research perspectives, was 
exactly what made it interesting research. 
I began looking for other models of research, continued building more media 
systems, and began to think more broadly about the full spectrum of projects I had 
worked on throughout my career in the School of Arts, Media and Engineering.  In this 
time period, I was invited to join the newly formed Synthesis Center at ASU (Sha, 2014) 
as a graduate researcher. Dr. Sha Xin Wei (2013; 2011, 2014), director of AME and the 
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Synthesis Center, introduced the concept of the atelier-laboratory as a research 
environment modeled on the artists’ studio (Sha, 2011) and the general idea of art as 
research.  I explored this and considered various ways art practice could be seen as 
research practice (Bolt, 2006; Hockey, 2003; Maarit, 2007; Seago & Dunne, 1999; G. 
Sullivan, 2006). Naturally these approaches have differences, but they share the 
perspective that the artistic practice provides a unique and valuable way of generating 
new knowledge and that the artifacts of these practices can provide a “a method for 
collecting and preserving information and understanding” (Maarit, 2007, p. 1). Sullivan 
(G. Sullivan, 2006) emphasizes a fundamental concern about arts practice as research: 
“A positivist legacy expounded so clearly as a research maxim or a mantra 
curriculum asserts, if you don’t know where you’re going, how do you know when 
you get there? The assumption is that clearly defined intentions, whether 
expressed as hypotheses, research questions, lesson objectives, or standard 
statements, position the purpose of educational acts within the context of what is 
already known”  
Sullivan identifies this perspective as one that inherently limits the possible range 
of types of knowledge that can be generated by the research. He goes on to ask: 
 “But, how do we construct theories of ‘possibility’? An arts researcher would 
more than likely subscribe to the view that if you don't know where you are 
going, then any road will get you there. Rather than seeing inquiry as a linear 
procedure or an enclosing process, research acts can also be interactive and 
reflexive whereby imaginative insight is constructed from a creative and critical 
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practice. Oftentimes what is known can limit the possibility of what is not and this 
requires a creative act to see things from a new view. 
I embraced this perspective and began my own process of reflecting on my own 
creative process and products. For a while I focused on the relations between the 
traditional computational and material computational dimensions of my work. I was 
interested in physical-digital systems in which there was a strong, mutually dependent 
fusion between the physical and computational aspects of the system. I labeled these 
systems ‘computational objects’. In systems of this nature, if either the computational or 
physical aspects of the system could be removed or altered without fundamentally 
altering the remaining part of the system, then I did not consider it a computational 
object.  
For another phase of this exploratory research I looked at my systems as relations 
between sensors and motors. This paradigm encompassed both machine and human 
sensorimotor systems and looked at the topologies of these systems. I focused attention 
on the varying aspects that defined the relations between sensorimotor components and 
how changing these relationships fundamentally changed the nature of the systems. 
 The problem I kept running into with these lines of investigation was the problem 
of how to constrain the scope of the research without reducing the complexity and 
accompanying richness of the systems I was drawn to think about. Starting from the 
media systems themselves, I found exponentially expanding ways of investigating their 
nature. It was only by consciously reversing my research process, stepping back from 
these systems and turning my attention to philosophical and theoretical texts that I began 
to get a handle on a focused way to progress in my research. The difference is subtle, but 
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prior to this, I had turned to literature as a way to find theoretical support for the creative 
work I was intrinsically motivated to produce. At this point I was instead reading the 
literature for itself and slowly began finding ways in which what I was reading seemed to 
be referring to my projects. By reading this way, the literature became the foundation of 
the research, not a theoretical justification for my media systems.  
I present this history of my search for a definition of my research to set the stage 
for an understanding not only of the abductive methodological approach I ultimately used 
for this dissertation, but importantly to emphasize why I did not pursue the work through 
alternate methodologies. Traditional inductive scientific studies were not attractive 
because they would have required looking at the work in a simplified form that would not 
accurately represent the essence of the work as I conceived it. The material of my 
research, the philosophical material and the process and products my media production 
that I consider in light of these texts, did not lend themselves to alternative subjective 
methodologies such as the systematic application of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 
2009). The material that constitutes my subject of research is not clearly bounded and 
amenable to a systematic axial coding as I understand a grounded theory methodology 
requires.  
In the research presented in this document I define the materiality of my practice, 
which emerges through an analysis of my photographic documentation, software, 
electronics and tangible products, and present aspects of materiality as a lens though 
which to view other systems. These systems include the biological and technical systems 
that are the topics of the foundational literature, as well as the cultural systems of 
industrial and artisanal makers, media culture and other intangible systems. I emphasize 
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that the point of observation from which I present any of this content is but one of 
manifold points of observation. It is impossible for me to present this work from every 
point of observation and dilutes the value of the work if I try to approach the work from 
too many points of observation. To the degree that it is possible, I will declare the point 
of observation from which I’m considering the subject matter as the research is presented, 
but it is important to note that this point of observation can never truly be a singular, 
concrete point. It will always to some degree be manifold and in flux. My objective is to 
provide the reader with an enriched understanding of the theoretical content I present by 
illustrating these theories significantly from the points of observation of my personal 
paradigm and practice.  
I identify my research as a ‘paradigm construction project’. This identification 
emphasizes the dynamic nature of observation. I intend, through my presentation of this 
research, to promote active reflection on how we see things and to encourage active 
reconstitution of our paradigms to generate the worlds we want to experience.  
I employ an abductive research methodology in the conduction of the research 
documented in this dissertation. Abductive reasoning, which is the foundation of 
abductive research, can be illustrated with the following example from Pierce (1935):  
Rule: All the beans from this bag are white. 
Result: These beans are white.  
∴Case: These beans are from this bag (Peirce et al., 1935, vol. 2.623) 
This canonical example illustrates that this form of logic does not operate in the 
way we typically think of logic. There is no claim of truth implied in the conclusion. In 
fact, a layman’s term appropriate for describing this logic is ‘guessing’ (Patokorpi, 2009). 
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In scientific practice, abductive reasoning is a form of logic that is typically applied for 
theory creation, not theory testing. Importantly, it does not require complete knowledge, 
as is required by deductive logic, and does not require the control of variables required by 
inductive testing. Instead it operates as a practical approach to forming theories in 
complex systems in which all the factors can never be known or fully controlled and in 
which there likely is no single truth (Patokorpi, 2009).  
Josephson and Josephson (1996) explain one of the powers of abduction,  
“abductions are ampliative inferences; that is, at the end of an abductive process, 
having accepted a best explanation, we may have more information than we had 
before. The abduction transcends the information of its premises and generates 
new information that was not previously encoded there at all” (Josephson & 
Josephson, 1996, p. 10). 
 Josephson and Josephson (1996) continue, “Whereas valid deductive inferences 
cannot contain terms in their conclusions that do not occur in their premises, abductions 
can “interpret” the given data in a new vocabulary. Abductions can thus make the leap 
from “observation language” to “theory language” (Josephson & Josephson, 1996, p. 
10). 
A very important characteristic of abduction applied as a research methodology is 
what Josephson and Josephson call ‘emergent certainty’, “that is, the conclusion of an 
abduction can have, and be deserving of, more certainty than any of its premises” 
(Josephson & Josephson, 1996, p. 13). This is essential in the way I apply this 
methodology to my subject matter. I identify many patterns and parallels in the language 
and systems that I consider. Any of these individual associations could be considered 
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relatively weak or the product of chance, but collectively they add up to a strong 
abductive argument.  
I observed, when I first read Peirce’s (1935) example of abductive reasoning, that 
this is how many magic tricks work. Our expectations cause us to see things in a way that 
we are surprised by. As I describe in the introduction to this document, Wittgenstein 
(1953) draws our attention to this experience of perception, noting that when we see 
something, we always “see it as” something. From this perspective, there is no truth to be 
observed, so the abductive approach is not flawed. In fact abduction is important for 
diagnosis (Josephson & Josephson, 1996, pp. 6–9), industrial network research (Dubois 
& Gadde, 2002), human-computer interaction studies (Patokorpi, 2009), implementations  
of neural networks (Abdelbar, Andrews, & Wunsch, 2003), and in Bayesian networks 
(Galán & Mengshoel, 2009), to cite just a few applications.  
 In my research, following the abductive method, I see existing theories and 
philosophies as a rule. I observe commonalities between the features of the systems 
considered in these theories and philosophies and the features of the systems of 
experiential media production and products. I conclude from the rule and observations 
that the experiential media systems are “from the same bag” as the systems on which the 
theories and philosophies of structural determinism and technical objects are founded. 
Considered at this simplified level which reduces all the incremental stages of this logical 
inference to a single step produces a result that may seem tautological. In practical terms, 
this logical flow, as applied to my research, is much more nuanced and iterative. It is only 
through the accumulative evidence of many inferential relations that the strength of the 
theory emerges. I also remind the reader that this paradigm production is a dynamic 
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process in which I see one philosophy or theory as another, and see my material practice 
and products as instantiations of these philosophies and theories. My material practice 
and products in turn affect how I see the philosophies and theories when I return to them. 
These statements should be read with Wittgenstein’s (1953) theory of “seeing it as”, 
which I introduced in my introduction, in mind. Through this process I generate 
questions; questions that may inspire new ways of seeing and inventing experiential 
media systems and suggest new ways of seeing systems in general, including social and 
cultural systems. 
In the early stage of this research, I was not seeing my making process and 
products as instantiations of theories and philosophies. It was the other way around; I was 
seeing these theories and philosophies as instantiations of my creative work. When I 
came across theories of structural coupling (Maturana, 2002) and recurrent causality 
(Simondon, 1958) I viewed these ideas through the lens of my haptic systems, and the 
philosophies of GaLLaG (Game as Life and Life as Game) systems (Lee, Garduño, 
Walker, & Burleson, 2013). Theories of structural determinism were seen in light of my 
experiences as a sculptor and in terms of my material computation approaches to media 
systems. 
Thesis Statements 
My research methodology is not designed to test, but rather to generate theory 
based on the available information. These statements were not starting points for this 
research. They are a consequence of the research and included here to offer the reader 
anchor points for a few of the core concepts discussed in this dissertation. This list is by 
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no means a comprehensive list of all the theory generated in this document, but 
represents some of the major points.  
Thesis 1: Maturana’s foundational theories of autopoiesis apply to Simondon’s 
theories of mechanology (Maturana, 2002; Simondon, 1958). 
Thesis 2: Experiential media systems are a class of technical objects as defined by 
Simondon (Simondon, 1958). 
Thesis 3: Making is a form of structural coupling and subject to the same rules as 
all structurally determined systems. (Maturana, 1987, 2002). 
Thesis 4: Artistic, aesthetic and other conceptual information may be constructed 
in cognizing individuals as a result of structural coupling with systems external to 
themselves. 
Thesis 5: The organizational dynamics (or technicalities) of systems should 
include a consideration of thesis 4 when the system’s plurivalence or plurifunctionality is 
assessed (Simondon, 1958, p. 87). (In less precise terms: Conceptual as well as physical 
functions should be considered when the multiplicities of functions of a form or material 
are assessed.) 
This concludes my discussion of my research methodology. I presented a history 
of my search for a cohesive and appropriately scoped research project to contextualize 
my choice of research methodology. I emphasized the functional and experiential 
complexity of the systems I developed and argued that these characteristics were an 
essential part of their nature and that if they were reduced to simpler systems for 
evaluation, they would not be the same systems; therefore methodologies requiring a 
strict constraint or coding of variables were inappropriate for evaluating these systems. I 
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described abductive reasoning, presented examples of how it is used in science and 
research domains, and emphasized some of the strengths of this form of logical inference. 
I showed how this form of reasoning would apply to my research to reveal interrelations 
between philosophical theories of natural and technical objects and the products and 
processes of my media practice. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The survey of related people and projects that I present here is far from 
comprehensive but it is focused and should serve as a highly practical resource for 
readers and for my own ongoing research. I will introduce the theoretical and 
philosophical scholars that I directly reference throughout this dissertation as well as 
additional intellectuals whose work and philosophies relates to my subject matter, 
including anthropologists, sociologists and artists. Finally, I will provide a thorough 
introduction to the theory and application of haptics, including a review of related 
theories of perception. 
 Several of the philosophers and theorists that are central to my work are 
relatively unknown outside of specific regions and domains. Simondon in particular is 
difficult because of the lack of translations of his work. I will do my best to provide 
enough introduction and connections to provide readers a point of access for these more 
obscure, but important, thinkers. In this background section, I will not provide significant 
details of the theoretical stances of the authors that I extensively cite in the remainder of 
this document.  
 This background will not only serve to provide a general understanding of the 
conceptual terrain of the document, but significantly, will help to define the observational 
points of the research. The observation points of the artist, the philosopher and the maker 
will all be more fully established through the contents of this chapter. I include myself as 
a key observer in this dissertation, but here am specifically emphasizing all the observers 
other than myself, whose points of observation are revealed through their creative work.     
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I will begin with an introduction of the theorists and philosophers that constitute 
the theoretical foundation of this research. This introduction will include Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Humberto Maturana, Gilbert Simondon, David Pye, Richard Sennett and 
Michael Reddy. The next section will introduce anthropologists, sociologists and artists 
whose work is not directly referenced elsewhere in this research but is critical to its 
existence. Following this will be an extended section focusing on haptic information and 
perceptual fusion of multimodal information. Haptics are a key element in several of my 
media systems and this background section will be essential to contextualize that 
dimension of my work in preparation for later discussions of these systems. Integral to 
the discussion of haptics is a consideration of the experiential impact of our multiplicity 
of sensory modes.  
Philosophical Foundations 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953), who is primarily identified as a philosopher, was 
born in Vienna, Austria-Hungary in 1889 into an extremely wealthy, but troubled family. 
He gave away his fortune and pursued numerous career paths other than philosophy. His 
philosophical career, to the extent that it could be called a career, was framed by the two 
world wars. In spite of his prolific writing, he was not a well published writer in his 
lifetime but his posthumously published Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 
1953) is considered a modern classic work of philosophy (Wikipedia, 2015f). His 
philosophy that I express in shorthand as "seeing it as" (Wittgenstein, 1953, pp. 194, 195, 
202, 213), is fundamental to my dissertation. The proposition that anything that we 
perceive is always perceived as something, is simple on the surface but has tremendous 
  30 
ramifications. My paradigm construction project explicitly operates with the knowledge 
that what we see something as is always in flux and never singular.  
Humberto Maturana (2002) provides way of seeing the mechanics of 
Wittgenstein's "seeing it as" philosophy. Maturana was born in 1928, in Santiago, Chile. 
He is identified as a biologist, cyberneticist, and philosopher. He is famous for the theory 
of autopoiesis, which describes what it is about a system that makes it a living system: a 
system of self-creation. Underlying this larger theory is the theory of structurally 
determined systems, which play a key role in my paradigm construction project. I 
emphasize the fundamental elements of structurally determined systems and structural 
coupling, relating these elements to technical objects (Simondon, 1958). Maturana went 
on to evolve his theories into biologically based explanations of cognitive processes. He 
argues, “Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of 
cognition. This statement is valid for all organisms, with or without a nervous system” 
(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 13). 
Gilbert Simondon (1958) was a French philosopher, born in 1924, making him a 
contemporary of Maturana. His broad philosophical topic is individuation. I studied his 
"minor dissertation" On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, which focuses on 
mechanology or the science of machines. He defines technical objects in terms of their 
genesis, describing cycles of specialization, internal unification and convergence into 
ensembles, providing rich insights into the nature of technology and its existence as a 
core component of human culture. Miguel de Beistegui (2005) describes the ontological 
challenge that Simondon’s philosophy addresses: 
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In the light of the event of science, philosophy must avoid a twofold trap: namely 
that of philosophising without taking into account the challenge of science for 
thought; and that of subordinating philosophical thought to scientific procedures 
and ‘‘facts.’’ In other words, it can be a question of neither blissfully ignoring 
such a challenge, nor turning it into the sole measure of thought and an 
unquestionable paradigm. The task, rather, consists in setting a new ambition for 
philosophical thought against the background of the event of contemporary 
science. It is a question, in short, of allowing thought to advance in and through a 
genuine dialogue with science. (Beistegui, 2005) 
De Beistegui’s (2005) consideration of the relation of scientific paradigm with 
philosophical ontology compares the perspectives of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
Simondon (Beistegui, 2005). De Boever (2012) describes the paradoxically close and 
distant relationship between the two philosophers, 
Simondon was Merleau-Ponty’s doctoral student. Simondon’s monumental 
doctoral thesis, however, does not reveal any traces of influence on the part of 
Merleau-Ponty. And Merleau-Ponty’s comments on Simondon amount to 
virtually nothing. Does this mean that the two approaches are incompatible? Such 
would seem to be the case: where Merleau-Ponty insists that philosophical 
questioning be rooted in perception, and finds his impetus as well as his method 
in Husserlian phenomenology, Simondon simply ignores phenomenology. Yet a 
closer look at Merleau-Ponty’s later thought, which aims to overcome the 
Cartesian dualism still present in Husserl, reveals a certain proximity to 
Simondon’s problematic of pre-individual being. (De Boever, 2012) 
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Limited publication and translation of Simondon’s work constrained its reach 
within his lifetime. His work is gaining attention; new publications and translations of his 
work are emerging and many articles make reference to his philosophy. A Google 
Scholar search for “Gilbert Simondon” with the search limited to results since 2011 
shows about 1,490 results. Limiting this search to English results only reduces the 
number to about 684. While this is certainly not a vast number, and this is a crude, 
unscientific measure, within these results one finds plenty of evidence of energetic 
discussion of Simondon’s work. His work had an early and notable impact on Deleuze’s 
(1968, 1969, 2002) thinking. “Simondon's theory of individuation through transduction in 
a metastable environment was an important influence on the thought of Gilles Deleuze, 
whose Différence et répétition (1968), Logique du sens (1969) and L'île déserte (2002) 
make explicit reference to Simondon's work” (Wikipedia, 2015e). 
David Pye (1968) is an unusual figure amidst the philosophers and scientists 
featured in this document. He is a highly articulate theorist and his work provides an 
important point of observation to relate to those of Simondon (1958) and Maturana 
(2002), but he is also a highly respected artist and craftsman (though he has something to 
say about the latter term and proposes an alternative phrase). Pye lived from 1914 –1993. 
He grew up in a family with historical connections to the Arts and Crafts movement. His 
aunt, father and great-uncle all had vocations and/or hobbies involving craft and making. 
Pye trained as an architect but ultimately turned his talents to commercial furniture 
design and artistic production of wooden objects, particularly carved and turned bowls 
and boxes. His theory of design, particularly his concept of the ‘workmanship of risk’ 
(discussed later in this document) grew out of his material practice, his teaching of 
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furniture design at the Royal College of Art, and his philosophical reflection (Frost, 1993; 
Wikipedia, 2014b).  
I cite Richard Sennett’s (2008) book The Craftsman (2008), in my introduction to 
my chapter focused on determining structure (chapter 6). This book is one of three he 
wrote in which a consideration of Homo faber (man as maker) plays an important role in 
understanding society (Sennett, 2008, 2011, 2012). Sennett’s early career aspiration was 
as a cellist and conductor (Wikipedia, 2015h). This training and experience as an artist 
clearly informed his later work as a sociologist. This influence is expressed in his use of 
musical performance examples in his discussions of craft. While I don’t extensively 
explore Sennett’s theories in my dissertation, his work played a pivotal role in the course 
of my research. My woodworking professor, Tom Eckert (2015) assigned The Craftsman 
as mandatory reading. He recognized that craft extended far beyond techniques, 
aesthetics or anything nostalgic, and represented a philosophy and way of being. I read 
this book while doing the primary physical fabrication of my Vox Curio instrument. 
Doing so primed my thoughts for the philosophy I would explore in the development of 
this dissertation.  
Michael Reddy (1979) was identified as a linguist at the time he wrote The 
conduit metaphor: A case of frame conflict in our language about language. In this brief 
but highly influential article, Reddy identifies how the structure of our language 
reinforces what he considers to be a logically untenable metaphor of communication 
(Reddy, 1979). I discuss this theory and his proposed alternative in depth later in this 
document so I will not repeat it here. The most interesting thing about Reddy as an 
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academic figure is that beyond this single document, he is virtually non-existent. He 
changed careers several times and now is a therapist, wellness coach and author. 
Cultural and Artistic Perspectives 
My paradigm construction project, particularly in the way that I consider the 
creation and use of tools, can be seen in terms of anthropological and sociological 
research. Simondon (1958), whose philosophy is central to my project, sees the technical 
as playing an essential intermediary role in human culture (Simondon, 1958). Franz Boas 
(Bashkow, 2004; Wikipedia, 2015d), Émile Durkheim (Durkheim, 2014; Wikipedia, 
2015c), and Claude Lévi-Strauss (Lévi-Strauss, 2008; Wikipedia, 2015b) provide 
foundational insights into material objects and culture and show how they are 
dialectically created. 
The theories expressed by Franz Boas (Bashkow, 2004; Wikipedia, 2015d) have 
important parallels to Simondon’s (Simondon, 1958) views of how culture is shaped. 
Both see integrative and diffusive forces continuously at play (Bashkow, 2004; 
Simondon, 1958). Bashkow (2004) describes the Boasian perspective, “First, it was 
axiomatic to the Boasians that cultural boundaries were porous and permeable. Boasian 
anthropologists, whatever their differences, did not conceptualize cultural boundaries as 
walls or barriers to external influence” (Bashkow, 2004, p. 445). This view aligns with 
Maturana’s (2002) and Varela’s (1978) understanding of structurally determined systems 
as organizationally closed but interactionally open (Maturana, 2002; Varela & Goguen, 
1978). 
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1958/2008) formulated a structuralist view of anthropology, 
arguing that mental and social structures, of which we are generally unaware, shape 
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human culture and that these structures are shared broadly by humanity (Lévi-Strauss, 
1958/2008; Wikipedia, 2015b, 2015i). This paradigm, which opened up new ways of 
considering humans and human culture, shares the foundations of theories of structural 
determinism (Maturana, 2002). 
Émile Durkheim’s (1893/2014) structural functionalist theories strongly 
influenced Lévi-Strauss (1958/2008). He looked for what unified and maintained the 
stability of societies. He said,  
For if society lacks the unity that derives from the fact that the relationships 
between its parts are exactly regulated, that unity resulting from the harmonious 
articulation of its various functions assured by effective discipline and if, in 
addition, society lacks the unity based upon the commitment of men's wills to a 
common objective, then it is no more than a pile of sand that the least jolt or the 
slightest puff will suffice to scatter. (Allan, 2005, p. 136) 
Unity, in this context, equates to viability. I discuss viability of natural and 
technical objects later in this document.  
Durkheim (1893/2014) states, “The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to 
the average members of a society forms a determinate system with a life of its own. It can 
be termed the collective or common consciousness” (Durkheim, 1893/2014, p. 63). This 
notion of society seen as a determinant system resonates with my project of seeing 
experiential media systems as structurally determined. 
In the upcoming section, Haptic Interface Technology, I highlight numerous 
researchers and artist who produce experiential media systems featuring haptic 
components. At the end of this current section on Associated Philosophy and Theory I 
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highlight three sculptors who produce works significantly dependent on materiality as a 
key aspect of their conceptual and experiential impact. I identify this use of material as 
implicitly expressing philosophical theory. Many additional artists and craftspeople could 
be fruitfully referenced here. I select these three because of the clarity of the examples 
they provide and because of the personal resonance I feel with these fellow artists. Tim 
Hawkinson’s (2007) and Tom Friedman’s (Applin, 2008) work both exhibit a fusion of 
physical and conceptual functionality through their media choices and application of this 
media in their sculptures. Ned Kahn’s (Mather, 2006) work helps to illustrate Maturana’s 
(Maturana, 2002) theories of structurally determined systems.  
Tim Hawkinson’s (2007) sculptures frequently represent the human figure, but in 
forms and materials that are far from traditional. His works emphasize aspects of 
materiality in ways that generate a poetic dialog between the visual forms and culturally 
defined associations. He utilizes the elasticity of latex rubber to produce his Balloon Self-
Portrait. In this piece he creates a full body life cast of his own body, inflates the 
resulting rubber skin and suspends it from the ceiling. Areas of the rubber skin with less 
complex structures, such as the torso, readily inflate while the remaining areas remain 
closer to original proportions, producing a strangely distorted figure with a very real 
internal pressure and skin tension. Another sculpture, Self-Portrait (Height Determined 
by Weight), is simply a lead casting of the artist’s feet and most of his calves. In the same 
way that cubism may draw our attention to dynamism and multiple points of observation, 
Hawkinson’s sculptures, mechanisms and installations elicit questions of temporality, 
materiality and the nature of the human body.  
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Tom Friedman (Applin, 2008) also challenges our preconceptions and invites 
socially driven meaning with his innovative repurposing of everyday materials. He carves 
micro scale figurative sculpture out of aspirin tablets, makes snow angels in circular piles 
of laundry detergent and generates formal, non-representational sculptures out of plastic 
cups and drinking straws. His work clearly owes something to the ready-mades and found 
object sculpture of earlier eras, but he manages to continue work in this tradition in a way 
that feels completely fresh and surprising. Any individual work by Friedman might come 
across as a one-liner, but the collective force of his work is far greater than the sum of the 
parts. Each work adds a piece to the puzzle and suggests a reconsideration of the 
previously viewed work. Both Friedman’s (Applin, 2008) and Hawkinson’s (Hawkinson 
et al., 2007) work inspire and illustrate my theory of conceptual plurifunctionality 
(Simondon, 1958). 
Ned Kahn (Mather, 2006) exploits materiality to produce systems that replicate or 
make perceptible naturally occurring phenomena such as weather events. His tornado 
systems are classic examples of his work. He configures the structure of the systems so 
that the desired organization of the system can manifest. Maturana (2002) uses the 
tornado as an example to explain the relations of structure and organization in structurally 
determined systems. Kahn recognizes that his work straddles scientific and artistic realms 
and doesn’t fully fit in either, but serves both. 
This concludes my introduction of key philosophers, theorist and artists that 
inform my dissertation project. The next section introduces theory and practical research 
related to haptic systems and perceptual experience.  
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The Haptic Channel and Perceptual Fusion of Multimodal Information 
The focused discussion of haptic systems and related perceptual topics in this 
section is important for contextualizing discussions of my Vox Curio musical instrument, 
which features multiple modes of haptic interaction. The concepts and specific research 
presented in this section also serve as examples for the upcoming discussions of 
structurally determined systems, structural coupling, technical objects and the nature of 
determining structure. I will make reference to some of these concepts in this background 
presentation. I do so knowing full well that I have not yet adequately introduced the terms 
and concepts, but feel it is better to draw the connections now, even if the full meaning 
may not emerge until the reader has progressed further in the document, rather than leave 
it to the reader to retrospectively make these connections.  
The Haptic Channel 
The importance of haptic information in our daily lives is undeniable but typically 
underappreciated. We likely take haptic information for granted to a much greater degree 
than we do our vision or hearing, both of which can be easily temporarily suppressed. 
Tactile, kinesthetic and proprioceptive senses, along with the motor control systems that 
are engaged when we interact with physical objects through touch are collectively 
described as the “haptic channel” (Hayward, Astley, Cruz-Hernandez, Grant, & Robles-
De-La-Torre, 2004). An important feature of the haptic channel is its two-way nature: it 
incorporates both sensing and actuation as mutually dependent and inextricably linked 
components. Sensing through touch is dramatically impoverished without motor 
engagement in a process Gibson (1962) calls “active touch” (Gibson, 1962). Likewise, 
motor movements are severely hampered without the sensing dimensions of the haptic 
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channel.  One need only attempt to tie one’s shoelaces while wearing gloves, or recall the 
experience of trying to drink a glass of water after one’s mouth has been numbed at a 
dentist’s office to begin to appreciate our dependence on haptic information for efficient 
and psychologically rich interactions with our environment. As more dimensions of our 
lives are augmented with computer-mediated interactions, the absence of tangible 
engagement with our virtual environments and media becomes an increasingly obvious 
void.  
The haptic channel may be subdivided in multiple ways to clarify the roles of its 
various components. First, the haptic channel may be split into sensing and motor-action 
components. Second, haptic feedback can be subdivided according to the specific 
bioreceptors and cognitive systems involved in the sensing process. Doing so results in 
the major categories of tactile feedback and kinesthetic/proprioceptive feedback. Tactile 
feedback may be further broken down into texture, temperature, shape, vibration, 
hardness, and other material properties.  
Kinesthetic/proprioceptive sensing involves the body in space and in motion. It 
includes the sense of the relative positions of individual body parts to others, the sense of 
the body in relation the external environment (particularly including the sense of balance) 
and the force required to move or to resist movement. Haptic interaction devices designed 
to engage the kinesthetic system are generally referred to as force feedback devices.  The 
distinctions between kinesthetic and proprioceptive senses, when recognized at all, are 
often debated and defined differently by different professionals in different fields of 
study. Stillman (2002) strives to provide common definitions and describes kinesthesia as 
a component of the proprioceptive sense (Stillman, 2002). When the distinction is 
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relevant to the discussion, the terms kinesthesia and proprioception (and their derivative 
forms) will be carefully selected. In broader discussion where the distinction is not 
significant, the more inclusive term proprioception will be used. 
Properties such as weight and shape that involve muscular activation and changes 
in the configuration of the body (e.g. closing one’s hand around a ball) may be 
considered tactile or kinesthetic. This classification may depend on the scale of the 
movements, the hierarchical importance of the various sensing receptors involved and the 
source of one’s definition for these classifications. The point is that these subdivisions 
have blurry lines in natural interaction with the physical world. We receive information 
simultaneously from many sources and combine and integrate this information (Ernst & 
Bülthoff, 2004) to arrive at perceptions of our environment. 
Tactile information frequently is transmitted through direct skin contact with the 
sensed object, but direct contact is not a requirement. Tactile information may be 
received through indirect contact, such as touching a surface with a tool or probe. 
Merleau-Ponty’s example of the blind man’s cane is relevant here: 
 The blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer 
perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the 
scope and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel to sight. (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962, p. 165) 
 The nature of the tool may even reveal information that is not perceptible with 
direct skin contact. An example of this is the detection of fine cracks in a surface by 
probing with a sharp pointed tool. The tool tip will drop into the void of the crack, 
producing a resistance or impulse that is transmitted through the tool to the hand of the 
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user. This principle of receiving haptic information through indirect contact is key to the 
functionality of computer haptic feedback devices. We are able to perceive virtual 
information in tangible terms through intermediate devices.   
Motor-action is the component of the haptic channel involving the physical 
exploration and/or manipulation of the environment with our body. As will be described 
in more depth in an upcoming section, sensing and motor-action are naturally coupled 
and complementary. One might appropriately argue that any physical manipulation of our 
environment with our body is a haptic interaction, making a standard computer mouse a 
haptic interaction device. Strictly speaking this line of reasoning is perfectly valid. 
Moving the mouse and clicking the buttons results in kinesthetic and tactile information, 
however this information is solely dependent on the actions of the user. Clicking a mouse 
with no connection to a computer provides the same haptic experience as clicking on an 
icon that launches an application. This is not to discount the value of haptic information 
that results from the physical properties of the interaction device (e.g. typing on a 
mechanical keyboard is substantially different that typing on a flat touch screen).  
This brief introduction has highlighted tactile perception, proprioception and 
motor action as components of the haptic channel. While there is value in considering 
each of these components individually to better understand the details of how they 
function, it is more important for the purposes of this research to focus on how they work 
together. The next section will do just that: introducing the concept of “active touch”. 
Active Touch 
Intuitively, there is a significant difference between actively exploring the texture, 
shape, and other material properties of an object through intentional interaction with that 
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object and a passive transmission of this same information without agency or independent 
control of the touch experience. Researchers (individually cited in the upcoming 
examples) have defined, classified and quantified these differences, validating our 
intuitive understanding of these different forms of haptic experience. 
I draw attention at this point in this introduction of haptic interaction to the main 
topic of this dissertation: seeing systems as structurally determined. As has been touched 
on in previous sections and will be elaborated on in the main body of this dissertation, 
systems may be seen as structurally determined, “that is a system in which all that 
happens with it and to it is determined at every instant by the way it is made (its 
structure) at that instant (Maturana, 2002, pp. 5–6). The concepts of such a system being 
‘organizationally closed’ and ‘interactionally open’ (Maturana, 2002; Varela & Goguen, 
1978) are helpful in appreciating the upcoming discussion which requires a defined 
interiority and exteriority for the perceiving individuals. 
Gibson (1962) introduces the concept of active touch, differentiating “being 
touched” from “touching”. He argues, and presents evidence to support the idea, that 
perception of objects through touch is dependent on a differentiation between what he 
terms exterospecific and propriospecific stimuli. Exterospecific stimuli are information 
whose source is external to the body. Propriospecific stimuli are information whose 
source is internal to the body. Actively scanning an object or environment through an 
active touching process presents both external stimuli and proprioceptive information. 
Through this process the observer is not cognizant of the patterns of stimulation, but 
rather, perceives the object itself. Passive presentation of the same object to the observer 
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(a researcher touching the observer’s hand with the object) results in an awareness of 
distinct stimuli, but minimal perception of the object as an object (Gibson, 1962).  
Gibson (1962) notes that performatory movements (active transformation of an 
object, by hand or with a tool) represent yet another class of haptic interaction and 
communication beyond that of the exploratory movements that were the subject of this 
research (Gibson, 1962). This notion of performatory movements foreshadows my 
discussion, later in this document, of making as a form of structural coupling. 
Fanselow and Nicolelis (1999) explore the topic of active touch at the 
neuroanatomical level. In their journal article, Behavioral Modulation of Tactile 
Responses in the Rat Somatosensory System, they demonstrate that the neural responses 
to stimulus are different when the rat is actively exploring an environment and when the 
rat is passive. Four levels of activity were investigated in this study. In these experiments, 
stimuli are delivered directly to nerve cells as brief electrical pulses. Responses are 
measured in populations of neurons via arrays of microwires implanted in the ventral 
posterior medial nucleus and the primary somatosensory cortex. Describing the 
motivation for the research, they refer to other studies indicating that, “… motor activity 
alters the characteristics of neural responses to tactile stimulation.” The findings of this 
research imply that active touch is not merely a higher level cognitive process involving 
attention and other factors that may influence perception, but that at the lowest neural 
stimulus-response level, voluntary motor activity influences the raw electrical 
information in the rat’s brain (Fanselow & Nicolelis, 1999). This research empirically 
demonstrates the interrelationships between the structure and the organization of an 
autopoetic (structurally determined) system (Maturana, 2002).  
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Two examples that I experienced first hand provide an opportunity to compare the 
experience of active touch and passive haptic feedback. The first example is an 
interactive system experienced several years ago in the Emerging Technologies venue at 
the SIGGRAPH (“SIGGRAPH,” 2015) conference (I have been unable to retroactively 
identify this system so it cannot be cited.). In this system the participant had small 
vibrotactile actuators attached to their index finger and thumb and were given an empty, 
clear, plastic box to hold between these fingers. A 3D rendering of the plastic box 
appeared on a small 2D video display in front of the participant. The virtual box moved 
to match the position and orientation of the physical box held by the participant. Next a 
virtual ball was dropped into the virtual plastic box displayed on the screen. The 
vibrotactile actuators energized in a synchronized response to the collisions of the virtual 
ball with the walls of the container. Simple audio feedback, replicating the acoustics of a 
ball in the plastic box, accompanied the vibrotactile feedback. The participant could tip 
the box, allowing the ball to roll from side to side and explore the resulting visual, sonic 
and haptic sensations. More virtual balls were added, increasing the complexity and 
density of feedback. Finally the participant was invited to dump all the balls out of the 
plastic box. It was remarkable how convincing the illusion was. It truly felt like physical 
balls were being added to the physical container. Most surprising was the sensation that 
the box weighed less after the virtual balls were dumped out. 
The second example from Emerging Technologies at SIGGRAPH in 2012 was 
called Ungrounded Haptic Rendering Device for Torque Simulation in Virtual Tennis 
(Teck, Ling, Farbiz, & Zhiyong, 2012). This system utilized solenoids attached to a real 
tennis racket to provide haptic feedback. Like the previous example a visual display was 
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used to show a virtual representation of the environment, in this case, a tennis court. 
Unlike the previous example this display was a large-screen, 3D image projection, 
utilizing head tracking to provide the appropriate perspective based on the participants 
location. The participant was instructed to hold the tennis racket out in front of them with 
the racquet face parallel to the ground. Virtual tennis balls were dropped onto the racket 
face, striking in the center and on the edges of the racket. High-quality sounds of these 
collisions accompanied the visual and haptic feedback, which generated torques 
consistent in angle, if not magnitude, with the simulated collisions. In spite of the rich 
multimedia feedback provided by the system I found the overall experience 
unconvincing, especially compared to the experience I had years earlier with the simple 
clear plastic box example described in the last paragraph. My first thought was that I had 
had more experience with haptic systems in the intervening years and that it was simply 
the novelty of the experience that have made it so convincing earlier. It was only upon 
further reflection that I realized the true problem. The tennis system did not allow any 
agency or active touch. One could only passively hold the racket and experience a preset 
feedback. There was no opportunity to alter the feedback by moving one’s hand up or 
down or rotating the racket to change the collisions with the balls as one could do in a 
real-life version of the same interaction. The lack of agency dramatically decreased the 
sense of immersion and realism in the haptic feedback.  
Visell and Cooperstock (Visell & Cooperstock, 2010) produced an unusual 
computer mediated haptic experience in their Haptic Floor project. The characteristic that 
makes this system unusual is that it is primarily interacted with through one’s feet. Most 
haptic systems prioritize the hands and arms for interaction. The system they produced 
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renders convincing haptic illusions of walking on a variety of surfaces (e.g. sand, 
cracking ice). It does so by sensing the force on the floor surface then replicating the 
physical reaction forces through a Lorentz force type inertial motor. They model the 
physics of the surfaces as fracture mechanics systems and actuate the physical surface of 
the floor in real time based on the measured force from the participant and the state of the 
physical model (Visell & Cooperstock, 2010). Vibrotactile haptic systems are often 
included as features of theme park entertainment systems, arcade video games and other 
similar systems, but these typically only produce predefined or minimally varied 
sensations regardless of the active interaction of the participant. What sets the Haptic 
Floor apart from these systems is the role of active touch. The participant has agency and 
can actively explore the virtual surface on which they are walking.  
The observation that an active touch is different than passively received energy 
implies that the structure and organization of the perceiving individual is different when 
they are in an active state, thereby changing the structural changes they experience as a 
result of their structural coupling with systems external to themselves. 
The discussion of active touch has emphasized the importance of volitional 
control of one’s motor actions in the acquisition of haptic information. This implies a 
process by which raw sensory data from multiple sources (e.g. tactile receptors in one’s 
foot, muscle tension in one’s leg and a sense of balance and motion from one’s inner ear) 
is somehow joined together to form a cohesive perception. The following section 
considers perceptual fusion. 
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Perceptual Fusion of Multimodal Information 
The phrase “perceptual fusion of multimodal information” is used as an explicit 
way of defining the topic of how humans derive meaning from varying sensory channels. 
I use the term ‘information’ in this context as an abbreviated reference to the energy 
signals, the structural changes in the individual that these energy signals lead to, and the 
cognitive interpretation of these changes that takes place. I present a fuller examination of 
information later in this document, in a discussion on paradigms of communication 
(Reddy, 1979), and through discussions of structural coupling (Maturana, 2002).   
The subject matter of this section is often discussed in the literature as “sensor 
fusion”, however the phrase “sensor fusion” can also refer to, among other things, the 
mathematical combination of electronic sensor data. The subject is introduced here with 
an emphasis on human perception, and although the research from cognitive science, 
psychology and physiology has inspired, informed and been validated through its 
application to artificial intelligence systems and robotics, the primary focus of the 
research here is with regard to human perception and action. The phrases “perceptual 
fusion of multimodal information” and “sensor fusion” will be used interchangeably in 
this text, largely based on the terminology used by the authors referenced herein, but will 
consistently refer to human perceptual processes as described above unless specifically 
stated to the contrary.  
Perceptual fusion of multimodal information is not unique to haptics, which has 
been the focus up to this point. The concept applies broadly to all varieties of media and 
perceptual experiences. Perceptual fusion of multimodal information describes the 
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connections created in our mind between two or more forms of sensory information, such 
as visual information and sonic information. 
Murphy (1994) presents a model of sensor fusion based on prior research from the 
fields of cognitive science, neuroscience and artificial intelligence. Murphy proposes that 
sensor fusion can be explained as a perceptual schema (Murphy, 1994). A perceptual 
schema is generally defined as “A structured internal representation of an object or image 
acquired through perception” (Colman, 2012). Murphy emphasizes the significance of the 
relationships between perceptual schema and motor schema, or the actions that occur in 
relation to the perceived phenomena. Murphy’s model of sensor fusion also proposes that 
sensor fusion requires not only simple mathematical combinations of sensory information 
but also evidential reasoning regarding the reliability and significance of individual 
sensory channels in varying contexts (Murphy, 1994). The structured representations that 
Murphy and Colman propose can be seen as a consequence of the structure of a 
structurally determined system. 
Ernst and Bülthoff (2004) separate the sensory fusion process into two types: 
combination and integration. They state, “‘Sensory combination’ describes interactions 
between sensory signals that are not redundant. That is, they may be in different units, 
coordinate systems, or about complementary aspects of the same environmental 
property.” Ernst and Bülthoff continue, “‘sensory integration’ describes interactions 
between redundant signals. That is, to be integrated, the sensory estimates must be in the 
same units, the same coordinates and about the same aspect of the environmental 
property.” Sensory information that has been combined can be then integrated to form a 
single cohesive percept of the environment or object. An important concept described in 
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Ernst and Bülthoff’s article is a Bayesian “perception-action loop”. This loop 
incorporates prior knowledge about the sensed environment and emphasizes the mutually 
dependent dimensions of sensing, perception and action (Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004). This 
perception-action loop parallels Gibson’s (1962) concept of “active touch”. I note here 
the Bayesian inference and remind the reader that this process is abductive (Galán & 
Mengshoel, 2009). 
Helbig and Ernst (2007) confirm the automatic nature of bimodal sensory 
integration in a series of experiments in which participants estimated proportions of 
objects through visual and haptic inspection. They demonstrate that even in cases in 
which one sensory modality is available but explicitly excluded in the participant 
instructions, the excluded modality is not functioning completely independently and still 
significantly biases the perception of the object. They also find that sensory fusion is 
rarely complete but instead operates on a continuum. Only in cases in which the sensory 
information from both sources is completely congruent would they expect to find 
complete fusion.  A key factor in promoting this sensory integration is a priori knowledge 
(or belief) that the source of the sensory information is the same source (Helbig & Ernst, 
2007). 
Specifically considering the perceptual fusion of audio and haptic data, Bresciani 
et al. (2005) demonstrate that audio signals can affect haptic perception, but only if the 
auditory signal occurs within a sufficiently small temporal window so as to make it 
cognitively cohesive with the haptic stimulus (Bresciani et al., 2005). This demonstrates 
an application of the theory described by Murphy (1994, 1996): sensory information is 
fused, producing a biasing effect when the evidence logically supports it, but the 
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conflicting sensor data is disregarded when it does not. This finding is consistent with 
Helbig and Ernst’s (2007) theory of the role of knowledge of a common source. As the 
temporal difference between information received in separate sensory modalities 
increases, the observer’s belief in the unified source diminishes (Helbig & Ernst, 2007).  
Robles-De-La-Torre & Hayward (2001) provide further and surprising evidence 
about the nature of the perceptual fusion of sensory information acquired through active 
touch (Gibson, 1962). They demonstrate that force cues (information from muscles 
regarding resistance to motion as a finger is moved across a surface) can supersede the 
kinesthetic information that describes the geometry of the surface. Simply described, they 
produce the illusion of a bump when the actively explored geometry was actually a hole 
and vice versa by providing force cues for the opposite geometry (Robles-De-La-Torre & 
Hayward, 2001). This example of sensory fusion in which one information source can 
induce a contradictory perception in another sensory modality and mask the true nature of 
the object illustrates the complexity of the cognitive process and the potential for creative 
applications of multimodal interactive systems. In naturally occurring environments such 
perceptual illusions are less common, but computer control of multimodal feedback as an 
augmentation of reality provides the opportunity for enhanced and entirely new 
experiences. These experiments emphasize the organizational closure of structurally 
determined systems (Maturana, 2002; Varela & Goguen, 1978) and the inherent 
challenges of what we consider information transfer (Reddy, 1979) through structural 
coupling (Maturana, 2002). 
Kevin O’Regan (2011) extends the concept of active touch to all perception in his 
sensorimotor approach to explaining perception. His theory is based on psychological and 
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physiological studies that demonstrate that our perception is not fundamentally 
determined by the sensory stimuli, but by how our experience of this stimuli predictably 
changes with our active bodily engagement with the stimuli (O’Regan, 2011). O’Regan 
emphasizes, citing Ned Block (1995), that consciousness is “Being Conscious of 
Something”. This directly parallels Wittgenstein’s (Wittgenstein, 1953) claim that when 
ever we see something, we always see it as something.  
From the perspective of structurally determined systems, haptic interaction and 
perceptual fusion of multimodal information can be seen as structural coupling. With 
haptic interaction, structural coupling is readily understandable because of the inherent 
tangibility implicit in haptic interaction. Perceptual fusion of multimodal information 
involves a wider range of energetic modes, but is still explainable in terms of structural 
determinism. Extended discussions of structural coupling, information and 
communication in the upcoming chapters of this document may make this argument 
clearer, but it is not the focus of this research.  
Stimulus-Response compatibility. Structural coupling between structurally 
determined systems depends on an interactional compatibility between the systems. In 
psychophysical and human-computer interaction research, the phrase ‘stimulus-response 
compatibility’ (S-R) is used when considering such relationships. 
The earliest use of the phrase ‘stimulus-response compatibility’ was (as nearly as 
I can determine) in the paper by Fitts and Seeger in 1953 (1953). They offer this 
definition of S-R compatibility, “A task involves compatible S-R relations to the extent 
that the ensemble of stimulus and response combinations comprising the task results in a 
high rate of information transfer.” The study described in this paper focuses on the 
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relationship between the spatial characteristics of the visual display of information (the 
stimulus) and a spatial motor response to that stimulus. They found that in terms of 
response time and error rate, performances were better when the spatial relationships of 
the stimuli and the required responses aligned. The theory that they provide to explain 
this is that correspondences arise from our everyday interactions in the natural world and 
that limited experiences in any particular interaction environment will always be 
influenced by the cumulative effects of all those external experiences. They describe the 
relationship between the experimental conditions and the natural world conditions as 
interacting probability functions, with a stronger weighting produced by the probability 
from the natural world (Fitts & Seeger, 1953). Norman’s (1988) seminal work, The 
Psychology of Everyday Things presents and extended look at the natural world 
interactions that Fitts and Seeger attribute to the S-R compatibility effects they observed 
(Fitts & Seeger, 1953; Norman, 1988).  
Akamatsu et al. (1995) found that a haptic feedback condition provided a 
significant performance increase in a computer mouse target acquisition task compared to 
alternative feedback conditions. They compared normal (visual position feedback only), 
auditory, color, tactile and combined feedback. Specifically they found that users selected 
targets faster with tactile feedback. Akamatsu et al. conclude with an important guiding 
principle for the design of human-machine interfaces: the principle of Stimulus-Response 
(SR) compatibility. They state, “Tactile feedback for motor responses maintains SR 
compatibility and should be encouraged whenever its integration into the human-machine 
interface is possible.” In the simplest terms, SR compatibility describes the compatibility 
between perceived information and action required based on that information. They note 
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that even though the selection time difference in these tests were relatively small, they 
did not expect a large difference given the simplicity of the task tested and speculate that 
the performance increases would be significantly magnified in more complex interactive 
tasks (Akamatsu et al., 1995). Performing control gestures with a musical instrument, 
such as my Vox Curio instrument, described later in this document, is exactly the type of 
complex interactive task that is likely to benefit from high SR compatibility in the 
interface design. 
Hasbroucq et al. (1990) build on Fitts and Deininger’s (1954) earlier research  to 
provide a detailed analysis and taxonomy of stimulus-response compatibility, 
decomposing the problem into categorical sets with potential “dimensional overlap” or 
commonalities (Fitts & Deininger, 1954; Hasbroucq & Kornblum, 1990). Returning to 
the claim made by Akamatsu et al. (1995) that tactile feedback should be provided when 
motor responses are required, we recognize that the commonality between the stimulus 
(the tactile feedback) and the response (the required motor action) is the common 
location of the hand which acts as both information receptor and actuator (Akamatsu et 
al., 1995). In Hasbroucq et al.’s (1990) terms, there is a strong dimensional overlap 
between the stimulus and response properties, improving reaction time and decreasing 
error rates (Hasbroucq & Kornblum, 1990). 
Mudd (1963) describes experiments investigating the possible existence of 
common, spatially mapped, cognitive models of dimensions of sound. Stereotypical 
responses were found for frequency, intensity and direction of sound. The strongest 
stereotypical response was for frequency, which mapped to a vertical coordinate system. 
These findings provide a foundation for understanding potential dimensional overlaps for 
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S-R compatibility driven decisions when designing interactive systems involving audio 
information (Mudd, 1963). 
Simon and Rudell (1967) investigated the effects of S-R compatibility with a 
semantic auditory stimulus and a corresponding motor-action response. They explored 
varying levels and types of S-R compatibility, changing which ear heard a “left” or 
“right” verbal cue and changing from a randomized ear stimulus state to a state in which 
participants knew in advance which ear they would be hearing the cue in. In all cases, 
response times were quickest when the semantic content of the cue corresponded to the 
location of the ear. Eliminating the random variability of the cue location improved 
performance, but not as significantly as when the compatibility was at its highest 
potential experimental state (Simon & Rudell, 1967).  
Response-Effect compatibility. Response-effect (R-E) compatibility (Kunde, 
2001) is the complement to stimulus-response compatibility. R-E compatibility refers to 
the relationship between an action (response) and the anticipated result (effect) of that 
action. When the actual effect matches the anticipated effect (determined by an existing 
mental model), the R-E relationship is said to be compatible. When the actual effect is 
contrary to the anticipated effect, the R-E relationship is said to be incompatible. The 
reason this compatibility is significant is founded in ideomotor theory. Shin et al. (Shin, 
Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010) summarize the concept this way, “A framework for action 
planning, called ideomotor theory, suggests that actions are represented by their 
perceivable effects. Thus, any activation of the effect image, either endogenously or 
exogenously, will trigger the corresponding action.” If incompatible effects disrupt this 
action planning process, the response is hindered. Keller and Koch (2008) demonstrated 
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this effect in a music-like interaction scenario and found that trained musicians exhibited 
a stronger reaction to the compatibility effect than non-musicians, presumably because 
their musical training had developed and/or reinforced the relevant mental models of 
action and sonic effect. R-E compatibility has interesting implications for seeing 
cognition in terms of structural determinism. It suggests that the structure of a cognizing 
individual is modified through structural coupling with external systems and that when 
similar systems are encountered this previously modified structure somehow facilitates 
interaction with those systems. Importantly this facilitation apparently happens in 
advance of the primary energetic exchange that is described as the interaction. For it to 
affect planning, a secondary energetic response would have to trigger the structural 
change. 
Spence (2011) provides an extensive summary of psychophysical research and 
theories attributed to the fusion and differentiation of sensory data. He focuses on 
theories explaining sensory integration that go beyond the basic, and earliest studied 
explanations of direct temporal or spatial correspondence between sensory stimulation 
sources. The crossmodal correspondences described in this paper may be of several 
different types. The author describes semantic correspondences, which are connections 
due to the conceptual meaning or identity attributed to the stimuli. Structural 
correspondences are attributed to what are thought to be common forms of sensory 
representation in the brain. Statistical correspondences are those formed by the 
associations naturally occurring due to the properties of entities in physical nature 
(Spence, 2011) 
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This concludes my presentation of the theoretical dimensions of haptic 
interactions and perceptual fusion of multimodal information. The next sections will 
present practical haptic technologies and implementations of systems with a significant 
haptic component. 
Haptic Interface Technology 
Haptic technologies can be classified according to the specific haptic senses they 
primarily address. In general terms, these can be reduced to two classes: tactile and 
proprioceptive/kinesthetic. Tactile haptic feedback devices produce signals with the 
objective of producing sensations of touch primarily at the skin level. Proprioceptive 
haptic feedback devices produce signals with the objective of producing sensations of 
touch primarily at the motor action level. Of course this classification scheme is a gross 
simplification. As noted in the prior discussions describing active touch, S-R 
compatibility and R-E compatibility, tactile sensing, proprioceptive sensing and motor 
control are intimately linked and mutually dependent. Nevertheless, these broad classes 
provide a useful structure for describing the most common haptic feedback technologies. 
Tactile haptic systems. The goal of tactile haptic feedback systems is to render 
the somatic sensation of touching surfaces with varying textures, frictions, temperatures, 
hardness, or other physical surface properties. This is accomplished with technologies 
including: voice coils; eccentric mass rotational motors; piezoelectric crystals; arrays of 
physically actuated mechanical pins; shape memory alloys; Peltier heat pump systems; 
electroheological fluid; magnetorheological fluid; electroactive polymers; 
electromagnetic suspension systems; and skin deformation techniques (Benali-Khoudja, 
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Hafez, Alexandre, & Kheddar, 2004). Of these, the voice coil and related actuator 
technologies used to produce vibrotactile sensations are likely the most common. 
Control algorithms for tactile rendering vary greatly depending on the properties 
of the technology used, the qualities of the virtual material(s) being rendered, and the 
requirements of the application. Laycock and Day (2007) describe the history and state of 
the art of haptic rendering algorithms. Benali-Khoudja et al. (2004) provide an extensive 
survey of tactile interfaces. 
One of the general principles for vibrotactile feedback, a common form of tactile 
rendering, is that our experience of touching physical objects can be described in terms of 
magnitude of force experienced and frequency of force experienced. If one slides one’s 
finger over a textured surface, the physical dimensions of the texture, in proportion to the 
contact force and velocity of the hand movement will determine the amplitude and 
frequency of bumps felt. High frequency transient forces may also be rendered, 
increasing the realism of the tactile experience (Kuchenbecker, Fiene, Niemeyer, & 
Member, 2006). 
Proprioceptive haptic systems. Haptic systems that engage the proprioceptive 
system are commonly known as “force feedback” devices. They typically operate by 
sensing position of, or force applied to, a physical mechanism with which the user 
interacts. A control model (often, but not necessarily physics based) uses this sensor data 
(potentially along with additional data) to calculate a responsive force or new position. 
This calculated information is used to drive one or more actuators. This sensing feedback 
loop is repeated continuously at a high frequency, ideally resulting in the sensation of 
interacting with a physical object or environment. 
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The sensors required for this feedback loop depend on the specific design 
specifications of the system. Resistive, optical, magnetic, accelerometer and gyroscope 
sensing devices are all commonly used for position sensing. Force sensing is achieved 
directly with force sensing resistors (FSR’s), torque sensors, load cells and pressure 
sensors. Many combinations of mechanical systems with other forms of sensing hardware 
make the indirect sensing of force possible. Force and position sensors must meet the 
dimensional range, dynamic range, sensitivity, resolution, frequency, hysteresis and any 
other system requirements. 
Actuators for proprioceptive haptic systems can be rotational motors (servo, 
stepper, DC gear motor, etc.), linear motors (pneumatic, hydraulic, electric) or any other 
mechanism capable of producing physical motion, controlled by computational means, in 
a distance and force range perceptible by humans as movement (as opposed to a tactile 
sensation of vibration).  
In compliance with Newton’s third law of motion, forces always occur in equal 
and opposite pairs. The nature of these pairs of forces forms a sub-classification scheme 
for proprioceptive haptic feedback devices (Winfree, Gewirtz, Mather, Fiene, & 
Kuchenbecker, 2009). Devices may be classified as: classically grounded; body 
grounded; and ungrounded. Classically grounded devices are attached to a relatively 
massive and stable object such as a table such that the forces generated by the device act 
on the user and the immobile base. Body grounded devices produce forces on two 
different parts of the human body (e.g. the finger tip and the wrist). This configuration 
relies on the relative differences in mass, anatomical stability and perceptual sensitivity 
between the individual body parts to produce useful and convincing haptic renderings 
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(Lederman & Klatzky, 2009; Winfree et al., 2009). Ungrounded haptic devices produce 
forces through gyroscopic, asymmetrical acceleration, and other mass - inertial effects.  
Yano et al. (2003) and Winfree et al. (2009) produced and explored the 
engineering challenges and affordances of ungrounded gyroscopic force haptic feedback 
devices. These examples can be described as control moment gyroscope (CMG) systems, 
producing torque by changing the angle of a rotating flywheel. 
GyroTab (Badshah, Gupta, Morris, Patel, & Tan, 2012) is another, more recent, 
example of an ungrounded haptic feedback system. This system would be commonly 
classified as a reaction wheel system. It produces variable torque by changing the 
accelerations of two parallel flywheels. The flywheels’ orientations are not changed as 
those in the previous CMG style systems (Badshah et al., 2012).  
Amemiya et al. (Amemiya, Ando, & Maeda, 2008) demonstrate a technique 
which produces an illusion of a constant translational force from one direction with an 
ungrounded haptic interface. Their system utilizes asymmetrical acceleration of a mass to 
produce this effect. The mass rapidly accelerates one direction and relatively slowly on a 
return path. Major engineering hurdles faced in the production of this system included 
minimizing forces other than the single force direction they intended the device to render 
and finding an operating frequency at which the cyclical forces perceptually merged into 
constant force without being experienced as a vibration (Amemiya et al., 2008). 
Haptics and musical instrument design. A great many technological 
innovations have facilitated the development of new and varied musical instruments 
throughout the centuries. Of interest here are the changes in musical interfaces as a result 
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of the emergence of electronics and computer technologies and in particular, the role 
haptic information plays in the performance characteristics of these instruments. 
On the plus side, electronics and computers have tremendously expanded the 
pallet of sounds available to musicians. New sensing and modeling technologies facilitate 
new musical gestures and performance modes. Networked systems of performers and 
instruments expand the potential scale and complexity of musical events to 
unprecedented dimensions. However, there are also challenges presented by the evolution 
from purely acoustic instruments to ones built around these new technologies.   
Cook (2004) describes the consequences of isolating the controller portion of a 
musical instrument from its synthesizer and sound production components. He 
summarizes the problem as a loss of intimacy between the performer and the instrument, 
specifying the loss of haptic feedback, reduction in interaction fidelity and loss of the 
sensation of the sound actually coming from the instrument as the fundamental problems 
resulting from this type of instrument design. He proposes a design and construction 
methodology that reintegrates the instrument controller systems with the synthesis, sound 
output and haptic feedback systems, thereby restoring the intimacy between the 
instrument and the musician. Importantly, Cook suggests that this methodology may lead 
to new controller designs that evolve out of the process of being co-designed with and 
integrated into the instrument's synthesis systems and vise versa (Cook, 2004). The 
integration Cook suggests echoes Simondon’s description of the concretization of 
technical objects and may benefit from the generation of plurifunctional structures.  
Many researchers and instrument builders have recognized what they perceive as 
limitations of musical interfaces with impoverished interaction and feedback modalities 
  61 
and have produced a wide variety of new interfaces that address these deficiencies in 
creative ways. 
One class of such interfaces is identified as “hyper-instruments” (Machover, 
1992).  Bowers and Archer (2005) discuss the terminology of, and concepts behind, 
hyper, meta, cyber and a new proposed class of infra-instruments. Hyper-instruments are 
traditional musical instruments augmented with additional sensing and computational 
systems, allowing the instruments to maintain their traditional expressive potential and 
interaction affordances and have expanded performance capabilities (Bowers & Archer, 
2005). Tod Machover (1992) created the “Hyperinstrument Project” at the Media Lab at 
MIT. His work continues as the director of the “Opera of the Future” group at MIT. 
Gyrotyre (Sinyor & Wanderley, 2005), a music controller, is similar in its 
conceptual motivation and technical dimensions to my Vox Curio instrument, which is 
discussed later in this document. Gyrotyre consists of a small bicycle wheel with an 
attached handle and a set of sensors to detect the motion of the device. The musician 
manually actuates the Gyrotyre wheel. The motion of the spinning wheel, and the motion 
of the overall device are sensed and used to drive audio synthesis and signal processing 
programs, resulting in varying sonic output from the instrument. The physical nature of 
the device, including forces resulting from the potentially spinning wheel provides haptic 
feedback to the musician (Sinyor & Wanderley, 2005). A fundamental difference 
between Gyrotyre and Vox Curio is that the Gyrotyre’s physical feedback cannot be 
computationally modulated. It is simply a one-way controller. Information is transferred 
to the computer from the interface, but no information is sent back to the controller from 
the software.  
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Bahn et al. (2001) consider the importance of the human body in musical 
performance. They emphasize not only the significant physical relationship between the 
performer and their instrument, but also social and cultural factors including what they 
observe as the vicarious experience of the audience listening to and visually observing 
the physical act of the musician’s performance (Bahn et al., 2001). This emphasis on the 
importance of the physical character, visual presence and performance characteristics of 
the instrument significantly influenced the design of my Vox Curio instrument. 
Chafe (1993) experimentally demonstrates the critical role haptic feedback plays 
in the control of a musical interface. A key principle of haptic interaction is demonstrated 
in this research, namely the value of feedback and control being spatially and temporally 
co-located. Vibrotactile feedback significantly improved the accuracy and control of the 
software instrument in which a lip tension parameter was controlled through a hand 
deflecting a flexible metal bar, with and without vibrotactile feedback (Chafe, 1993). 
This finding is predicted by the principle of S-R compatibility (Fitts & Seeger, 1953).  
Marshall et al. (2006) provide a brief overview of the importance of haptic 
feedback for musical interfaces; summarize the requirements for vibrotactile feedback 
with reference to the human sensory system; describe a number of actuators appropriate 
for generating tactile haptic feedback; and finally, present two musical interfaces that 
incorporate the aforementioned principles and techniques. They emphasize the value of 
having the musical control gesture, haptic feedback and sonic production systems full 
integrated into a single instrument body to produce something that is perceived by 
musicians as a “musical instrument rather than a computer controller”. Marshall et al. did 
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not present evidence from any formal studies to evaluate their success in achieving this 
goal (Marshall et al., 2006). 
Overholt et al. (2011) describe the affordances of actuated musical instruments 
(physical instruments which combine computer and human controlled actuation of the 
instrument). They outline potential extensions and enhancements to the musical 
performance experience that result from the synthesis of human and computational 
abilities. They emphasize the vital role of the physicality of the instruments and the 
haptic feedback loop they provide. The authors propose the following potential benefits 
of actuated musical instruments: decreasing cognitive load for the performer (since the 
computer is doing some of the work); enabling and/or stimulating new ways of 
interacting with the instrument; freeing the performer from the need to constantly input 
energy into the instrument (allowing them to instead modulate energy produced by the 
instrument); perform in collaborative ensembles in which instruments are networked and 
performance gestures and feedback can be shared; and allow the musician to experience 
computationally defined parameters of instruments as tangible properties. Overholt et al. 
present four instruments as examples of actuated instruments: the Overtone Fiddle, the 
Feedback Resonance Guitar, Robothands, the Electromagnetically Prepared Piano and 
the Haptic Drum (Overholt et al., 2011). Each of these instruments is unique in 
interaction and sonic affordances and provides lessons that can be applied the design of 
future instruments. 
In his dissertation, Playing by feel: incorporating haptic feedback into computer-
based musical instruments, O’Modhrain (2001) researched the utility of including haptic 
feedback in addition to sonic feedback for what he calls “virtual” musical instruments. 
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O’Modhrain found that the availability of haptic feedback (above and beyond the passive 
haptic feedback associated with basic human motor activity) did improve the learnability 
and playability of these instruments (O’Modhrain, 2001).   
Ahmaniemi (2010) compared the use of static versus a dynamic plus static 
vibrotactile cues for interaction with a virtual instrument. In this study, participants were 
tasked with following a percussive rhythm. They struck a virtual percussive surface with 
a downward motion of a hand-held sensor-actuator device. In the static condition, a pulse 
of tactile vibration was synchronized with the sonic pulse associated with the crossing of 
a virtual control surface boundary. In the dynamic plus static condition, an additional 
ramped vibrotactile signal was added to the haptic feedback. The magnitude of this haptic 
signal increased in inverse proportion to the distance from the target surface. Ahmaniemi 
found a significant performance increase with the dynamic feedback condition in both 
timing accuracy and in velocity control (Ahmaniemi, 2010).  
The role of haptic feedback is not limited to the use of external musical 
instruments. Sundberg (2013) discusses how singers use phonatory vibrations, resulting 
from their vocalizations and felt in their chest and face, as feedback to help them 
perform. Sundberg focuses on the questions surrounding the utility of this potential 
feedback mechanism, pointing out for example, how singers describe placing a tone in 
their nose or chest. Sundberg also notes the perceptual limitations of this form of 
feedback based on our understanding of human physiology and the physics of the 
vibrations involved (Sundberg, 2013). 
This concludes my survey of background literature, theory and systems. This 
background set the stage for the heart of this dissertation, a paradigm construction project 
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in which I see systems as structurally determined. The theories of perception, particularly 
theories of haptic interaction may be more richly understood seen from the perspective of 
structural determinism and structural coupling. The aspects of materiality that are 
observed in the coupling of structurally determined systems may be seen at play in social 
and cultural systems. Artists’ use of media may be seen in terms of structure and 
organization. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STRUCTURE DETERMINES ORGANIZATION 
Foundations of Structural Determinism 
When Maturana (2002) embarked on his search for an answer to the question of 
what defined a living system as such, he framed his approach through this question: 
"What should happen in the manner of constitution of a system so that I see as a result of 
its operation a living system?" (Maturana, 2002, p. 5). He bluntly added, "to answer the 
question properly I would have to create a living system, either conceptually or 
practically in the laboratory" (Maturana, 2002, p. 6). 
Maturana's (2002) approach to the problem, first espoused in the early 1980’s, 
which we see directly echoed by Braitenberg (1986) in his conceptual synthesis of 
cognitive structures, led Maturana to the development of his concepts of structural 
determinism, structural coupling and autopoiesis.  At the heart of these concepts is the 
notion that the organization and structure (two terms that Maturana carefully uses and 
differentiates) of a system is what ultimately matters in defining its existence. 
Specifically, Maturana defines a structure determined system as, "a system in which all 
that happens with it and to it is determined at every instant by the way it is made (its 
structure) at that instant" (Maturana, 2002, p. 6). 
An important dimension of structural determinism, and one that was in contrast to 
the prevalent thinking of the time regarding the nature of living systems was the self-
defined closure of the system. This closure was defined not by a material boundary, the 
system remained open and was dependent on a flow of energy and matter, but by its 
organization (Maturana, 2002, p. 7). 
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When Maturana (2002) speaks of the organization of a system, he is speaking 
unambiguously about the relations between the components that make up the system. 
Relations in this context mean the functional dynamics of the system. The structure, at 
every instance, determines the dynamics, and thereby the organization. The structure can 
change while maintaining a consistent organization or can change such that the 
organization also changes. The organization of the system defines the class of the system 
(Maturana, 2002, pp. 15–16). 
An autopoetic system is a specific form of organization in which, in a circular 
pattern, a process (which spontaneously occurs as a result of the system's structure) 
produces a structure that spontaneously exhibits this same production process (Maturana, 
2002, p. 7). This high level summary of Maturana’s definition does not capture the 
specificity and nuance of his meaning, and I encourage readers unfamiliar with these 
concepts to refer directly to Maturana's texts for a more thorough and refined 
explanation, but this will suffice for now in the context of my research. Autopoiesis, as a 
specific organizational possibility within and between structurally determined systems, is 
not directly related to my topic. Structural determinism and structural coupling, which 
will be addressed in greater depth soon, are fundamental to my conceptual investigation 
of the function and creation of experiential media systems. Ken Rinaldo’s (2000) kinetic, 
interactive sculpture entitled Autopoiesis (Rinaldo, 2000) is a good example of an 
experiential media system in which one can see the interplay of structure and 
organization. 
Maturana (2002) emphasizes that, "what constitutes a dynamic system is its 
manner of dynamic composition, not the elements that compose it." (Maturana, 2002, p. 
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10). Again we are focused on the relations that are established between the elements, not 
on the elements themselves. Maturana uses a tornado as an example to illustrate his point. 
The dynamics of movement (in this example) are what are significant, not the material 
makeup of the object. In an upcoming section I will introduce in greater depth, the ideas 
of Gilbert Simondon (1958), but I include a quotation from him here to emphasize the 
clear links I find between the ways they see their subjects. Simondon says in his 
description of technical individuals (a specific class of technical objects defined later in 
this document),  
Therefore the technical individual should be imagined, that is to say, it should be 
assumed to be constructed, as an ensemble of organized technical systems. The 
individual is a stable system of technicalities of elements organized into an 
ensemble. What is organized is these technicalities; the elements also are 
organized, but only in so far as they are bearers of these technicalities and not 
because of anything that has to do with their own materiality. (Simondon, 1958, p. 
87) 
 I draw particular attention to Simondon's (1958) use of the term "organized" and 
even more specifically to his emphasis that, "What is organized is these technicalities". 
He says directly here that the materiality is not what is important, paralleling Maturana's 
(2002) definition of organization. I must reemphasize here that structure, which 
significantly includes materiality, is absolutely critical to both Maturana's theory of 
autopoiesis and Simondon's theory of technical objects. 
A simple example, not of a living, or even a biological system, that further 
illustrates the relation of structure and organization is an inflatable rubber ball. For this 
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example, let us assume the ball has a diameter of 12 inches. The ball’s structure changes 
as it is inflated or deflated. This claim may be debatable, but I argue that the air 
molecules contained in the ball are part of the structure of the ball because they are a 
fundamental part of what defines the organization of the system. Just as in Maturana’s 
(2002) examples of biological cellular systems, material and energy may transfer in and 
out of these structures and be incorporated and unincorporated in the cell’s structure 
(Maturana, 2002, p. 7). I also remind the reader that I am speaking of structure, which I 
differentiated from form in my introduction. By changing the structure of the ball, its 
organization is simultaneously changed. If we deflate it far enough, it no longer bounces 
and it no longer rolls. Our dog might now enjoy it because it can easily carry it around. 
The important question is: is it still a ball? If we define a ball by its organization, or 
dynamics, as proposed by Maturana (2002), at some point it stops being a ball. The exact 
point this occurs depends on what organizational characteristics we require in our 
individual definitions of a ball. Incidentally, from the dog’s point of observation, the ball 
likely never ceases to be a ball. It smells the same, tastes the same and so forth.  
A slightly more complex example of an experiential media system pushes the 
question further. Wii bowling, a game played with the Nintendo Wii game console as part 
of the Wii Sports package (wikipedia, 2015), simulates the physical game of bowling. 
The question is: is Wii bowling, bowling? Clearly there are structural differences 
between the video game and the traditional version of the game, but organizationally 
there are potentially many commonalities. From my personal experience playing Wii 
bowling, the best experiences involve multiple players, all of whom, to varying degrees, 
physically mimic the sequences of actions that would occur in a physical bowling alley. 
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They wait for their turn to bowl, perhaps sipping a beverage and chatting with their 
competitors. When it is their turn, they stand up, maneuver to a position in which they are 
centered in front of the alley (on the video display). They calm themselves; raise the ball 
(the Wii remote) in preparation for the gesture that will generate a virtual toss of the ball. 
They may take a step or two as they swing their arm and virtually release the ball. After 
the ball is rolling down the alley, they will often lean their body in an effort to remotely 
impart a change in the vector of the rolling ball. Depending on the outcome of their 
efforts, they may jump in celebration or slump back to their chair in defeat. 
Organizationally, Wii bowling may be very similar to the real thing, even if there are 
significant structural differences. 
 Wii golf (wikipedia, 2015) provides an interesting point of comparison to Wii 
bowling in terms of their respective organizational similarity with their physical analogs. 
Bowling takes place in a stationary location. The players of Wii bowling, in a living room 
may, for the most part, replicate the entirety of the movements of bowlers in a physical 
bowling alley. Golf takes place in a much larger physical environment, with no single 
focal point as exists in the simulated bowling alley. Virtual golfers cannot, with today’s 
technology, in any practical, seamless way, mimic the movements and interactions of real 
golfers as they walk or ride from location to location. The stationary focal point of the 
bowling alley, by contrast, establishes a persistent extension of the physical space 
occupied by the Wii bowlers.  
This discussion of embodied video game experiences is intended to illustrate the 
extent to which a structure of an experiential media system may vary while maintaining 
an organizational identity (Maturana, 2002, p. 16). Simondon (1958) says, “The machine 
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is a result of organization and information” (p. 9), emphasizing a conceptually consistent 
way of seeing systems as defined by their organizational structure and open to 
information.  
The next section, introducing the concept of structural coupling (Maturana, 2002), 
will focus on this informationally open aspect of structurally determined systems. 
Structural Coupling 
When the concept of a structure determined system (Maturana, 2002) is first 
introduced, a logical challenge seems to arise. If a system is defined as a closed system 
and this system defines its own boundaries, interaction with anything external to the 
system seems impossible. Maturana (2002) seems to reinforce this understanding when 
he claims,  
A living system as a molecular system is a structure determined system, and 
everything that happens in it or to it, happens in each moment determined by its 
structure at that moment. That is, nothing external to a living system can specify 
what happens in it. (Maturana, 2002, p. 12) 
 The important detail to recognize in this statement is the claim that the external 
system cannot “specify” what happens to it. A simple example helps clarify the 
difference that is presented here.  
The motion of a billiard ball struck by another billiard ball is sometimes seen as 
determined by the force and direction of the ball striking it, but it is actually deter- 
mined by the structure of the ball being struck. If the ball had the structure of a 
tennis ball it would move very differently. The ball striking the other ball provides 
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energy, but the structure of the ball being struck determines what happens to that 
energy. (Reid & Mgombelo, 2014, p. 3) 
It is easy to imagine an endless array of such energetic exchanges between 
systems of differing structure. We can easily see how in these exchanges the structure of 
each involved system will be changed and how these changes will affect subsequent 
interactions. In more specific and formal language Maturana (2002) offers this as a 
definition, “I have called the dynamics of congruent structural changes that take  place 
spontaneously between systems in recurrent (in fact recursive) interactions, as well as the 
coherent structural dynamics that result, structural coupling” (Maturana, 2002, pp. 16–
17). These mutual energetic and even material exchanges provide a way for information 
to be shared. The next section considers the mechanics of this information sharing in 
greater detail. 
Conduit or Toolmaker 
This section takes the foundational principle of structural coupling, initially 
defined by Maturana (2002) in the context of living systems, and considers its 
implications and applicability in the larger context of machines and humans. This 
discussion presents ideas put forth by the linguist Michael Reddy (1979) and considers 
these ideas in the context of Gilbert Simondon’s (1958) mechanological way of seeing 
information.  
I argued in the last section that structural coupling could be seen as way of 
sharing information. By what means is this information shared? Reddy's (1979) linguistic 
analysis and comparative metaphors for communication provide a way of interpreting the 
mechanism by which information may be said to transfer from one structurally closed, 
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often heterogeneous, system to another (Reddy, 1979). Reddy presents two metaphors for 
communication. The first, a conduit metaphor, implies a direct transfer of information as 
a package that is created, packaged (in words, sentences, etc.) or simply released, and 
received, collected and unpacked by another. This metaphor assumes a direct replication 
of the information on the receiving side of the exchange (Reddy, 1979, pp. 286–292). The 
second metaphor, identified as the toolmaker metaphor, assumes no possibility of a direct 
transfer or replication of information. It instead assumes that energetic exchanges are 
possible, in the form of sound waves (vocalized utterances, words), mechanically 
generated marks (diagrams, text), or other means determined by the structural properties 
of the objects involved in the exchange. The response to energy received from another, is 
wholly dependent on the current structure of the receiving object. In Reddy's 
metaphorical terms, the receiver must build what they can, from their own repertoire of 
materials, to generate their unique version of the information. The information that 
generated the energy transfer on the transmitting end may have little to nothing in 
common with that interpretively reconstructed on the receiving end (Reddy, 1979, pp. 
292–297). 
Simondon (1958) states, "The real perfecting of machines ... relates to the fact that 
the functioning of the machine conceals a certain margin of indetermination. It is such a 
margin that allows for the machine's sensitivity to outside information" (Simondon, 1958, 
p. 4). I see Simondon's notion of the margins of indetermination in technical objects, as 
the variables or degrees of freedom that these objects present. These variables account for 
the potential for a changed structure, a response to external energy, and thereby a 
potential informational response, in the sense of Reddy’s (1979) toolmaker paradigm. I 
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will return to this idea of variables, degrees of freedom, and constraints in chapter 6 when 
I discuss the making process and Pye’s (1968) concept of regulation. 
Reddy (1979) emphasizes the challenge of communication as understood through 
the toolmaker metaphor. He points out that it is a lot of work for communication to occur 
and that often many energetic exchanges must occur before any real information can be 
accurately interpretively regenerated (Reddy, 1979, pp. 295–296). This vision of the 
continuous nature of this process parallels the notion of Simondon's (1958) idea of 
recurrence of causality. Simondon says,  
For the reasons already outlined, we can rightly state that the individualization of 
technical beings is the essential condition for technical progress. Such 
individualization is possible because of the recurrence of causality in the 
environment which the technical being creates around itself, an environment 
which it influences and by which it is influenced. This environment, which is at 
the same time natural and technical, can be called the associated milieu. By means 
of this the technical being is conditioned in its operation. This is no fabricated 
milieu, or at least it is not wholly fabricated; it is a definite system of natural 
elements surrounding the technical object and it is linked to a definite system of 
elements which constitute the technical object. The associated milieu is the 
mediator of the relationship between manufactured technical elements and natural 
elements within which the technical being functions. (Simondon, 1958, pp. 60–
61) 
This persistent energetic exchange, as described by Reddy (1979) and Simondon 
(1958) is congruent with Maturana’s (2002) definition of structural coupling. It provides 
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a mode of communication between such heterogeneous objects as a human, a tool 
wielded by the human and a material modified by the tool. It provides a way of seeing 
how one can claim to ‘know their material’. This concept of ‘knowing material’ is further 
examined in Chapter 6. 
Simondon (Simondon & Le Moyne, 1968) describes a basic example of an 
energetic exchange in the operating of an oil lamp, which self regulates its combustion by 
consuming the oxygen it is dependent on for combustion. He states, "its functioning 
implies something informational, as implied internally.” He continues, “the implicit 
information, allowing homeostasis and stability of the object, exists in a simple ancient 
oil lamp" (Simondon & Le Moyne, 1968). This example emphasizes the subtlety of 
potential structural couplings and hints at the organizational dynamics that lead to the 
unity systems, be they living systems (Maturana, 2002) or technical objects (Simondon & 
Le Moyne, 1968; Simondon, 1958). 
Structural coupling, far from being a secondary theoretical offshoot of structural 
determinism, has been shown to be essential to its meaning, for without structural 
coupling, a structurally determined system would have a meaningless isolated existence 
(Maturana, 2002). These essential nature of structural coupling will emerge in greater 
detail as Simondon’s (Simondon, 1958) concepts of unity are examined in the next 
chapter, which continues to examine systems as structurally determined. In the next 
chapter the emphasis will shift from the foundations of structural coupling to seeing 
technical objects as structurally determined.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DETERMINING STRUCTURE (IN THEORY) 
The previous chapter introduced the theories of structural determinism and 
structural coupling as defined by Maturana (2002). I emphasized the importance of the 
interrelated concepts of ‘structure’ and ‘organization’ in understanding these theories 
(Maturana, 2002). The informational implications of structural coupling (Maturana, 1987, 
2002) were examined through a discussion of communication featuring Reddy’s (1979) 
competing framings of the mechanisms by which communication occurs. These framings 
are the “conduit metaphor” and the “toolmakers paradigm” (Reddy, 1979) the latter of 
which was shown to be consistent with Maturana’s theory of structural coupling 
(Maturana, 2002) and Simondon’s mechanological way of seeing information (Simondon 
& Le Moyne, 1968; Simondon, 1958). An understanding of these theories and their 
implications is important for interpreting the validity and utility of seeing experiential 
media systems as structurally determined systems.  
Simondon’s (1958) mechanological theory will now be examined in light of the 
theories introduced in the previous chapter. I look at Simondon’s “technical objects” as 
structurally determined systems, using Maturana’s (2002) language and concepts as a 
foundation for interpreting Simondon’s concepts of unity and concretization. 
Concretization is examined as an evolutionary process (Simondon, 1958). Additional 
theoretical intersections of mechanology and biology are explored. The chapter 
culminates with a discussion of viability. The factors that determine the viability of 
systems are considered from biological and mechanological perspectives (Maturana, 
2002; Simondon, 1958). Simondon’s understanding of invention is considered with 
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respect to these concepts of viability (Simondon, 1958). The subject matter of this 
chapter, which provides a way of seeing human made objects as structurally determined 
systems, establishes the foundation for the final chapter, which examines dimensions of 
making, or the practice of determining structure, from my vantage points as an artist, 
engineer and philosopher.  
Mechanology 
Mechanology is the “science of machines” (Simondon, 1958, p. ii). For Simondon 
(1958), the technical object is the heart of mechanology. A comprehensive definition of 
the technical object as envisioned by Simondon can only be acquired through his original 
texts. The summary explanation I provide can only scratch the surface of his full 
dissertation on the subject (Simondon, 1958), but it should be sufficient to carry my 
thesis forward. 
Technical Object 
First and foremost in Simondon’s (1958) characterization of the technical object 
is the importance of recognizing the human presence in technical objects. He stresses that 
the technical is not separate from, or in opposition to culture, but is an essential 
component of it. The technical is shaped by humanity and shapes humanity, and serves as 
“the mediators between man and nature” (Simondon, 1958, p. 1). I included a short 
section on anthropologists and sociologists in my Background chapter and highlight 
immaterial systems, including cultural systems in my concluding discussion in chapter 6 
on aspects of materiality, but at this stage in my career, the social/cultural dimension of 
this topic are not my focus. I approach this work, not from a modernist perspective, but 
from a perspective that does not prioritize an anthropocentric view of media systems. 
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Simondon (1958) defines the technical object “in terms of its genesis” (Simondon, 
1958, p. 8). He does this specifically in opposition to classification systems based on 
specific characteristics and practical uses. This type of classification is easily done, but 
Simondon warns, “such specificity as this is illusory, for no fixed structure corresponds 
to its defined use” (Simondon, 1958, p. 11). Simondon turns his attention instead to the 
evolutionary forces and processes that shape and specialize technical objects, identifying 
this process as concretization (Simondon, 1958, p. 11). 
Unity. Concretization describes the process of the specialization of a technical 
object (Simondon, 1958, p. 30). This gradual refinement happens as problems in earlier 
iterations of systems are addressed in later iterations. It is important to note that 
according to Simondon (1958), not every functional improvement to a system represents 
a concretization. If a change is made that fixes one problem, but adds others, Simondon 
would identify this as an abstraction (Simondon, 1958, pp. 30–31). Simondon specifies,  
“The concrete technical object is one which is no longer divided against itself, one in 
which no secondary effect either compromises the functioning of the whole or is omitted 
from that functioning” (Simondon, 1958, p. 30). So concretization implies a unity. I argue 
that Simondon’s definition of a concrete technical object directly parallels Maturana’s 
definition of an organizationally closed structurally determined system (Maturana, 2002; 
Simondon, 1958). These parallels will be further explored later in this chapter. For now, I 
will continue with additional details on the process and ramifications of concretization. 
Hypertelia. As technical objects are concretized, their specialization results in 
varying levels of what Simondon (1958) calls “hypertelia”. He says, “ The evolution of 
technical objects manifests certain hypertelic phenomena which endow each technical 
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object with specialization, which causes it to adapt badly to changes, however slight, in 
the conditions of its operation or manufacture” (Simondon, 1958, p. 51). Simondon also 
refers to this phenomena as “functional over-determination” (Simondon, 1958, p. 8) and 
uses the phrase “overadapted functionally” (Simondon, 1958, p. 51). A simple example is 
presented here to help the reader get a feel for this concept.  
A basic glove might start as just the projection of a hand shape onto two pieces of 
fabric. These pieces are cut out and stitched into an enclosed form with an opening at the 
wrist for the hand to slide into. At this stage, either hand can fit equally well in the glove. 
The front and the back of the glove are defined by its use, by which hand it is on. This 
glove is highly versatile. It provides basic protection for the hand. It would be described 
as having a low level of hypertelia (Simondon, 1958, p. 51). This original glove may 
have some disadvantages in certain circumstances. Because it needs to be able to bend in 
either direction as the fingers are curled, depending on which hand is involved, it may 
have more length of fabric on the palm side of the glove to accommodate this than would 
otherwise be necessary. This extra fabric bunches up, is uncomfortable, and makes it 
difficult to grab things with the glove on. The glove could be remade and tailored to 
better fit the three-dimensional contour of the hand. At this point the glove has become 
more specialized. For practical purposes, it can only be worn on the hand it is made for. 
Hypertelia is essentially the compromise that comes with specialization. At this stage in 
our glove's evolution, it has become more hypertelic, but only minimally so. If we make a 
dramatic transformation in the form and material of our glove, making it out of leather for 
instance, adding a bunch of extra padding on the palm side, and connecting a pattern of 
leather webbing between the index finger and the thumb, we now have a glove that is 
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highly specialized for catching balls of a certain size, but not a glove that will allow us to 
effectively use our hand for very many other operations. If we were looking for a general-
purpose glove, we would describe this latest glove as over-determined (Simondon, 1958, 
p. 8). It is only good for one specialized activity. It is hypertelic (Simondon, 1958, p. 51). 
This does not mean this evolutionary result is negative. This example merely illustrates 
the dynamic relationships that are in play as structures are changed and the technical 
object increases or decreases in viability in relation to a particular intermediary function 
and environment in which it exists (Simondon, 1958, p. 51). 
When we design experiential media systems, we are presented with the 
opportunity to define the degree of specialization of the system. There is always a 
temptation to refine a system so that it is an optimal fit for a specifically determined 
environment or envisioned interaction. This may work well if the system remains in these 
narrow parameters of use, but may be of little use if the environment changes or a person 
deviates from the intended mode of interaction. Sha, Freed and Navab (2013) address this 
concern in their designs of interactive media spaces by specifically not defining the 
interactions that may take place in these spaces from a human-centered perspective. They 
instead see the space as a structurally determined system with customizable 
organizational dynamics (Maturana, 2002) (these dynamics may be thought of as the 
physics of the space). This space may be structurally coupled with any other structurally 
determined system, which could be a person, a group of people, a robot, a shaft of 
sunlight, etc. The structure of the space is changed through this structural coupling. This 
structural change is manifest as varying changes in the media from which the space is 
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constituted (i.e. energy we perceive as sound, light, tactile sensations) (Sha et al., 2013). 
This approach avoids hypertelia and affords rich interactional opportunities.  
Stages/Classes of technical objects. As technical objects evolve they require 
varying levels of external support and are combined with or are independent of other 
technical objects, humans and the natural environment (Simondon, 1958, pp. ixx–xx). 
Simondon systematically classifies technical objects with respect to these variables. 
These classifications have little to no direct bearing on my application and synthesis of 
Simondon’s theories so I will not address them in depth (and a very in depth examination 
would be required to unravel his use and meanings of these terms). I present them here, 
with very basic definitions, to provide the reader with some clarity when they arise in 
Simondon’s quotations.  
The first classification of a technical object is as a technical element. Technical 
elements can perhaps best be understood as man-made analogs to natural elements 
(Simondon, 1958, p. 61). Just as the function of a natural element can only be described 
with respect to other natural elements, the technical element is wholly dependent on 
relations with other elements for its purposeful existence (Simondon, 1958). An 
important distinction between natural elements and technical elements, is that new 
technical elements may be generated (Simondon, 1958, pp. 85–86) whereas new natural 
elements may not (although this limitation on natural elements may be argued, the 
distinction remains useful). Simondon presents a sewing needle as an example of a 
technical element that emerged as the product of a technical ensemble (an explanation of 
a technical ensemble is provided in the upcoming paragraphs of this section). He says, 
“At the element level, technicality is concretization” (Simondon, 1958, p. 86). In other 
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words, all the technical knowledge and physical technology that made the manufacturing 
of the needle possible is embodied in the needle. It is important, to interpret this meaning, 
to recall that Simondon defines technical objects in terms of their genesis (Simondon, 
1958, p. 8).  
Technical individuals are the next in Simondon’s (1958) classification scheme. A 
technical individual is best understood by comparison to a human being as an individual 
(Simondon, 1958, p. 8). Simondon states, “man can act as a substitute for the technical 
individual, and can join elements to ensembles in a era when the construction of technical 
individuals is not possible” (Simondon, 1958, p. 96). The defining characteristic of an 
individual is its functional independence. This definition parallels Maturana’s (2002) 
definition of a structurally determined system, the boundaries of which are defined by its 
own organizational dynamics (Maturana, 2002). A laser cutter is an example of a 
technical individual. It consists of a combination of technical elements, which, as a result 
of their structure, define an organizational dynamic or function. The distinction between a 
technical element, a technical individual, and a technical ensemble (which will be 
described next) is not always clear, however when I am attempting this distinction, a 
useful question that sheds light on some examples is: does this object/system potentially 
replace man as a tool-bearer or organizer of technical or natural elements (Simondon, 
1958, p. 8)? Simondon’s philosophy never places technical elements or individuals in 
isolation. They always exist in the context of a milieu, or environment, which is both 
natural and technical (Simondon, 1958, p. 61). The final classification is constituted by 
this relationship. 
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The technical ensemble, the last of these three classifications, is defined by the 
relationships between individuals (Simondon, 1958, p. 68). Groups of individuals, be 
they technical individuals, human individuals or a combination thereof, may have 
organizational dynamics (Maturana, 2002) that define these groups as individuals 
themselves or as technical ensembles. Simondon (1958) describes the concept: 
 The principle that recurrent causality individualizes a technical object in its 
associated milieu makes it possible for us to consider all the more clearly certain 
technical ensembles and to know whether we should treat them as technical 
individuals or as an organized collection of individuals.  We may say that a 
technical individual is one having an associated milieu as a sine qua non condition 
of its functioning. The opposite is true of an ensemble. (Simondon, 1958, p. 68) 
I gain clarity in my understanding of this quotation by focusing on Simondon’s 
(1958) use of the phase ‘recurrent causality’ and seeing this from the perspective 
generated by Maturana’s (2002) theory of autopoiesis. Just as the living system, through 
its organization, recursively generates the structure it requires to maintain its organization 
as a living system (Maturana, 2002), the technical individual (in this case consisting of a 
structure of other individuals) is dependent on its organization to create its milieu 
(Simondon, 1958).  
The classifications of technical elements, individuals and ensembles arise from 
the evolutionary levels and character of the technical objects classified. This chapter 
continues with a deeper discussion of the concepts of concretization and abstraction as 
defined by Simondon (1958). 
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Concretization and abstraction. Simondon’s (1958) use of the terms concrete 
and abstract do not match their more common usage. He is not differentiating between 
the idea of something and the actual physical instance of that thing. His meaning 
differentiates between the degrees of unification of a system. An abstract system is not 
unified whereas a concrete system is unified. In Simondon’s terms, “The concrete 
technical object is one which is no longer divided against itself, one in which no 
secondary effect either compromises the functioning of the whole or is omitted from that 
functioning” (Simondon, 1958, p. 30). 
Concretization implies not only a fitting of structures to functions, but the 
production of synergetic relations between these functions (Simondon, 1958, pp. 30–31). 
A primary way Simondon considers this to occur is through a "convergence of structures 
into a structural unity rather than with the seeking of compromises between conflicting 
requirements" (Simondon, 1958, pp. 15–16). Simondon uses the example of a rib that is 
formed as a continuous exterior feature on a cylinder in a combustion engine to illustrate 
this meaning. Multiple essential and complementary functions are fulfilled by this 
structural element. The rib provides structural integrity for the cylinder, countering the 
force of the expanding combusted fuel; it dissipates heat by increasing the surface area; 
and it decreases the overall weight of the vehicle by reducing the required mass of the 
cylinder and eliminating extra fasteners that would be required to attach external heat 
sinks (Simondon, 1958, pp. 15–16). Simondon labels structures that exhibit this 
multiplicity of functions in a single structure, plurifunctional or plurivalent (Simondon, 
1958, pp. 16, 57, 58, 60, 84).  
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Plurifunctional structures are featured in my musical instrument, Vox Curio, the 
production of which is described in detail in Chapter 6. This instrument features a 
motorized flywheel that is used to provide ungrounded haptic feedback. A cylindrical 
array of magnets, embedded in the interior of the torus shaped flywheel serve several 
simultaneous complementary functions. They act as a magnetically coupled gear, driven 
by a motor with a mating array of magnets on its output shaft. The magnetic gear adds no 
physical friction to the mechanism, reducing undesirable noise and vibration. It also 
provides a margin of safety by naturally slipping if mechanical impedance is introduced. 
Finally, the magnets, whose positions are detected by a Hall effect sensor, serve as an 
encoder, allowing a measurement of the rotational speed of the flywheel, which serves an 
important feedback function for controlling the flywheel’s driving motor.  
Simondon (1958) equates increasing technical perfection with the refinement and 
convergence of structures for specific functions. This is identified as a form of increasing 
concretization (Simondon, 1958). We have however, already noted the potential 
downside of concretization in the manifestation of hypertelia. Abstraction can be 
desirable. General-purpose computers, while highly concrete technical individuals from a 
genetic evolutionary perspective, are in and of themselves, functionally abstract. As 
symbolic processing machines, they are inherently not specialized. Computers allow a 
common set of hardware to be dynamically fitted to a wide range of functions. This 
dynamic malleability allows a modular construction of virtual machines. The symbolic 
processing reduces all information to binary data streams, resulting in a naturally 
ambivalent form of information. The source of information, and the destination of that 
information are irrelevant within this symbolic structure. The affordances of digital 
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computer systems are an invaluable asset in the realization of experiential media systems 
but their intrinsic nature, their structure and organization as a technical individual, biases 
their use in such systems, contributing to the development of characteristic modes of 
interaction. I argue that experiential media system designers should consciously utilize 
traditional computational technologies when needed but should look for computational 
solutions in other technical and natural objects. I emphasize this idea further in my 
discussion of material computation in Chapter 6. Next I present an example where an 
increased concretization is necessary in the system’s evolutionary path. 
PaperPhone (seen in Figure 1) is an interactive interface, simulating the 
functionality of a smart phone with a variety of apps (Lahey, Girouard, Burleson, & 
Vertegaal, 2011). This device was constructed using actual flexible display technology. 
We augmented the flexible display with an array of flex sensors to allow the investigation 
of bend gestures as a mode of interaction with the device. While this study was 
groundbreaking in its use of actual flexible display technology (similar prior research had 
simulated the display using video projection and other strategies) and represented an 
essential step forward in the research on Organic User Interfaces (Vertegaal & Poupyrev, 
2008), the results were limited in depth and nuance by lack of sufficient concretization. 
Our prototype was, in Simondon's terms, highly abstract. 
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Figure 1. PaperPhone simulated smart phone with real flexible display. 
The prototype interface exhibited extreme modularity and was not physically 
unified as an interactive object. The PaperPhone was conceived as a handheld smart 
phone with similar hand fitting proportions and scale. The display area itself reasonably 
matched these dimensional requirements, and had the added benefit of being as thin as a 
heavy weight paper stock. However, the display technology required additional signal 
processing hardware that extends the dimensions of the physical display by another third 
of the area of the display itself. It also required an external processor that is hardwired to 
the display through a ribbon cable. Beyond this, PaperPhone required a second 
hardwired microcontroller to handle the sensor systems. Finally the whole system was 
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connected to a laptop computer that simulated the phone operating system, allowed for 
dynamic participant programming of bend gestures, and ran the software for the studies 
we conducted.  
This accumulation of disparate components limited testing to a static lab 
environment and restricted the range of testable gestures. For example, an accelerometer 
was functionally integrated into an early prototype, but was deprecated in later iterations 
because the relatively short and potentially fragile connecting ribbon cables made larger 
gestures and rotations of the display impractical. 
More significant still, for our testing, was the limited flexibility and inherent 
fragility in the hardware. The addition of bend sensors to the display contributed to the 
relative inflexibility of the display. We did what we could, within our means, to optimize 
this sensory augmentation, including printing a custom flexible circuit for the sensors, but 
the simple act of layering the already laminated display with the sensors and an additional 
protective layer to shield the sensors resulted in a relatively stiff device, relative to the 
initial flexibility of the display itself.  
Finally, the display hardware itself exhibits a major limitation that can clearly be 
defined as an opportunity for concretization. The actual display technology itself, the 
portion of the flexible circuit in which images are rendered, has been proven through 
rigorous testing to be robust (A S U Flexible Display Center, 2012). It can withstand 
repeated bending and high impact forces. However the required supporting electronics, 
including the integrated circuits, the electronic traces that carry the power and signals, 
and the connections from these traces to the electrophoretic display are not as flexible. 
Specifically the transitions from flexible to rigid components proved to be highly 
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vulnerable to damage from bending. The physics of this are simple to understand, the 
flexible component becomes a long lever with the rigid point as a fulcrum. 
The result of this limitation, where rigid materials were destructively coupled with 
flexible ones, was a significant number of displays that were rendered unusable, 
additional physical layers of protection to reduce the likelihood of further damaged 
hardware, and modified instruction sets for study participants restricting their interactions 
with the displays. It should be emphasized at this point, that all of these challenges and 
limitations were, to some degree, predictable given the general nature of prototyping 
interactive systems with newly emergent technologies; and highly informative, revealing 
the state of the art and the opportunities for concretization.  
I will not suggest every potential concretization that would need to occur to 
translate our prototype PaperPhone into a viable commercial product. I believe most of 
these will be obvious to the reader from my description of the challenges we faced, and 
also acknowledge that the required machine genesis would likely take a number of 
unanticipated leaps and turns as it progressed. 
I will however highlight one potential area of convergence in this system. A 
display that is flexible has multiple affordances that differ from those of a rigid display. 
Many of these can be appreciated as passive material properties: a large display could be 
rolled up or folded, displays could be integrated into clothing where compliant movement 
is required, etc., however many more affordances depend on knowing the nature of the 
movements of the flexible device. For this reason, the integration of a high-resolution 
array of flex sensors into the display itself is a logical advancement. It is unclear to me 
whether there is any commonality in materials used in current or emerging sensors and 
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displays that would readily present an opportunity for a plurifunctional convergence, but 
it seems clear that the form and production technologies for both would provide this 
opportunity at the higher technical level of the manufacturing machines used in their 
production. 
I have presented explanations of concretization and abstraction, and have 
provided several examples exploring the utility and problems that may arise in systems of 
either nature. I now shift attention to some of the cross-fertilization that occurs between 
these theories in the fields of mechanology and biology. 
Intersections of Mechanology and Biology 
Valentino Braitenberg (1986) was inspired by his neuroanatomical studies, to 
present his perspective of the mechanics of cognition through the conceptual creation of 
mechanical vehicles (Braitenberg, 1986). Figure 2 shows a simple example of 
Braitenberg vehicles. He realized that when we, as external observers, observe the 
functions of a system, we are not able to conclude from those observations, what 
underlying structure is responsible for these functions and in most cases, overestimate the 
complexity of the structure. He proposed the “law of uphill analysis and downhill 
synthesis” claiming that it is easier to build a system that exhibits a complex behavior 
than to analyze a closed system and accurately estimate its structure. He demonstrated 
through his relatively simple conceptual mechanical vehicles, behaviors that convincingly 
replicated seemingly complex cognitive activity (Braitenberg, 1986).  Braitenberg’s 
example starts from biological structures, which inspires mechanological structures, 
which provide a way of seeing biologically based cognitive systems. The next section 
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continues the theme of the relation of biological and mechanological theories, providing 
additional depth to the already introduced concept of structural coupling. 
 
Figure 2. Variations of Braitenberg Vehicle 3, illustrating the relation of structure and organization as 
observed through behavioral difference, from Vehicles: Experiments in synthetic psychology. Copyright 
1986 MIT press. 
Communication and Information Flow: Structural Coupling 
Structurally determined systems do not exist in isolation. They interact with other 
objects, systems, and their environment at large through a process Maturana (2002) labels 
"structural coupling". He defines it, saying,  "I have called the dynamics of congruent 
structural changes that take place spontaneously between systems in recurrent (in fact 
recursive) interactions, as well as the coherent structural dynamics that result, structural 
coupling" (Maturana, 2002, pp. 16–17). 
This is consistent with Simondon's (1958) concept of "recurrence of causality" as 
a condition for the existence of technical individuals. He states, "Such individualization is 
possible because of the recurrence of causality in the environment which the technical 
being creates around itself, an environment which it influences and by which it is 
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influenced" (Simondon, 1958, pp. 60–61). In both the biological and mechanological 
contexts the meaning is the same. Systems can be organizationally closed, but 
interactionally open (Varela & Goguen, 1978). In humans, this openness to our 
environment provides the opportunity for structural coupling that we experience as 
perception. Varela et al. suggests a way of seeing perception as the result of energetic 
exchanges with our environment, stating, 
We can now give a preliminary formulation of what we mean by enaction. In a 
nutshell, the enactive approach consists of two points: (1) perception consists in 
perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent 
sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided. (Varela et al. 
1991, pp. 172–173) (as quoted in (Reid & Mgombelo, 2014)).  
There is a common phrase used to describe the formation of structures in brains. It 
states, “neurons that fire together, wire together” (Miller, 1996). Varela’s (1991) 
aforementioned theory is more inclusive in terms of the involved structures, but it is 
consistent with the commonly held belief about the results of concurrent neural activity.  
This section elaborated on the theory of structural coupling and its implications 
for human perception. The next section concludes the focus on connections between 
biological and mechanological perspectives on structurally determined systems with a 
discussion regarding what accounts for the viability of systems. 
Viability: Internal Unity and Relation to the External 
Simondon (1958) says, "Technical objects which in their liaison with the natural 
world put into play what is essentially a recurrent causality must be invented rather than 
developed in stages, because such objects are the cause of their own condition of 
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functioning" (Simondon, 1958, p. 61). This statement alludes to the question of the 
viability of a technical object. This section presents a dialogue, comparing Simondon’s 
and Maturana’s (2002) theoretical and philosophical stances on viability of the systems 
they study. 
Maturana (2002) presents two laws that speak to the viability of biological 
systems. These are:  "the law of conservation of organization (autopoiesis in the case of 
living systems) and the law of conservation of adaptation, that is operational congruence, 
with the medium in which a system (a living system in our case) exists" (Maturana, 2002, 
p. 10). The first of these laws focuses on the unity of the system as defined by its internal 
organization and determined by its structure (which may of course change). The second 
law focuses on the relations, the structural coupling between the system and its 
environment (anything external to its organizationally defined bounds). Again, a 
preliminary comparison between Maturana's (2002) and Simondon's (1958) perspectives 
is in order. 
Simondon (1958) describes the process by which a technical object becomes 
viable as a technical individual: 
 Little by little, as it develops in concretization, it becomes capable of doing 
without the artificial environment, and this is so because its internal coherence 
increases and its functioning system becomes closed by becoming organized. A 
concretized object is comparable to an object that is produced spontaneously. It 
becomes independent of the laboratory with which it is initially associated and 
incorporates it into itself dynamically in the performance of its functions. Its 
relationship with other objects, whether technical or natural, becomes the 
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influence which regulates it and which makes it possible for the conditions of 
functioning to be self-sustaining. The object is, then, no longer isolated; either it 
becomes associated with other objects or is self-sufficient, whereas at the 
beginning it was isolated and heteronomous. (Simondon, 1958, pp. 47–48) 
I present this quotation in an extended form to provide the reader a fuller context 
for and additional details of his meaning, but I point to a small portion of this text in 
particular. Simondon (1958) says, "its internal coherence increases and its functioning 
system becomes closed by becoming organized" (Simondon, 1958, pp. 47–48). Internal 
coherence and organizational closure precisely align with Maturana’s (2002) "law of 
conservation of organization" (Maturana, 2002, p. 10). Simondon (1958) continues the 
thought a little further along in his text, "The technical being evolves by convergence and 
by adaption to itself; it is unified from within according to a principle of internal 
resonance" (Simondon, 1958, p. 13). 
Simondon's (1958) discussion of topics related to Maturana's "law of conservation 
of adaptation" (Maturana, 2002, p. 10) is more complex and harder to draw direct 
parallels with individual quotations. This challenge is magnified by the varying levels at 
which he discusses technical objects (as elements, individuals, ensembles, and combined 
groupings, all with varying adaptations and associated milieux -- depending on the object 
in question). Simondon (1968) does however present the basic idea quite clearly in an 
interview in which he says,  
a technical object exists, is constituted, first as a unity, a solid unity, an 
intermediary between the world and man, an intermediary perhaps between two 
other technical objects, and that first stage of its development is, first of all, a 
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stage of constitution of unity, a stage of constitution of solidity. (Simondon & Le 
Moyne, 1968) 
 This emphasizes the "conservation of organization" (Maturana, 2002, p. 10), but 
also directly alludes to the relation with the external environment in which it must exist. 
Simondon (1968) goes on to say, 
 "the function of the tool is to establish a constant and non-fallacious relation 
between the body of the operator and the object on which he acts. There is an 
individuality, but an internally consistent individuality, of the object, even the 
tool" (Simondon & Le Moyne, 1968). 
 This example, while simple, illustrates a general philosophical perspective that I 
find consistent with Maturana's "conservation of adaptation" (Maturana, 2002, p. 10).  
Another reference takes the concept a step further and emphasizes the dynamic 
interplay between technical objects and the other objects and environment with which 
they interact. Simondon (1958) says,  
"Technical objects which in their liaison with the natural world put into play what 
is essentially a recurrent causality must be invented rather than developed in 
stages, because such objects are the cause of their own condition of functioning. 
Such objects are viable only if the problem is resolved that is to say, only if they 
exist along with their associated milieu" (Simondon, 1958, pp. 61–62).  
I’ve shown, through this dialog, fundamental parallels between Maturana’s (2002) 
biologically based theories and Simondon’s (1958) mechanologically based theories. This 
is sufficient evidence to arrive at the abductive conclusion that it is valid to, in 
Wittgenstein’s terms, see one theory as the other.  
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This chapter has introduced technical objects and argued for seeing them as 
structurally determined systems. This was done primarily from a theoretical perspective, 
with a few practical examples. The next chapter will focus on the practical implications 
of and questions posed by this theoretical stance. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DETERMINING STRUCTURE (IN PRACTICE) 
In the previous chapters, I have introduced the general theories of structural 
determinism and structural coupling. The informational and communication implications 
of these theories were considered. I then showed how these theories apply to technical 
objects, emphasizing the fundamental parallels between the expressions of theory in the 
natural/biological domain and the technical/mechanological domain. I will now show 
how the practical domain of making can be seen from these theoretical perspectives, 
starting with a consideration of the role of the human in the technical ensemble. 
The Human Role in the Technical Ensemble 
Simondon (1958) regards the human individual as the original technical 
individual and argues that we should see the human in the technical (Simondon, 1958). 
According to Simondon, man is comfortable with his position as “tool-bearer,” as a 
human technical individual: organizer of technical elements. When human-made 
technical individuals emerge, the human sees them as a threat, fearing they will replace 
him/her. As technical ensembles of technical individuals grow in scale, complexity and 
ubiquity, the human’s role becomes as an assistant and/or supervisor. This can be 
experienced as problematic for humans as individuals and for society at large (Simondon, 
1958, pp. 8, 92–94). Much of Simondon’s philosophy can be seen as addressing this 
concern by calling attention to the human in the technical and placing the technical not in 
opposition to, but as an essential part of a unified human culture (Simondon, 1958).  
The ALERT (Active Learning Environment with Robotic Tangibles) system 
explicitly attempted to connect the human and the machine (Lahey et al., 2009). This 
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system, which utilized tangible symbolic instructions for the programming of robots, 
required participants to occupy a shared physical space with the robots and encouraged 
them to think like the robot, planning their program by actively engaging in the space as 
they intended the robot to do (Lahey et al., 2009). ALERT systems are illustrated in 
Figure 3 and Figure 4. 
 
Figure 3. An ALERT robot reacting to a tangible fiducial programming instruction. 
 
Figure 4. Children learning to program an ALERT robot using tangible instruction objects. 
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Thor Magnusson (2009) emphasizes the often ignored human imprint on the 
technical object, focusing on the cognitive dimensions of musical instruments/interfaces. 
He differentiates between the embodied and hermeneutic relationships that are 
established in the structural coupling of musician and instrument, arguing that the former 
is dominant with traditional acoustic instruments, and that the later mode dominates with 
instruments that are fundamentally computer based (Magnusson, 2009). Magnusson 
introduces the idea of concretization as a variable in these systems, but he uses it to draw 
attention to the “black box” hidden nature of the systems that results from the 
concretization. I argue, in a way that I believe in no way contradicts Magnusson overall 
thesis, that the acoustic instrument is a highly individualized, concrete system, not in any 
way “divided against itself” (Simondon, 1958) and that the computer instrument is 
fundamentally more abstract, even if it’s interactional affordances are fixed, because of 
the initial arbitrariness of their definitions. These examples serve as a prelude for the 
remainder of this chapter, which will focus on the human dimension of technical 
ensembles, in which the human serves as creator/maker/inventor. 
An important concept to keep clear in this discussion is the difference between 
making a technical object (a machine, experiential media system, etc.) and the genesis of 
a technical object as it is understood by Simondon (1958). The genesis, in which 
concretization may, or may not, occur, refers to the evolution of a lineage of technical 
objects. It assumes the creation of multiple technical objects. A single technical object 
may be created, and may certainly be concrete in some greater or lesser degree, but 
concretization does not happen in the creation of a single technical object (Simondon, 
1958). While it is tempting to claim concretization when plurifunctional structures are 
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incorporated in the technical object (as I described in the magnetic gear mechanism of my 
Vox Curio instrument), this claim would be invalid by Simondon’s definition.  
I can identify a technical genesis, though not necessarily yet with a high degree of 
concretization, in my series of balance board interfaces. The Team Balance game system 
(see Figure 5), Physical Function math learning tool (see Figure 6) and my Snowboard 
Simulator (see Figure 7), are all of a common lineage. A convergence of these 
independent systems, incorporating the degrees of freedom of the Team Balance 
interface, with the force feedback mechanics of the Physical Function interface, and the 
sensing and vibrotactile haptic capabilities of the Snowboard Simulator would result in a 
highly dynamic and versatile experiential media system. The technical requirements for 
such integration, even in an abstract form, are significant. 
Figure 5. Team Balance physical interface hardware (left) and Team Balance game interaction (right). 
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Figure 6. Physical Function pneumatically actuated balance interface (left) and detail showing pneumatic 
and position sensor components (right). 
Figure 7. Snowboard Simulator game view (above) and haptic interface hardware being tested (below). 
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The preceding section introduced several important factors when considering the 
role of the human in the technical ensemble. I drew attention to the cultural role of the 
human as a technical individual. I introduced ways in which we can see the human in the 
technical. I emphasized the difference between the creations of individual systems from 
their genesis and illustrated this difference with references to systems of my own 
creation. The culture of making will be further considered in terms of the potential modes 
of production through which it occurs and the blurring of the boundaries between these 
modes. 
Modes of Production 
Modes of production are classified by Simondon (1958) as either industrial or 
artisanal. He summarizes these classifications saying, "The primitive artisanal phase is 
characterized by a weak correlation between the scientific and the technical, while the 
industrial phase is characterized by improved correlation" (Simondon, 1958, pp. 32–33). 
Industrial implies concretization. Artisanal implies abstraction. Simondon recognizes that 
there is an essential rhythmic oscillation in the evolution of technical elements, 
individuals and ensembles. He defines this process as “the law of relaxation”(Simondon, 
1958, p. 75) (which is likely a reference to electronic relaxation oscillator circuits). This 
process involves a progressive increase in the technical, going from elements, to 
individuals, to ensembles. The process ends and restarts with the production of a new 
technical element. The presence of a new technical element requires concretization. 
Simondon explains,  
Industrial construction of a specific technical object is possible as soon as the 
object in question becomes concrete, which means that it is understood in an 
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almost identical way from the point of view of design plan and scientific outlook. 
This explains why certain objects have been capable of being constructed 
industrially long before others. (Simondon, 1958, p. 33) 
I suggest that the nature of the artisanal workshop has dramatically transformed in 
recent years and that the potential for concretization now is widely distributed. The next 
section describes my working studio and a vision for how such a studio may evolve in the 
near future.  
Nature of a contemporary experiential media studio. As a contemporary media 
artist, my artisanal studio has many tools that were in relatively recent times, relegated to 
the industrial mode of production. The mechanism by which these tools became available 
may be described as an inductive transference of technicity: technical elements and 
individuals come into being as a result of tools and infrastructure with a higher level of 
concretization (Simondon, 1958). I identify the result of this process as a democratization 
of industrialization. Tools for concretization are now available to the individual maker 
and to small groups of makers.  
 
Figure 8. 3D model of SphereBot robot showing mechanical structure, motors and batteries. 
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The evolution of technology has compressed industrial processes into forms that 
are now accessible at the artisan workshop level. CAD (Computer Aided Design) and 
CAM (Computer Aided Manufacturing) tools allow for systems to be rapidly prototyped, 
allowing a true machine genesis. CAD tools, many available for free, allow systems to be 
virtually built and tested, with endless variations of forms and materials. With advanced 
tools, many of which are freely available to students, testing goes well beyond basic 
mechanics. It includes tools such as fluid and thermal dynamics, stress testing, and 
production feasibility evaluation. My SphereBot (an individual project) and PeteBot (a 
collaborative production) projects, shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9, demonstrate projects 
realized primarily through a CAD-CAM process. While it would have been possible to 
produce these projects without these design and fabrication tools, it would have been 
significantly more difficult to achieve the required mechanical relationships and precision 
of fitting. Most importantly however, producing these systems with these tools opens up 
potential for iterations and new systems, using components of these systems as 
foundations. This potential simply doesn’t exist on the same time scale in the absence of 
such tools.  
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Figure 9. Animatronic head of PeteBot featuring embedded audio/video sensors and servo motor actuators. 
CAM tools allow virtual machines to be physically instantiated, allowing further 
iterative evolution. The laser cutter, a revolutionary technology in this domain, is a highly 
evolved technical ensemble, able to simulate an arbitrarily complex set of constraints to 
define a controlled cutting path. This technical ensemble facilitates the production of 
accurate and precise mechanical components, and generally does so far more quickly 
than other traditional tool processes. While in some cases, the parts produced by a laser 
cutter could be produced with relative ease (albeit requiring more time in most cases) by 
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a simpler machine, in other cases the output of the laser cutter is virtually impossible to 
produce by other means, including most alternative CNC tools. The wings on my 
OctoBoto project, shown in figure XX, are a clear example of a component that is 
difficult to imagine producing with another tool. An important feature of the laser cutter 
is the ability to quickly and directly fabricate in final production materials, at a relatively 
large scale. 
Figure 10. OctoBoto responsive kinetic sculpture featuring hand assembled, laser-cut domponents. Overall 
view (left), detail (right). 
Technical elements such as microcontrollers, breakout boards, shields, and other 
components with high levels of embedded technical concretization are widely and 
affordably available. Just as in Simondon’s example of the quality of a needle as a 
measure of the “degree of perfection of a nation’s industry” (Simondon, 1958, p. 85), the 
integrated circuit, in all its rich variety, is an embodiment of tremendous technical 
achievement and provides versatile organizational dynamics. By themselves of course, 
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they are inconsequential. They are only of consequence when structurally coupled with 
other technical and natural elements, individuals and ensembles. 
Information networks, the Internet at large being the most prominent example, are 
prime examples of technical ensembles. The veracity of this claim could be measured by 
looking at the technical genesis and the structure of contemporary information networks, 
both big and small, but the strongest evidence in support of this claim is the cultural 
impact that information networks have had on our culture. Simondon argued in 1958 that, 
 “Today, technicality tends to reside in ensembles. For this reason, it can become 
a foundation for culture, to which it will bring a unifying and stabilizing power, 
making culture respond to the reality which it expresses and which it governs” 
(Simondon, 1958, p. 9).  
This quotation may be taken in with a sense of dread, exhilaration or something in 
between, but I suspect few readers in 2015 would deny that this accurately describes the 
magnitude of the Internet’s impact on our culture. For the artisanal workshop, the Internet 
concentrates global knowledge on every subject and places it on the workbench next to 
the hammer and soldering iron.  
Collectively the technicality embodied in these elements, individuals and 
ensembles brings many of the affordances of the industrial to the artisanal. Significant 
differences remain of course, the scale, capital resources, and the like are not present in 
the small workshop or studio, but the lines are blurred. I’ve painted a rosy picture of the 
affordances of the industrial modes of production that have populated studios like those I 
inhabit. It would be reasonable to ask, what’s next, and is there anything left from the 
artisanal worth saving? These questions form the basis of the next topics. 
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Seeing making spaces as seeing spaces. Contemporary making spaces, even 
those equipped with the latest in CAD, CAM, motion capture, visualization and robotics 
systems may still be lacking something important. Bret Victor (2014) argues for the 
creation of "Seeing Spaces", as extensions of "Maker Spaces" (Victor, 2014). He 
identifies a trend in the types of systems that are made in maker spaces. He notes that 
many projects are not simple static objects, or even basic mechanical systems  (which I 
observe may reveal their functional status through their tangible form), but instead are 
systems that include electronics and other computational hardware and software. These 
systems frequently have a dynamic interaction with the world, through relations of 
sensors and actuators (Victor, 2014). 
Victor (2014) argues that the tools we have at our disposal in most shops, studios 
and maker spaces are all primarily designed for shaping and assembling things, not for 
understanding the things we have made.  He proposes building maker spaces with an 
embedded suite of tools focused on seeing, in high functional detail, the status and 
behavior of what we build. Victor presents three levels, or dimensions of seeing: seeing 
inside, seeing across time and seeing across possibilities (Victor, 2014).  
Victor (2014) separates types of making into three primary modes: tinkering, 
engineering and science. Tinkering happens without any theoretical understanding of the 
operational principles of the medium with which one is working. Engineering takes place 
when one understands the theoretical principles that define one's medium. Science is 
required when new theory is required. Victor argues that "seeing tools" allow a maker to 
work across all of these modes (Victor, 2014).  
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Victor's (2014) informal presentation of this theory frames his "seeing space" in 
conduit metaphor terms (Reddy, 1979). Taken in this sense, it is inconsistent with 
structural coupling theory (Maturana, 2002) and Reddy's tool maker paradigm (Reddy, 
1979), but in fundamental ways, Victor's theory may be seen as strongly aligned with 
these theories. As I interpret Victor's intentions, he emphasizes the need for a continuous, 
immersive, multidimensional, multimodal, stream of data that is always available at a 
glance. A system of this sort could be seen as establishing a recurrent causality 
(Simondon, 1958), a structural coupling (Maturana, 2002), a persistent, bidirectional 
passing of signals that need to be interpreted through a building process with the limited 
materials we have at our disposal (Reddy, 1979). The persistence of signals that Victor 
proposes strongly differentiates his thinking from traditional engineering and scientific 
approaches that bring out a specific seeing tool (an oscilloscope for example) to look for 
a specific bit of data at a specific moment. This isolated look at a system leaves us with 
an impoverished understanding of the system. A continuous, multifaceted signal dialog 
offers far greater potential to "understand" a system. 
Victor (2014) presents a vision for studios and laboratories of the future. What, if 
anything does the traditions of craft contribute to the advancement of experiential media 
and other technology? Is the act of making an act of thinking? These are the next topics. 
Thinking to make and making to think. In John Hart's preface to Simondon's 
(1958) On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, he says, 
The crafts can act to provide continuity of meaning through direct knowledge of 
function made specific by the understanding of gesture. Nonverbal knowledge 
articulated by the hands and feet is the body's way of thinking just as the chiseling 
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of words from sound is the mind's way of making contact. (Simondon, 1958, pp. 
xv–xvi) 
He later notes,  
The studies of the crafts and of linguistics as prelude to mechanology take us 
closer to the centre of somatic reality. They have the effect of joining the distance 
that has long separated occidental man from the work of his hands. (Simondon, 
1958, p. xxii) 
I suggest that such studies, far from serving only as a prelude, should be, as I have 
in this document, considered in parallel and on equal grounds with mechanology. 
Sennett (2008) introduces his book "The Craftsman" with a description of an 
encounter with his teacher Hannah Arendt. This encounter and conversation occurred just 
after the Cuban Missile Crisis and the threat of nuclear annihilation was in the forefront 
of her consciousness. Sennett said, "She wanted me to draw the right lesson: people who 
make things usually don't understand what they are doing" (Sennett, 2008, p. 1). Sennett 
explains, "In the working out of Greek culture, its peoples came increasingly to believe 
that Pandora stood for an element of their own natures; culture founded on man-made 
things risks continual self-harm" (Sennett, 2008, p. 2). He goes on, explaining her 
perspective, saying, "Technology itself can seem the enemy rather than simply a risk" 
(Sennett, 2008, p. 3). He continues to elaborate on the differences in their way of seeing 
the situation,  
Animal laborens is, as the name implies, the human being akin to a beast of 
burden, a drudge condemned to routine. ... Animal laborens takes the work as an 
end in itself. … By contrast, Homo faber is her image of men and women doing 
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another kind of work, making a life in common. Again, Arendt enriched an 
inherited idea. The Latin tag Homo faber means simply "man as maker." ... Homo 
faber is the judge of material labor and practice, not Animal laboren's colleague 
but his superior. ... Whereas Animal laborens is fixated in the question "how?" 
Homo faber asks "Why?" ... For Arendt, the mind engages once labor is done. 
Another, more balanced view is that thinking and feeling are contained within the 
process of making. (Sennett, 2008, pp. 6–7) 
Sennett suggests we ask, "what the process of making concrete things reveals 
about ourselves" (Sennett, 2008). (In this context, it seems clear that Sennett's (2008) use 
of the term concrete matches the more common use of the term, describing a real, 
materialized instant of something, as opposed to Simondon's (1958) more specialized use 
of the term to imply a reference to a genetic evolution of an object.) Sennett concludes, 
saying  
I want to make the case that my juvenile self could not then make to Arendt, that 
people can learn about themselves through the things they make, that material 
culture matters. … Craftsmanship names an enduring, basic human impulse, the 
desire to do a job well for its own sake. ... craftsmanship focuses on objective 
standards, on the thing in itself. (Sennett, 2008, pp. 8–9)  
Just as Simondon (1958) identifies the technical, not as a force outside of, and in 
opposition to humanity and culture, but something fundamentally human and part of 
culture, Sennett recognizes material culture. He sees, as the essence of this culture, not 
merely material artifacts, but more significantly, the craftsmanship that persists in 
material and immaterial human activity. David Pye narrows in on the topic still further, 
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identifying a particular mode of making and fundamental qualities that emerge from this 
mode. This next section provides a unique way of seeing what the industrial and concrete 
may be missing.  
Artisanal process: what should not be lost. David Pye (Pye, 1968) says, 
"Design is what, for practical purposes, can be conveyed in words and by drawing: 
workmanship is what, for practical purposes, can not" (Pye, 1968, p. 17). These 
epistemological definitions which differentiate design and workmanship parallel my 
understanding of praxical knowledge, which I define as embodied knowledge that 
emerges through active engagement with the world and resists translation into symbolic 
representation. It also has important connections with Simondon’s (1958) conception of 
the abstract and concrete. Simondon says, “Invention takes place on a middle level 
between the concrete and the abstract, the level of diagrams, which implies an earlier 
existence and a coherence for its representations” (Simondon, 1958, p. 86). This “earlier 
existence and coherence” is the primitive (fundamental) essence that workmanship 
provides.  Pye continues,  
There is in the man-made world a whole domain of quality which is not the result 
of design and owes little to the designer. On the contrary, indeed, the designer is 
deep in its debt, for every card in his hand was put there originally by the 
workman ... Designers have on been able to exist by exploiting what workmen 
have evolved or invented. (Pye, 1968, p. 17) 
In Simondon’s (1958) terms, invention, the creation of the technical individual, 
cannot take place without technical elements (Simondon, 1958, p. 86), which at repeated 
points in the history of the technical, come into existence as a result of the human 
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individuals and ensembles of human individuals working in the artisanal mode 
(Simondon, 1958, pp. 91–92). 
Pye’s (1968) thinking parallels that of Simondon’s (1958) and Maturana’s (2002) 
in other profound ways. Pye says,  
This domain of quality is usually talked of and thought of in terms of material. 
We talk as though the material itself conferred the quality. ... Only worked 
material has quality, and pieces of worked material are made to show their quality 
by men, or put together so that together they show a quality which singly they had 
not. "Good Material" is a myth. (Pye, 1968, p. 18) 
This idea directly echoes Simondon, who says, "What is organized is these 
technicalities; the elements also are organized, but only in so far as they are bearers of 
these technicalities and not because of anything that has to do with their own materiality" 
(Simondon, 1958, p. 87).  As both authors (Pye, 1968; Simondon, 1958) emphasize, it is 
not ultimately the material itself but the organization of this material that matters. Pye’s 
proposition that materials put together may manifest a quality that was not present in the 
individual materials (Pye, 1968, p. 18) suggests that structural coupling is occurring, not 
only between the materials, but more importantly, between the composite system and a 
human who, as determined by their own structure, experiences the result (Maturana, 
2002). This reading of these texts is further reinforced by Simondon’s statement, "Usage 
brings together heterogeneous structures and functions in genres and species which get 
their meaning from the relationships between their particular functions and another 
function, that of the human being in action" (Simondon, 1958, pp. 11–12). It is in the 
refinement of materials, in the forming and structuring of the materials, and in the 
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convergence of these materials with other materials that the qualities we prize emerge. 
This process of refinement, as described by Pye (1968), is akin to the concretization 
process described by Simondon (1958).  Quality, seen from Pye's perspective may be 
seen as equating to viability, in Simondon's terms. I argue that an object becomes viable 
by non-self-destructively fulfilling its intermediary function. The workman makes a 
material viable for its intended functional and/or aesthetic/artistic purpose through their 
structural coupling with the material. 
Comparisons between Pye’s (1968) way of seeing traditions of workmanship and 
Simondon’s (1958) view of the genesis of technical objects are revealing. Pye says, "In 
speaking of good material we are paying an unconscious tribute to the enormous strength 
of the traditions of workmanship still shaping the world even now (and still largely 
unwritten)" (Pye, 1968, p. 18). The "traditions of workmanship" of which Pye speaks, 
makes explicit a historical dimension, an evolutionary genesis of technique. Technical 
objects are defined in terms of their genesis (Simondon, 1958, pp. 8, 12). I argue that the 
tradition of continuous refinement and evolution of techniques that Pye discusses is an 
example of concretization. 
I’ve introduced the significance of material culture as seen by Sennett (2008) and 
outlined strong parallels between Pye’s (1968) philosophies of workmanship and 
Simondon’s (1958) philosophies of the technical. While this indirectly addresses the 
importance of the artisanal process, these next discussions will provide more specificity.  
Pye (1968) cuts to the heart of what he sees as a primary issue with the industrial 
mode of production,  
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the greater part of all manufacture now is mass-production; in which, although 
there is some bad workmanship, much is excellent. Much of it has never been 
surpassed and some never equaled. The deterioration comes not because of bad 
workmanship in mass-production but because the range of qualities which mass-
production is capable of just now is so dismally restricted; ... as if the same short 
tune of clear unmodulated notes were being endlessly repeated. (Pye, 1968, pp. 
18–19) 
Pye (1968) identifies the uniformity and consistency that results from the 
industrial mode of production as a blessing and a curse. He points to “the workmanship 
of risk” (Pye, 1968, p. 20), which incudes working with materials that fundamentally do 
not guarantee a successful outcome, as a making mode that by its nature avoids many of 
these negative qualities of the industrial mode.  
Organic materials, or natural elements, offer an inherent complexity and richness 
that is often engineered out of refined materials, or technical elements. This complexity 
arises from the natural processes by which these organic materials come into being. In 
this text I use the word organic with the intended meaning of naturally developing, not 
man-made, not technical. I do not intend the meaning of carbon-based.  
The processes by which organic materials come into being have an abundance of 
variables. In the case of plants, from which we derive the widely used material of wood, 
these variables include fluctuations of temperature, water, wind pressure, air quality, 
sunlight, soil quality, and interaction with other plants and animals. All of these variables, 
none of which are static, are recorded in the material of the plant as it grows (this is a 
form of memory in the context of material computation). The cellular structure is 
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perceived in terms of porosity, grain patterns, color, hardness, shape, etc. All of these 
characteristics determine the physics of the material, and not just the physics as a 
homogenous mass, but variable physics at a microscopic level. In a technical element, 
these physics could be defined as a core part of the element’s technicality (Simondon, 
1958). The physics of these materials express themselves in the rich visual, sonic, tactile, 
olfactory and taste information that they have the potential to generate in an observer 
through structural coupling (Maturana, 2002).  
The materials described in this discussion are useful examples to draw 
connections, and make distinctions, between natural and technical elements. Wood, a 
product of an autopoetic system, is a natural element. Maturana (2002) argues, “ living 
systems are never out of place, or "more" or "less" adapted while living” (Maturana, 
2002, p. 17). Maturana continues,  
it is precisely because a living system exists as a totality, through a molecular 
architectural dynamics and thus is realized moment after moment according to 
the operation of the local structural coherences of its molecular components, that 
there is no general organizational principle or force guiding the operation of the 
molecules that compose it in the integration of a whole. (Maturana, 2002, p. 17) 
It is in this sense that Simondon (1958) separates technical objects from natural 
objects. He claims, 
 There should be no confusing of a tendency towards concretization with a status 
of absolutely concrete existence. Though every technical object possesses to some 
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degree aspects of residual abstraction, one cannot go to the extent of speaking of 
technical objects as if they were natural objects. (Simondon, 1958, p. 50)1 
Technical elements, such as plywood and MDF, in contrast to Maturana’s (2002) 
definition of natural elements, are structured with a “general organizational principle” 
(Maturana, 2002, p. 17). As discussed earlier, technical objects may exhibit varying 
levels of hypertelia (Simondon, 1958, p. 51) as a result of their specialization.  
Of particular interest in my current work are the acoustical, structural, mechanical 
and aesthetic properties of natural wood, which I discuss in the upcoming section, 
Building Media Systems, which describes my experience creating several media systems. 
The next section provides additional details of Pye’s (1968) theories of material and 
making, which are related to Simondon’s (1958) ideas on the existence of technical 
objects. 
Workmanship of risk, constraints, and self-jigging. Pye (1968) finds the word 
craftsmanship troubling in its ambiguity and culturally ascribed meanings.  He addresses 
this concern and proposes and alternative phrase with a specific intended meaning. He 
says, 
If I shall ascribe a meaning to the word craftsmanship, I shall say as a first 
approximation that it means simply workmanship using any kind of technique or 
                                                 
1 I question the inclusion of the word ‘Though’, in the start of the second sentence 
of this quotation. This may be a slightly inappropriate artifact of the translation, though I 
am unable to read the original text to evaluate my assumption. I believe excluding this 
word makes the meaning more consistent in the context of this text.  
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apparatus, in which the quality of the result is not predetermined, but depends on 
the judgment, dexterity and care which the maker exercises as he works. The 
essential idea is that the quality of the result is continually at risk during the 
process of making; and so I shall call this kind of workmanship 'The 
workmanship of risk'. (Pye, 1968, p. 20) 
Pye’s (1968) ‘workmanship of risk’ can be seen as a description of a particular 
type of structural coupling, one in which the coupled elements all have significant 
margins of indetermination (Simondon, 1958, p. 4). Pye clarifies his meaning of risk and 
suggests how to differentiate the ‘workmanship of risk’ from the ‘workmanship of 
certainty’, asking, "Is the result predetermined and unalterable once production begins?" 
(Pye, 1968, p. 22). The margins of indetermination in the human individual, the tools 
used and the material allow the entry of minute variations, nuance and other artifacts that 
are commonly identified as expressive and, indeed, individualizing. 
The workmanship of risk may be thought of as a form of concretization. Pye 
explains, 
The first thing to be observed about printing, or any other representative example 
of the workmanship of certainty, is that it originally involves more of judgment, 
dexterity and care than writing does, not less ... all this judgment, dexterity, and 
care has been concentrated and stored up. (Pye, 1968, p. 21) 
The concentrating and storing up of workmanship is a physically embodied record 
of concretized workmanship. This record is represented in the tools, machines and 
factories built by the workers. I choose the word 'represented' here intentionally. I do not 
intend the meaning of information transfer as exemplified by Reddy's (1979) conduit 
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metaphor, but, mean precisely the structural re-presentation of information as expressed 
by his toolmaker paradigm.  
The ‘workmanship of risk’ does not describe a constant freeform relationship that 
is completely uncontrolled. The degree of risk for any given operation can be moderated 
by a process Pye (1968) calls ‘regulation’ (Pye, 1968). Regulation may be thought of as 
limiting the “margins of indetermination” in a system (Simondon, 1958). According to 
Pye, this is done through dexterity, gradualness, and shape-determining systems. Shape 
determining systems are constraints (Pye, 1968, pp. 34–35). I will return to a particularly 
interesting mode of constraint Pye identifies as ‘self-jigging’ after presenting an extended 
consideration of the application of constraints and a consideration of constraints as they 
apply to a robotic system I produced. 
Constraints. Constraints are fundamental to making. Let’s consider the simple act 
of drawing as a making activity. As I have previously described, all the systems involved 
in this activity (the human individual, and all the materials and tools) can be seen as 
structurally determined systems and interactions between these systems as structural 
coupling. The drawing surface establishes the first constraint. One may move a marking 
device near the surface without making any marks, but once the marking device intersects 
the drawing surface, a mark is made. Marking gestures frequently have what may be 
considered a ramp-up, or pre-flight period that establishes a particular energy and 
trajectory, producing a characteristic profile to the mark that is made. Similarly, marks 
may have a post-flight takeoff, an exit from the drawing surface. This exit may be at a 
shallow angle, resulting in a subtle, fading tail to the mark, or may take off at a sharp 
angle, leaving an abrupt ending, or even a slight backlash, to the mark. The drawing 
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surface may be a rigid plane, or a soft, possibly contoured, form. The characteristics, the 
structures, of this constraint and the drawing medium, will significantly affect the 
resulting line qualities and the overall character of the drawing.  
The anatomy, or structure, of the artist engaged in the drawing activity provides 
additional constraints. The wrist only moves so far, the elbow only has a single degree of 
freedom and is dependent on the shoulder for expanded ranges of motion. It is interesting 
to observe that throughout the human body, the pattern tends to be alternating joints with 
highly limited degrees of freedom (the elbow for example) with joints with more degrees 
of freedom (the wrist and elbow in this example). The same pattern can be seen going 
from ankle to knee, to hips. This structure determines the organization of the human 
body. These constraints, combined with the constraint of the drawing surface, can 
produce useful, and sometimes frustrating restrictions to the drawing gesture.  These 
constraints may be considered soft constraints that can be consciously retrained and 
temporarily overridden. Drawing a circle requires coordinated movements of multiple 
joints. Drawing a consistent series of arc shaped marks may be accomplished with quick 
repetitive wrist motion and a slow retraction of the arm with a subtle bend of the elbow 
and movement at the shoulder. In this case, the elbow and shoulder are relatively static 
constraints for each mark in the series and the pivot of the wrist is a strong constraint, 
especially when combined with the constraint of the drawing surface. 
What happens when the artist wants to draw a straight line, or a perfect circle? 
They may train their body to produce these shapes through a precisely choreographed 
movement of their joints, but in many cases, they decide it is time to call on external 
constraints and pick up a ruler, a compass, or another drawing template that will 
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structurally couple with their drawing surface and their drawing tool to increase the 
regulation and accomplish the task with relative ease. This describes structural coupling 
with varying regulation of ‘degrees of indetermination’ involving humans and tools. I 
will now provide an example with a robotic system.  
Camera Projector Robot. CPR (Camera Projector Robot) is relatively simple in 
terms of its basic components and operation. Figure 11 shows the CPR system. It has a 
single camera and a single video projector mounted in a motorized pan-tilt mechanism. 
The camera and projector are arranged so that they face the same direction. The camera 
“sees” the same space that the projector produces an image in. Ideally these components 
would share the same optical nodal point so that they would have identical visual 
perspectives. As it is, they are close together, but the system exhibits parallax problems. 
This is a negligible issue with distant objects in the camera-projector view, but becomes 
more of an issue the closer objects are to CPR.  
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Figure 11. Camera Projector Robot (CPR) system. 
The physical movements of the pan-tilt mechanism accentuate the parallax 
problem. Again, the ideal axes of the pan and tilt movements would align with the optical 
nodal points of the camera and the projector so that movements of the system would not 
result in changing foreground and background visual information. This performance 
would be very useful when attempting to augment a space with visual information based 
on the visual information received by the camera sensor. Aligning the visual information 
and maintaining common perspectives is facilitated by such a structural configuration of 
sensor and actuator elements. However there is a counter-argument that would suggest 
such a configuration might not be ideal.  
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Humans (and other animals) use parallax as part of their sensorimotor perceptual 
system to construct visual information from the raw light signals acquired by our eyes. 
Notice that the axes of rotation or the head, as determined by the location and mechanical 
characteristics of our spine, do not align with the nodal points of our eyes. Our eyes shift 
from side to side and move up and down when we tilt or rotate our head. This, combined 
with the binocular spacing of our eyes, insures that we do not have a stable relationship 
between foreground and background visual information, with very practical results of 
discriminating objects in our environment. The same opportunity exists for the CPR 
system. Theoretically it could learn about its body and external world by moving and 
receiving visual feedback during these movements. It has the additional capacity of 
projecting visual information into its environment and using the transformed feedback 
from this information as additional reference material with which to understand its world. 
A sensorimotor learning interaction similar to this is described by Philipona et al. 
(Philipona, O’Regan, & Nadal, 2003). 
The arrangement of sensors and actuators in the CPR system are a major part of 
its structure and thereby significantly define its organization, which we experience as 
interaction affordances. The most interesting structural elements in CPR are not its 
tangible elements, but its intangible ones: it camera view and projection space. These 
elements may be seen as gradients, with sharp boundary edges, but as a property of their 
structure, with progressively less substance (to use a term typically reserved for tangible 
media) as the distance from the camera and projector increases. Due to the programming 
of the system, which can also be seen as a structural change, the camera view is 
experienced as a tangible structure, even though it is not physically tactile. The 
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projector’s projection of light provides an equally intangible structure. Taken 
collectively, the camera and projector constitute a system that is fully capable of 
structurally coupling with external structurally determined systems. The additional 
motorized, mechanical structure expands the dynamic organizational range of CPR. In its 
debut application, CPR allowed a projected image the Earth’s moon to be pushed around 
through bodily interactions with the projected image. The description of CPR suggested 
the interesting possibility of seeing intangible elements in terms of their structure. I will 
now return to a description of tangible interactions with structurally determined systems 
with the presentation of a concept identified by Pye (1968) as self-jigging. 
Self-jigging. Self-jigging (Pye, 1968, p. 35), which is illustrated in Figure 12, may 
be seen as a process in which one structurally determined system, which for this example 
we will identify as a chisel, is structurally coupled with another structurally determined 
system, which I will call the material. In this process, a human individual, who we will 
call the maker, is structurally coupled to the chisel. At the instant the structural coupling 
between the chisel and the material is initiated, the structure, and thereby the 
organization, of the maker is completely determining the structural coupling between the 
chisel and the material. The maker’s organization must be sufficiently regulated (margins 
of indetermination minimized and prioritized) such that this initial coupling of the chisel 
and material matches her intent (which is determined by her structure at that instant). As 
the structural coupling between the chisel and the material continues, the structure of the 
chisel, the material and the maker all change. For now, the structural change of the maker 
will be disregarded, it is highly important, but not the focus of this topic. The structural 
change of the chisel will likely be microscopic in the course of a brief structural coupling 
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with an appropriate, material, so it too will be disregarded for this example (although 
with different specific examples the changes could be more dramatic and instantaneous). 
The structural change of the material is of the utmost significance for this example. As 
the chisel progresses in the material, the structural coupling between the chisel and the 
material fundamentally changes. The channel cut by the chisel, now regulates its path. 
The maker, still essential for imparting energy into this system, is less critical in 
determining the relationship between the chisel and the material.  
 
Figure 12. Self-jigging. From The nature and art of workmanship. Copyright 1968 by Cambridge UP. 
Self-jigging (Pye, 1968) is also an essential form of structural coupling found in 
the operation of traditional mechanical shop tools. Shop tools provide a variety of 
constraints that are fundamental to their operation. These constraints are gradually 
integrated into the maker’s cognitive structure in an embodied form “in the praxis of 
living” (Maturana, 2002, p. 32). These constraints are physical and in many cases are 
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directly experienced by the maker as she uses these tools. I described the constraints as 
being fundamental to the operation of the tools. A couple of examples will help to clarify 
the meaning of this statement.  
A table saw has a thin, essentially planar, blade with a circular array of teeth 
around the circumference of the blade. The planar shape of this blade is key to its use. 
When material initially comes in contact with the rotating blade, it may do so at any 
angle, however as soon as the cut is started the angle of the material in relation to the 
blade becomes constrained to that defined by the plane of the blade. If one attempts to 
deviate the trajectory of the material away from this constrained angle, the blade will 
bind with the material, creating a friction that will burn the material, throw it across the 
room, or cause other potentially disastrous results. Fortunately the table saw has 
constraining affordances beyond that established by the plane of the spinning blade. It has 
a fence that is arranged in a parallel configuration with the blade for the material to be 
moved along and tracks in the table surface, also arranged in parallel to the plane of the 
blade to allow for other sliding guides for the material. The tabletop of the table saw 
provides one of the most critical constraints of the whole system. The plane of the 
tabletop restricts the material from rotating away from the plane of the blade (providing a 
constraint orthogonal to that provided by the fence or tracks). When a maker uses the 
table saw she feeds material into blade, using the combined constraints provided by the 
system to safely cut the material. She feels the restricted planar motion as she pushes the 
material through the blade. Furthermore, she feels the tangible product of this planar 
motion in the form that is recorded in the material processed by the table saw. Although a 
table saw can be used to produce a variety of shapes and forms (even circles), the most 
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characteristic products have two parallel sides (established by the relationship of the 
fence and the saw blade). This knowledge becomes part of the maker’s pallet and is 
embodied in her memory as muscle memory (from the cutting process and through 
tangible interaction with the products of this process) and in the physical artifacts that 
populate her workspace. 
The form and mechanical characteristics inherent in the tools may, through 
structural coupling, be instantiated in the materials they are used to process. In the case of 
the table saw, I identify the two parallel surfaces established by the relationship of the 
blade and the fence as the foundational, primitive, form. This form is transferred from the 
tool to the object produced and to the maker in the form of haptic/kinesthetic information. 
The resulting object possesses the capacity to recreate, again through structural coupling, 
this same formal (shape, mechanical, haptic) information to another object or person. 
Up to this point in this chapter I have presented perspectives of the human role in 
the technical ensemble. I discussed modes of production as seen by Simondon (1958) and 
showed how the organizational boundaries of these modes may be seen as blurring. I 
introduced Victor’s (2014) ideas maker spaces as ‘seeing spaces’. I presented an in depth 
discussion of artisanal making, synthesizing Pye’s (1968) theories with those theories 
previously discussed in this document. I used examples from my material studio practice 
to illustrate the points discussed. I wrapped up this section with a presentation of Pye’s 
theory of self-jigging. The next section will build on these ideas, presenting a perspective 
of making as structural coupling, discussing what it means to know material, and 
considering how these concepts may lead to a vision of material computation. 
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Seeing Making as Structural Coupling 
I argue that making can be seen as a unique form of structural coupling in which 
the maker intentionally alters the structure of the object or system they are making. 
Earlier discussions of structural coupling emphasized the mutual structural changes that 
occur to the involved structurally determined systems through this process (Maturana, 
1987, 2002; Simondon, 1958). The addition here is the concept of intention. I argue that 
intention is not a mysterious entity requiring additional theory to come to terms with. 
What we call intention is merely the observable cognitive manifestation of a specific 
dynamic organization that is determined by the structure of the system (Maturana, 2002). 
Armstrong, citing Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991), in his 
thesis An Enactive Approach to Digital Musical Instrument Design, states, 
 Merleau-Ponty’s concept of incorporation is consistent with the enactive 
model of cognition. In the enactive view, the systems and structures that play 
a determining role in the formation of cognitive patterns are in turn determined 
by the emergent patterns of interactional dynamics. Or to put it another way, at 
the same time that repetitive dispositions towards action and modes of 
perceiving are engendered within the agent’s sensorimotor mechanisms, 
“cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that 
enable action to be perceptually guided (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991: 
172-173).” This formulation is essentially a latter day reworking of the fully 
recursive process, encompassing incorporating practices, that Merleau-Ponty 
defined as the intentional arc4 (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2004). (Armstrong, 2006, 
p. 21) 
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With respect to the maker, this argument implies that what can be made is 
determined by the structure of the maker, the structure of any tools used by the maker and 
the structure of the medium with which they are working, and all of these structurally 
determined systems continuously change structure (and potentially organization) through 
this structural coupling we observe as the making process. This leads to the question of 
what a maker means when they say that they ‘know their material’. 
As a sculptor, I may claim to know my material. This expression of a sensitivity 
to, or understanding of my media, is not fundamentally about knowing its chemical 
composition or the manufacturing or processing that brought it forth. I may have some 
incidental understanding of these details, but what I’m really saying is that I understand 
its functional characteristics, or to phrase it more consistently with my perception of 
material as a structurally determined system, I say I understand its organization 
(Maturana, 2002). I know how it will respond to a variety of tools, whether or not it will 
polish to a glossy finish, how it will interact with other materials, how plastic it is at 
varying temperatures, how conductive or insulating it is, etc. In the next section I explore 
the relationships of structure and organization in materials I use to construct experiential 
media systems. This knowledge of materials is not limited to tangible media. It extends to 
electronics, code, and, as I shall further emphasize in upcoming arguments, conceptual 
media. 
Simondon (1958) emphasizes the importance of understanding the structure and 
organization of media. He says,  
The technical imagination may be considered as defined by a particular 
sensitiveness to the technicality of elements that paves the way for the discovery 
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of possible connections. The inventor does not proceed ex nihilo, beginning with 
matter to which he gives form; he begins with elements that are already technical 
and then discovers an individual being that is capable of incorporating them. The 
compatibility of individuals in a technical individual implies an associated milieu. 
Therefore the technical individual should be imagined, that is to say, it should be 
assumed to be constructed, as an ensemble of organized technical systems. The 
individual is a stable system of technicalities of elements organized into an 
ensemble. What is organized is these technicalities; the elements also are 
organized, but only in so far as they are bearers of these technicalities and not 
because of anything that has to do with their own materiality. (Simondon, 1958, p. 
87) 
Recognizing the inventor’s sensitivity to the technicalities (Simondon, 1958, p. 
87) of their media is an appropriate way of translating what we mean by knowing our 
material. Fundamentally it is not about the material in and of itself, it is about 
understanding the organizational dynamics (Maturana, 2002) of the material, and how it 
will couple with other natural and technical elements. I argue that from this perspective, 
we can see the invention process as a form of coding and the resulting systems as a form 
of computers. This way of seeing the coupling of structurally determined systems as 
computation may be labeled material computation. 
Material Computation 
Material computation may be thought of as a means of processing information 
through the physical characteristics of the medium. The entity that I identify in this 
section as ‘information’ should be seen as I have previously described it, as a structural 
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change, in a structurally determined system, as a result of an energetic exchange, through 
structural coupling, with other structurally determined systems, as determined by the 
instantaneous structure of each coupled system (Maturana, 2002).  
At a fundamental level, the systems we call digital, are no different than any other 
computational system. What sets them apart is the application of a threshold, defining 
on/off, or high/low, binary states. This artificial constraint, which abstracts, concretizes 
and renders generic the information it allows these systems to process, is extremely 
useful, as evidenced by the rich ecosystem of digital computational systems and 
applications we enjoy. Material computation, as I define it, does not utilize binary, or for 
that matter, necessarily any discrete states. In other words, it does not simply replicate the 
logical structure of digital/binary computer systems with alternative materials. It instead, 
takes advantage of the continuous and often inconsistent nature of the materials involved. 
Properties such as drift, bounce and hysteresis that are often actively engineered out of 
digital systems, may serve useful computational functions in material computational 
systems.  
A common, and valid argument questioning the validity of material computation 
as a form of computation emphasizes the requirement for a computational system to be 
able to be programmed. I argue that one need only broaden their definition of what 
constitutes programming to recognize that non-digital, materials can be programmed. 
Take the simple example of a sheet of paper. Lets suspend that sheet of paper on a 
clothesline with two clothespins. The paper now processes input, e.g. air pressure from 
the wind, and outputs results, e.g. acoustic information, according to its current structural 
characteristics. If we change its structure, say for example by creating a crisp diagonal 
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fold across its width, it will now process the same information differently and provide a 
different output. The sheet of paper has been programmed. Interestingly, this computer 
can also, in a sense, program itself. Left in the wind, its structure, its program, will 
gradually transform. Environmental variables, such as humidity, will result in program 
changes. Our computer has built in atmospheric sensors! Simondon (1958) states, “the 
functioning of the machine conceals a certain margin of indetermination. It is such a 
margin that allows for the machine's sensitivity to outside information” (Simondon, 1958, 
p. 4). Simondon continues, 
Modern calculating machines are not pure automata; they are technical beings 
which, over and above their automatic adding ability (or decision-making ability, 
which depends on the working of elementary switches possess a very great range 
of circuit-commutations which make it possible to program the working of the 
machine by limiting its margin of indetermination. (Simondon, 1958, p. 5) 
We program material computational systems by modifying their structure and 
thereby modulating their margins of indetermination. 
Material computational systems may offer advantages over their digital 
counterparts. They offer continuous rather than discrete operation, may be seen as passive 
and always on, provide material memory (with affordances dependent on the material), 
and may be simultaneously inherently simple and complex. Unpacking this statement 
would require a second dissertation. I offer a single example from my personal 
experience as a glimpse into the potential relations of material and digital computational 
systems. 
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OctoBoto. In a kinetic sculpture system I call OctoBoto, seen in Figure 10, I 
assembled a system of eight servomotors attached in a circular pattern on a wooden disk. 
Attached to each servomotor was a lightweight, wing shaped form. Immediately upon 
powering up the system, the wings started to vibrate in strong oscillating patterns, with 
apparent couplings of the vibrations of wings directly opposite each other. According to 
the software, the wings should have been held in fixed positions, waiting for movement 
commands. What was happening was simple, but completely dependent on the 
relationship between the electronic control system and the physical structure of the 
system. When the motors were first powered on, or moved to a new position, the 
structure would flex and spring back based on the material properties and mechanical 
characteristics (especially important was the length of the wings –the pendulums) of the 
physical structure. The force of this initial flex would result in a deviation from the 
software defined target position of the servos, which would energize to correct for the 
error. Because the frequency of the servo control signal closely matched the resonant 
frequency of the physical structures, small movements would quickly be magnified in a 
positive feedback loop to produce a strong sustained vibration. A gentle damping, in the 
form of placing ones hands gently on the wings, would suppress the vibration, but it 
would spontaneously return when the damping force was removed. My ultimate solution, 
which regulated, but did not fully eliminate this intrinsic behavior, which I considered 
desirable, in moderation, was a combination of material and digital programming. I 
attached elastic cords between each wing and the main body of the sculpture, adding a 
subtle biasing tension that damped the vibrations similarly to how placing one’s hand on 
the wings did. I also edited the software to change the carrier frequency of the servo 
  134 
control signal, shifting it from the natural resonate frequency of the mechanical system. 
This interrelated structure and organization of physical matter and code is easy enough to 
see while building and testing a system (through downhill synthesis (Braitenberg, 1986)), 
but may be quite hidden to an external observer.  
The preceding section addressed the idea of seeing making as structural coupling. 
This way of seeing making opened up questions about how a maker might know a 
material. From that another question emerged regarding the potential to see structurally 
determined systems as a means of conducting material computation. This continuous 
revealing of questions exposes the yields of the abductive research methodology. This 
chapter continues with an in depth description of my material practice of building 
experiential media systems. 
Building Media Systems 
In this section I illustrate seeing experiential media systems as structurally 
determined from my point of observation as the maker of these systems. I will illustrate 
how making can be seen as structural coupling, and how materials can be seen as 
structurally determined systems with specific examples from my practice as a maker. To 
be very clear, the perspective I provide with this example is from the point of observation 
of a sculptor engaging with physical material. Making could be seen in a very different 
light from a different point of observation. The first example I have in mind is the process 
I utilized to bend wood for the sides of my Vox Curio instrument.  
Vox Curio. Wood, unless it is still very green must be made pliable before it can 
be bent. Depending on the specific wood, the shape and thickness of the pieces to be 
bent, and the ultimate end use of the product, this can be accomplished in a variety of 
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ways. Extended soaking in water, and especially soaking in boiling water can 
dramatically soften the bonds of the wood fibers, making the wood extremely pliable. 
However this technique may lead to uncontrollable warping and permanent separation of 
wood fibers, making it a poor choice for the thin, acoustically active walls of a musical 
instrument. Even if this technique were successful in producing the desired form, I 
speculate that the resulting, possibly microscopic, structural changes would have negative 
acoustic impacts on the finished instrument.  
Figure 13. Bending walnut panel over heated aluminum cylinder for body of Vox Curio instrument. 
The technique I used to bend my walnut sides was the traditional luthier practice 
of heating the wood on a tubular metal form (see Figure 13). The heat causes molecularly 
trapped moisture in the wood to be released, effectively steaming the wood from within. 
If the wood has enough moisture, which depends on the variety of wood, its age and 
environmental conditions, no additional water will be required. Knowledge of the 
properties of the specific material, either from research or prior experience, may inform 
this process, but the authoritative information is constructed through haptic channels at 
  136 
the instant of every individual bend on every piece of material. This is structural 
coupling. The structure of the material and the structure of the maker are in a persistent, 
full-duplex dialog. You find out how soft the wood is getting, whether it needs a spritz of 
water to add moisture content and prevent scorching, whether an inconsistency in the 
grain pattern is going to make the wood likely to twist or cause fibers to separate, and a 
multitude of additional pieces of information as you coax (never demand) the wood into 
the desired form. You must also be sensitive to the dynamics of the wood as it is removed 
from the heat source and external pressure is released. It will spring back somewhat, and 
the degree to which it does will depend on how hot the material became and how long it 
was held at that temperature. This rebound may also not be consistent across the length or 
width of a bend. This too, cannot be corrected with force. If the shape is wrong after it 
cools, it must be reheated to make a correction. Bending wood by hand using this 
technique is a truly multisensory experience. Information is constructed from thermal 
energy (the temperature of the wood is felt with your hands), chemical interaction 
(smelling the wood as it rises in temperature and steams) and through mechanical force 
(haptic feedback through your hands, arms and body: feeling the initial springiness, 
eventual pliability, ultimate mechanical shape transformation of the material, and the 
same characteristics in inverse order.)  
Figure 14 shows the bent walnut side pieces clamped into a rigid negative form. 
Traditional bar clamps are used in this process, as are less standardized clamping tools. In 
the lower left hand corner of the image on the left in Figure 14 a small piece of wood can 
be seen pressed into the tapered space between the walnut panels. This serves as a wedge, 
held in by friction and holding the panels in place in preparation for the gluing of brace 
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joints. The image on the right side of Figure 14 shows a rubber ball being used for a 
similar purpose. In all these clamping examples interactions of materiality (structural 
couplings) are on display. With the bar clamps wood blocks are used to prevent leaving 
the material history of the clamping process that would result from the compressive force 
of the small surface area of the bare metal clamp head. The wood strip used as a wedge is 
relatively soft, allowing it to compress against the harder walnut and form a strong 
friction fit. The rubber ball, which can be increased or decreased in air pressure as needed 
to apply more or less clamping pressure, conforms to the bent walnut sides without any 
risk of marring their surface. 
Figure 14. Bent wood pieces clamped in structurally defining form with bar clamps (left) and with rubber 
ball (right). 
The knowledge required to successfully engage in the wood bending process I 
detailed here cannot be acquired without structurally coupling with the material as I 
described. Naturally I read and watched videos to learn about the process before trying it 
myself, and this process of acquiring knowledge was an essential part of my learning, but 
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I argue that my capacity to construct knowledge from these sources was dependent on my 
prior similar structural couplings with other materials. Experience breaking kindling for a 
fire, bending steel rod, bending glass, stepping on a water soaked log, and an uncountable 
number of other embodied learning experiences, gave me the bodily and cognitive 
structure to have a sympathetic response when I watched another person heating and 
bending wood. 
 
Figure 15. Original, unfinished, flywheel that eventually broke. Maple crossbeam can be seen diagonally 
spanning the diameter of the flywheel. 
The organic richness of materials formed under the influence of highly variable 
processes does not come without a trade off. The micro and macroscopic variations in 
material present significant challenges to the engineer and maker. The material may vary 
in strength at different locations and along different axes.  It may split along a grain line. 
But perhaps the most consistent and pressing challenge, at least with wood, is the 
tendency of the material to swell, contract and warp with variations in temperature and 
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humidity. In early iterations of the flywheel mechanism in Vox Curio, I experienced these 
challenges in dramatic form.  
The first foreshadowing of troubles to come came as a tried to reassemble the 
crossbeam and the main flywheel mass, which can be seen in Figure 15. The ends of the 
crossbeam fit into precisely routed cavities in the flywheel. This fit was perfect the day I 
cut it. The next day I found myself needing to apply what seemed like an excessive 
amount of force to reinsert the crossbeam into the mating flywheel cavities. Fearing that 
this excessive force would crack the flywheel, I carefully sanded the mating surfaces until 
the parts once again slid together in a precisely fitting but low-pressure fit. I proceeded 
with work on other aspects of the instrument, thinking this stage of the fabrication was 
behind me. A day or so later when I went back to do some additional finishing work on 
the flywheel, I discovered that it was out of true and out of balance when I spun it. (This 
was wholly unacceptable since the flywheel needed to generate a controlled torque force, 
not act as a eccentric weight vibration motor!) Upon closer inspection I realized that the 
problem was not from my wood turning process, or from an inaccurately drilled axel 
hole. The problem was that the wheel had significantly warped. The crossbeam had 
restricted the movement of the sections of the flywheel that it was coupled with, but the 
free sections of the flywheel had shrunk and warped inward. Looking at the static 
flywheel, even under close inspection, you would not have noticed the problem, but when 
it was spinning the flat spots were painfully obvious.  Upon reflection, I recognized 
several problems with my initial fabrication process.  
First, I had done the initial shaping and fitting of the components on unusually 
wet Arizona desert days. The wood had absorbed extra moisture during these high 
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humidity days, causing them to expand. When the weather shifted back to the typical dry 
environment of the desert, the wood dried out and shrunk back to its original dimensions. 
The second problem was my material choices. I had selected maple, a wood 
traditionally favored for its hardness and stability, for the crossbeam. I used alder, a 
consistent, relatively easily carved, and reasonably affordable wood choice, for the 
flywheel. Alder, as I have now learned, is not as dimensionally stable as maple. The 
differences between the materials in their reaction the changing humidity accounted for a 
significant portion of the problems I observed.  
Another factor that I had not taken into consideration was the difference in 
moisture absorption based on the shape of the material and the exposure of the end grain 
of the wood. The crossbeam only had exposed end grain at each end providing a 
relatively small surface area for moisture to readily be drawn into the wood. The 
flywheel, fabricated from sixteen mitered pieces of wood and turned to produce a 
compound curved surface, had much more variations of exposed grain across its surface, 
providing more opportunity for moisture absorption. Neither component had any sealer 
treatment at this stage to slow the effects of the humidity changes.   
All of these collective factors led to the distortions and ultimate breaking of the 
original flywheel. The flywheel body, shown nearly finished in Figure 16, was 
refabricated in mahogany, a denser, more stable, and more costly, but aesthetically 
pleasing material. This version of the flywheel has held its form through several changes 
of season. Using the lathe to do the final shaping of the flywheel exemplifies the process 
of a highly concretized technical object transferring technicality to the objects it produces 
(Simondon, 1958).  
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Figure 16. Re-fabricated mahogany flywheel mounted in wood lathe. 
When thin wood panels are joined at non-parallel angles to one another, the joint 
is often reinforced with a supporting transitional brace. This brace serves to increase the 
available gluing surface area and defines the angular relationship of the joint. When the 
panels to be joined are not straight, but bent as they are in my Vox Curio instrument (see 
Figure 17), the supporting braces must follow this contour. A simple, and traditional way 
of fabricating wooden braces to match a curved surface is to cut a pattern of thin slices, 
perpendicular to the length of the bracing material. The resulting structurally engineered 
material is called ‘kerfing’. A kerf is the void left in a material that has been cut by a saw 
blade. The width of the blade determines the width of the kerf. (Forgetting which side of 
a cut line to locate the kerf on is a common way to measure twice, cut once, and still end 
up with pieces of the wrong dimension.) When cutting kerfing, the cut is stopped at a 
precisely determined distance through the material. The depth of the cut is critical to the 
function of the kerfing. The function of this structurally engineered material may be seen 
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as a consequence of the organization of a structurally determined system when it is 
structurally coupled with another system (Maturana, 2002). If the cut is too deep, the 
kerfing will be very fragile and difficult not to break while hurrying to get it clamped in 
place after applying glue. If the cut is too shallow, the kerfing will not be flexible enough 
and will require excessive force (which may break rather than bend the kerfing) or will 
require heating to bend it (dramatically reducing its utility). If the cut depths are not 
consistent across the length of the kerfing, some areas will not bend while others kink or 
break. For this reason a fixed stop-block that physically restricts the depth of the cut is 
typically used when manufacturing kerfing. The use of the stop-block also dramatically 
increases the speed at which kerfing can be cut. Cutting to a visually marked stop-line 
requires the cut velocity to be significantly decreased as the end of the cut approaches to 
minimize the risk of over or un-shooting the intended stopping point. Cutting with a 
tangible stop engages another sensory modality and practically guarantees a consistent 
result. Pye (1968) refers to this as a form of regulation, reducing the risk involved in the 
workmanship of risk (Pye, 1968). Pye’s theories will be discussed further in an upcoming 
section.  
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Figure 17. Kerfing installed on the interior edges of Vox Curio in preparation for the attachment of the top 
and back panels. 
The slices in kerfing produce discrete bend points. The wood sections between the 
slices do not interpolate between these discrete points, so the spacing of the slices 
determines the resolution of the curve (or more accurately, sequence of angularly joined 
line segments). If the spacing is too wide for the curve it will be mated to, at best there 
will be significant gaps between the kerfing and the mating surface, and at worst the 
kerfing will not match the radius of the curve at all. If the spacing is too narrow, the 
kerfing will have a reduced structural capacity to define the mating angle of the joined 
panels, and will offer less contiguous planar surface area for the glue. These problems 
with too narrow of spacing are only likely to emerge with an extremely narrow spacing. 
The main reason not to cut extra narrowly spaced kerfs is simply to save time and effort. 
The relationship between the kerfing and the material may be seen as a structural 
coupling between an analog curve and a digital approximation of that curve. The fit only 
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needs to be close enough to meet the larger structural and aesthetic requirements of the 
unified system. 
 
Figure 18. Structural bracing installed on underside of top panel of Vox Curio instrument. 
The body of Vox Curio was inspired by traditional acoustic guitar construction 
designs and techniques. Included in this design vocabulary is the use of bracing strips 
across the spans of the large flat areas of the thin top and bottom panels. Durability is a 
major motivating concern when engineering the shape and pattern of these braces, but 
this factor is by no means the only one. The thickness of the panel and the form and 
placement of the braces makes a significant difference in the acoustic performance of the 
instrument. The nuances of this engineering is beyond the scope of this document but it is 
not unrealistic to claim that the objective of the luthier is to produce a unified structure 
that represents, not a compromise between the desired acoustic characteristics and 
durability, but a synergetic relation between these structural requirements. Such a unified 
structure is described by Simondon (1958) as plurifunctional and represents a technical 
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concretization (Simondon, 1958). I had such an ideal in mind when I engineered the 
braces for Vox Curio (seen in Figure 18), but since the shape of this body and the mode 
of acoustic excitation of the body are significantly different than that of any traditional 
guitar, I had no clear basis for my decisions. This being the case, I chose to prioritize 
durability for this prototype instrument.  
The aesthetic and functional character of Vox Curio is a product of significant 
industrial concretization (Simondon, 1958) in the form of the software design tools and 
CNC fabrication hardware I used in its engineering and fabrication. Figure 19 shows an 
early design iteration of the instrument that eventually became Vox Curio. I was able to 
virtually iterate on different designs for the overall form of the instrument and specific 
components essential to its function with relative speed, ease and without added financial 
investment. This iterative cycle is in the spirit of the machine genesis that Simondon 
describes (Simondon, 1958).  
 
Figure 19. An early iteration, in 3D model form, of the Vox Curio instrument. 
Figure 21 shows a 3D model of the flywheel and driving motor for the 
ungrounded haptic mechanism in Vox Curio. An important feature of this mechanism is 
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the magnetic gear system that translates the motion of the rotary motor into the motion of 
the flywheel without a physical contact between the motor shaft and the flywheel. The 
real challenge of designing using contemporary software engineering tools is that 
virtually anything can be designed, but it may not be feasible to manufacture. I certainly 
keep manufacturability, with the tools I have at my disposal, in mind when designing 
systems, but I still run into challenges and need to make changes when translating my 
designs into actual products.  
In this example I was focused on engineering a cylindrical array of magnets with 
a desired gear ratio and appropriate spacing between magnets to produce a smoothly 
magnetically meshed gear structure. The affordance of the software made this a 
manageable task, but I ended up designing parts that I could not easily and accurately 
manufacture without first building a machine for the job. I originally envisioned cutting 
slots in the interior of the flywheel body to embed the magnets in. The magnets would go 
in the center of these slots and filler wood pieces would close up the outsides of the slots. 
The difficulty was figuring out what tool could fit in the toroidal form of the flywheel, 
which by itself represented a great deal of labor, and how I would regulate and index the 
cutting process to achieve the perfect spacing required for smooth operation. I abandoned 
this original fabrication approach and instead split the flywheel into two halves and 
sandwiched a thin laser cut part in between these halves that could be quickly and easily 
recut if it didn’t work perfectly on the first try. 
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Figure 20. Integration of hand built and laser cut subassemblies of Vox Curio instrument. 
Vox Curio was produced using a blend of traditional luthier hand building tools 
and techniques and contemporary computer-driven design and fabrication technologies. 
Later in this chapter I discuss Simondon’s (1958) way of seeing modes of production as 
either artisanal or industrial. I relate these perspectives to those of Pye (1968) who sees 
production techniques on a spectrum of risk (Pye, 1968). Figure 20 shows the integration 
of laser cut components with the hand fabricated bent wood body of my Vox Curio 
instrument. Although I utilized laser cut templates in the fabrication of the acoustic body 
of the instrument, subtle variations from this ideal form were the inevitable result of the 
organic variations in the natural wood and the compromises inherently required when 
bending and joining this wood. To integrate the hand built body with the laser cut 
components I had to carefully hand shape the laser cut parts to fit the body while 
maintaining the mechanical integrity of the laser cut components. For this reason, the 
laser cut panels could not be individually fit to the section of the body that they attached 
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to, but had to be preassembled into a unit and fit to the body as a three-dimensional 
whole. At the point in history at which I am writing this document, computer controlled 
manufacturing technologies have significantly advanced and have become accessible to a 
wide range of makers. Individual components can be cut and printed with relatively high 
levels of accuracy and precision. However, assembling these components into a 
structurally determined system with an intended resulting organization still poses 
significant challenges, and these challenges are magnified if the maker employs natural 
rather than technical elements (Simondon, 1958).  
Figure 21. Vox Curio flyweel 3D model (left) and detail of actual flywheel in production, showing array of 
embedded magnets. 
Vox Curio is a unique musical instrument in many ways, but with little doubt, its 
most unusual feature is the flywheel mechanism that provides ungrounded force 
feedback. An early iteration of this system is shown in Figure 22. (Notice that in this 
prototype the gimbal gear only allows a 180-degree rotation of the flywheel.) In technical 
terms this mechanism is known as a ‘control moment gyroscope’ or a ‘control 
momentum gyroscope’. Wikipedia provides a succinct definition,  
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“A control momentum gyroscope (CMG) is an attitude control device generally 
used in spacecraft attitude control systems. A CMG consists of a spinning rotor and one 
or more motorized gimbals that tilt the rotor’s angular momentum. As the rotor tilts, the 
changing angular momentum causes a gyroscopic torque that rotates the spacecraft” 
(Wikipedia, 2014a). 
I discussed a general taxonomy of haptic feedback devices and presented 
additional examples of related ungrounded force feedback systems in the background 
chapter of this dissertation. 
 
Figure 22. Assembled 'control moment gyroscope' head of Vox Curio instrument. 
A significant motivation for the inclusion of a force feedback mechanism in Vox 
Curio came from my personal experience as an amateur musician playing acoustic and 
electric instruments (primarily guitar, trumpet and percussion instruments). The 
observations I present here are from my point of observation as an experienced, but 
relatively novice musician. I discuss my points of observation as a maker and musician in 
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more detail later in this section. I considered the experience of playing these instruments 
in contrast to my experiences performing with the Laptop Orchestra of Arizona State 
(LORKAS) (LORKAS, 2015). While many differences between traditional musical 
instruments and the laptop computer as musical instrument can be enumerated, what 
stood out to me was the relationship of physical effort and sonic result. With the laptop 
such relations were arbitrarily determined through programming and choice of interaction 
modalities (e.g. key presses, touchpad swipes, accelerometer detected movement of the 
laptop body). With the traditional instruments the mappings of my physical efforts to 
sonic results were fundamentally a result of the structurally determined physics of the 
instruments structurally coupled to my body. A simple example of this is bending a guitar 
string to increase the pitch of the note. I observed, while learning to play guitar that I had 
to consciously minimize the force I exerted on the strings to avoid unintentionally 
shifting the pitch and playing out of tune, and that when intentionally bending notes I 
experienced the physical effort of doing so as not only a feedback that helped me 
consistently bend to a desired pitch, but importantly was intrinsically linked to my 
musical expression. I recognize that for more experienced and professionally trained 
musicians their experiences of playing may be different than my own and this haptic 
information may not be considered essential or even desirable (Paine, 2013, p. 80). 
Nevertheless I saw opportunities to explore this sensorimotor modality through this 
interface in which a substantial physical force could be programmatically modulated and 
implemented both as a feedback and as an assertive stimuli.   
  151 
 
Figure 23. Electronics drawer partially inserted into Vox Curio instrument body. 
An important relationship I wanted to explore in this system was the sensorimotor 
relationship established between the control moment gyroscope and the motion sensors 
that measure the movement of the instrument body. The suite of accelerometer, 
gyroscopic and magnetometer sensors are collectively identified as an Inertial 
Measurement Unit’ (IMU). In the prototype set of electronics visible in Figure 23, I am 
using a Nintendo Wii Remote ™ (Wikipedia, 2015j). In the current iteration of Vox Curio 
I have upgraded this sensor to a x-OSC wireless I/O (input/output) board which 
incorporates a high-performance IMU sensor unit (x-io.co.uk, 2015).  
The IMU allows for linear and rotational movements of the instrument body to be 
sensed, as well as an absolute orientation with respect to the magnetic field of the earth. 
IMU sensing is commonly used in musical interfaces (see Background chapter for 
examples), but what sets this interface apart from most is the potential for the control-
moment gyroscope (CMG) to be actuated in response to IMU sensor information and for 
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the movements of the instrument resulting from the CMG to be measured by the IMU. 
Both the system software and the musician, structurally coupled with the instrument, play 
an intermediary role in this potentially recurrent feedback loop.  
Earlier in this chapter, in my discussion of David Pye’s theories, which I see as 
describing structural coupling between makers, tools and materials, I discuss a concept 
Pye identifies as ‘self-jigging’. Although I have not yet implemented a mapping of 
sensing, sound synthesis and actuation that effectively exhibits this characteristic, I think 
it may be fruitful to consider how I might see the relations I establish between the 
sensors, sound synthesis and actuation in Vox Curio as an opportunity to experience a 
form of self-jigging with sonic matter. In such a relationship the musician could 
instantiate or shape, through a physical movement of the instrument body, a sonic 
element. The CMG could be actuated such that it magnifies, or carries through, the 
physical gesture initiated by the musician. The inverse relation could also be explored, 
where the instrument resists, or redirects an initiated gesture. These modes of interaction 
could exist on a continuous spectrum rather than being implemented as discrete states. 
Such a variable response is not inconsistent with Maturana’s (2002) definition of a 
structurally determined system. He says, “ Accordingly, I thought then, whether a dog 
bites me or doesn't bite me, it is doing something that has to do with itself” (Maturana, 
2002, p. 6). 
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Figure 24. Testing a vibrotactile actuator on the acoustic body of the Vox Curio instrument. 
In addition to the control-moment gyroscope haptic system implemented in Vox 
Curio, it includes vibrotactile actuators that produce both haptically perceived energy and 
energy that excites the acoustic body of the instrument. This may be seen as a 
plurifunctional structure (Simondon, 1958).  Figure 24 shows one of the actuators being 
tested on the outside of the instrument body (the actuators are ultimately installed in the 
interior of the acoustic body). In this test I was evaluating the coupling of the actuator to 
the body, varying the pressure of the actuator against the body and testing various 
materials for their damping effects and the resulting spectral response of the system. I 
was testing structures to see which structure provided the desired sonic and haptic 
organization for the system. 
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Figure 25. Vox Curio 'valve' pressure sensor/actuator assembly attached to instrument body. 
 
Figure 26. Vox Curio 'valve' pressure sensors under construction. Copper tape and Velostat material are 
visible. 
I drew on my experience as a trumpet player for inspiration for another 
interactional component of Vox Curio. I designed three pressure sensitive pads that I 
identify as ‘valves’ for the instrument. These can be seen in fully assembled, but still 
prototype form in Figure 25. Paired with a bite sensor, these three sensors can be used as 
a chording interface to generate a wide range of notes in the same way the valves of a 
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trumpet and lip tension on the mouthpiece of the trumpet do so. I produced custom 
sensors for these valves using a combination of conductive copper tape and a material 
called Velostat, which is a carbon-impregnated plastic material. The electrical resistance 
of Velostat changes as it is compressed, making it an effective material for fabricating 
pressure sensors. Just as I have come to know the structure and organization of materials 
such as wood and steel, I have, to paraphrase Simondon (1958) become sensitized to the 
technicalities of these electrically relevant technical elements (Simondon, 1958, p. 87). I 
created my own sensors in this case rather than using commercially available pressure 
sensors because doing so allowed me to cost-effectively produce sensors that were 
custom fit and tuned for this application.  
 
Figure 27. Detail of vibrotactile actuators on Vox Curio instrument 'valves'. 
The main vibrotactile actuators installed in the body of Vox Curio serve a haptic 
and sonic function, and although Vox Curio can be externally amplified in addition to its 
internal acoustic amplification, I generally do not attempt to incorporate haptic feedback 
through these actuators other than that which directly translates to sound. Vibrotactile 
actuators integrated into the valve sensor system (seen in Figure 27) provide the 
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opportunity to provide haptic feedback or assertive stimuli that is not directly part of the 
sonic signal. For example, I can produce feedback that corresponds to transitions across 
sensor threshold levels. For me, the most interesting feature of actual trumpet valves, 
modulating the flow of air through the instrument, is what happens when the valves are 
partially closed; the sonic slurring and muted tones that can be produced with the valves 
in these transitional zones. An implementation of such transitional interaction spaces is 
fully afforded by my hardware and is something I am eager to explore. 
 
Figure 28. Vox Curio instrument fully assembled, powered up and ready to play. 
Figure 28 shows Vox Curio powered up and ready to play. At this point I would 
like to make a subtle distinction regarding my point of observation while playing this 
instrument. First, it is clear that my experience of playing Vox Curio will likely always be 
something other that that of any other musician. As the maker of the instrument my 
perspective will always be informed by my knowledge of how I engineered its physical 
components and how I programmed its audio, haptic and sensory systems. But this is not 
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the subtlety I’m referring to. The distinction I want to make is that I have not yet 
experienced Vox Curio from the point of observation of a musician. When I have played 
this instrument it has been as a maker. (Figure 29 shows me playing Vox Curio.) I offer 
an analogy to make my point clearer. When I am sculpting a limestone form, only a 
portion of my time is spent directly removing material from the object. A significant 
percentage of my time is spent stepping back and regarding the form. In this regarding I 
am on the cusp of a point of observation as a viewer experiencing a work of art, but I’m 
still fundamentally regarding the emerging sculpture from the point of observation as its 
maker. In the same way, when I am playing Vox Curio, I am momentarily regarding it 
from the point of observation of a musician, but I am fundamentally still regarding it as 
an emerging instrument, from the point of observation as its maker. I hope at some point I 
will be able to experience it fully from the point of observation of a musician, without 
any thought on how it was made or what needs to happen to improve its performance.  
 
Figure 29. Vox Curio instrument being played. 
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I offer as a point of comparison a different experience of making and eventually 
playing an instrument in which I have been able to transition from observing it from the 
point of observation of a maker to that of a musician. I built a guitar and in spite of the 
fact that it still requires additional sanding and finishing, is missing volume and tone 
knobs, and still needs minor neck pocket adjustments, I was able to quickly transition to 
simply playing it and observing it from the point of observation as a musician. What is 
the essential difference between these two instruments that makes this dramatic 
experiential difference? The difference I see as significant is not the relative complexity 
of the two systems, although Vox Curio is dramatically more complex in many ways. The 
essential difference is that Vox Curio is a completely new instrument with no basis of 
comparison. I can easily see what I need to do to make the guitar “finished”. There are 
millions of points of reference for this assessment. Vox Curio has no traditional 
performance repertoire or even an established musical pallet from which to draw. For a 
guitar a repertoire and pallet are firmly established. The guitar has a multitude of cultural 
reference points. Vox Curio only has the cultural reference point of being a new musical 
interface. So it is a simple matter, once a guitar is even vaguely playable, to begin to 
experience it as a musician. There are many cultural and musical anchor points available 
help form a performance relationship with the guitar and virtually none for Vox Curio. 
I’m certain that many others have come to the same conclusion when building and 
attempting to evaluate new musical interfaces, but I’m pleased that this does not remove 
the motivation to produce them. This will conclude the discussion of the production of 
Vox Curio. I will continue the discussion with an example from my experience building 
the aforementioned guitar. 
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Fabricating a guitar neck. I have learned a great deal about the structure and 
organization of structurally determined systems through my focused consideration of the 
materiality of natural elements while fabricating a guitar neck. This project was an 
exercise in the mode of production Pye (1968) identifies as the workmanship of risk (Pye, 
1968).  
 
Figure 30. Guitar neck in production, showing end grain orientation. 
An important variable in many wood projects is the consistency and orientation of 
the wood grain. I selected a hard maple for the neck and a flat sawn orientation for the 
grain. Figure 30 shows the guitar neck in production with a clear view of the end grain 
pattern. Flat-sawn wood (looking at the end of the neck the grain pattern lies parallel with 
the fret board surface) provides lateral good stability but allows relatively easy flexing in 
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the direction that the string tension will pull. Many builders choose quarter-sawn wood 
(looking at the end of the neck the grain pattern is perpendicular to the fret board) to 
maximize the resistance to the force produced by the string tension. I am working with 
the philosophy that the steel truss rod, a technical element, is there to counteract the 
string (also technical elements) tension force, and that the stability in the lateral 
orientation, which is not otherwise compensated for, is best provided by the structure of 
the wood.  
Another variable in play in this decision is the orientation of the grain with regard 
to the arc of the grain. If (when) any warping force occurs, the wood will tend to bend 
away from the concave side of the grain arc. This tendency is a result of the anisotropic 
permeability of the wood grain. Exposed end-grain is more permeable than the relatively 
closed cellular structures of the other wood surfaces. I discuss anisotropy further at the 
end of this chapter in the section ‘Seeing it as Material’. I chose to orient the wood with 
the end grain (which is relatively flat as a flat-sawn board) in the direction of a smile (if 
one is looking at the heel end of the guitar neck) so that if any warping force is generated, 
it will be in opposition to the force of the strings. This allows the tension of the strings to 
continuously counteract the potential warping of the wood. Maintaining the necessary 
balance between the tuned string and truss rod tension should keep the neck appropriately 
flat. In this grain orientation, the natural warping tendency of the wood works in parallel 
with the tension of the truss rod. Of course aluminum, titanium, carbon fiber, or another 
technical element could be used as an alternative neck material to sidestep all these 
issues, but the familiar, desirable and traditional richness associated with the visual 
aesthetic and tone of the wood would be lost. 
  161 
These discussions about wood grain, warping flywheels, and the building of 
guitar necks, may seem far afield from the overall topic of this dissertation, but I argue 
that, although the level of detail in the prior descriptions may not have been necessary, 
the core ideas are exactly aligned with my overall goal of promoting seeing systems as 
structurally determined, and seeing structure and organization as a unified whole. The 
structure of natural elements, as exemplified by wood in the aforementioned systems, 
determines their organization. Modifying this structure at the macro level, the maker may 
transform some aspects of this organization while maintaining others. This modification 
takes place through a structural coupling of maker, tool and material. Throughout this 
coupling, the maker is modifying the structure, but with a continual focus on both the 
structure and the desired organization of the final system, which will ultimately be 
coupled with a human individual, and so on in an outward expansion of structural 
couplings.  
As the maker of systems determines the structures of these systems, the maker has 
the opportunity to generate plurifunctional structures (Simondon, 1958).  In the next 
section I extend Simondon’s (1958) notion of plurifunctionality. 
Conceptual Plurifunctionality 
When Simondon (1958) writes about plurifunctionality or plurivalence, he is 
specifically talking about physical functionality and structures (Simondon, 1958, pp. 16, 
57–58, 60). Even electricity, prominent in Simondon’s examples, can be seen as physical. 
While there are many strategies for generating plurifunctionality in this physical sense, 
such as employing sensors as actuators and actuators as sensors, I propose another way of 
seeing plurifunctionality, namely seeing the potential for conceptual plurifunctionality. 
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The notion of combining conceptual functions with physical functions is 
straightforward. Sculptors do it all the time, producing a structure that satisfies physical 
and mechanical requirements, while simultaneously visually or materially referencing an 
idea, or advancing an aesthetic. I suggest that such a fusion may not only serve poetic and 
artistic functions, but may also inspire invention by leading to non-obvious materials and 
forms. My theory of conceptual plurifunctionality is in early stages of production in my 
paradigm construction project. I will not, in the context of this dissertation, attempt a 
formal articulation and defense of this theory. 
In my original written documentation of my idea of conceptual plurifunctionality, 
I used Simondon’s (1958) related term ‘plurivalence’ and wrote of conceptual 
plurivalence as an attribute of the system itself, as part of its organization, which is 
determined by its structure. I concluded that doing so posed a philosophical inconsistency 
with Maturana’s (2002) theory of structurally determined systems as organizationally 
closed. I realized upon further reflection, that the term  ‘plurifunctionality’ was more 
accurate and was not inconsistent with the theory of structurally determined systems, 
because functionality is an abstraction from an external point of observation of 
structurally coupled, structurally determined systems (Maturana, 2002).  
In my construction of a theory of conceptual plurifunctionality, I use Simondon's 
(1958) concepts as a starting point. I build on them, going beyond physical material and 
energetic functions to a consideration of artistic, aesthetic and conceptual functions in the 
same objects. While this deviates from Simondon’s application of plurifunctionality in 
his mechanological examples, I believe it is consistent with his interpretation of the 
process of invention. In an interview, Simondon was asked whether it was reasonable to 
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compare his thought process with that of Gaston Bachelard (1958/1994), a French 
philosopher known especially for his philosophical application of phenomenology to 
architecture, in his book La Poétique de l'Espace (The Poetics of Space) (Bachelard, 
1958/1994), which was first published the same year as Simondon’s Du mode d'existence 
des objets techniques (On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects) (Simondon, 
1958). Simondon replied, 
I don’t know. Bachelard is a poet., I don’t really know his works well enough.. 
But I think we could just as well do a psychoanalysis of the technical object, as 
Bachelard has done a psychoanalysis of the elements. In particular, I think that 
each technical object can be treated as having an intention and an attitude. ... For 
me it is more than a symbol, rather a sort of gesture or intention or power, almost 
magical, a contemporary magic. ... That is a poetic aspect, an aspect of 
signification and of encounters of signification. ... We lack technological poets. 
(Simondon & Le Moyne, 1968) 
I argue that we can see artistic practice as plurifunctional discovery and that 
conceptual, aesthetic and artistic functions can be seen as extensions to the concepts of 
functions in technical object theory. I point to the concept of the objet trouvé (found 
object) or ready-made, popularized by Marcel Duchamp (1973) as an act of an alternative 
“seeing it as” (Wittgenstein, 1953).  
An example of my own art, a project called Flight Lessons, seen in Figure 31 and 
Figure 32, extends this act of “seeing it as” to encompass both physical and conceptual 
functionality. This project features a suspended speaker, which simultaneously functions 
as a sonic actuator, a symbol of communication and a magnetic lift. This same artwork 
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includes a lead bird structure that can be seen as an icon of flight, a physical mass, a 
symbol of weight and a symbol of toxicity. The lead bird stands on steel stilts, 
magnetically supported by the speaker. These stilts can be seen as an augmentation to 
enhance stature and elevate, as crutches, and (because of their mode of suspension) as 
simultaneously grounded and floating. An audiotape loop with original source material 
from an audio tape of a motivational lecture on The Seven Habits of Highly Effective 
People (Covey, 1989) is modulated in speed, resulting in the human speech being heard 
as bird chirps, warbles and squawks. This single artwork has still more plurifunctional 
structures. I present this example to illustrate my theory of conceptual plurifunctionality 
from the point of observation of a sculptor. 
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Figure 31. Components of Flight Lessons sculpture by Byron Lahey. Lead bird on steel stilts supported by 
magnetic field of speaker (left) and wooden marionette suspended under mechanical system with audio 
playback system (right). 
 
Figure 32. Overall view of Flight Lessons sculpture by Byron Lahey. 
My primary purpose for suggesting such an extension of Simondon’s philosophy 
is not to elevate artwork by associating it with the technical. My reason to suggest this 
conceptual extension is to encourage non-obvious thinking and thereby potentially 
enhance the process of invention, not to magnify the quantity of inventions, but to 
magnify the quality of inventions by promoting rapid cycles of concretization, 
individualization, the evolution of ensembles and the subsequent generation of more 
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technical elements. I propose that the active, conscious inclusion of conceptual functions 
in the process of generating plurifunctional structures would encourage seeing the 
problems of systems in a new light. Designers and engineers take the first step in this 
operation many times, repurposing a random part from one system in another. The artistic 
application of this process extends the pallet of elements available for this process by 
seeing the problem not only in terms of physics, but also in terms of poetics. If you are 
looking for a spring, you will only find a spring. If your priorities are looking for an 
element that not only pushes objects apart but also conveys a poetic meaning, or has a 
particular aesthetic quality in harmony with, or juxtaposed with, other elements in the 
system, you are likely to be considering other options. Engineers may dismiss this idea as 
a waste of time and mental energy, but I’m not suggesting this for subtle, incremental 
improvements in systems that already exist. I’m talking about breakthrough inventions 
that require real creativity.  
As a final note on this subject, I remind the reader that I am an artist, and I’m 
writing from that perspective. My expectation is not that the big industrial technology 
companies will take my advice and start rolling out systems that are not only truly 
innovative, but also poetic, though this would be a delightful impact to make. I’m more 
concerned whether my ideas resonate with my colleagues, professors, students and other 
artists and engineers inventing the future through the invention of experiential media 
systems. I will conclude this chapter with a deeper examination of materiality. Aspects of 
materiality have emerged throughout this document. This concluding section will look at 
these and other aspects of materiality and will consider how they apply to a variety of 
domains of knowledge and practice. 
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Seeing it as Material 
I’ve introduced several aspects of materiality, primarily from my point of 
observation as a maker. In this section I present aspects of materiality in a cohesive, but 
by no means comprehensive, form. I argue that other systems, even systems as 
immaterial as social and cultural systems, can be seen as material. I make this argument 
with Wittgenstein’s (1953) concept of a “‘dawning’ of an aspect” (Wittgenstein, 1953, 
pp. 194, 206, 212) in mind. Specifically I am suggesting the meaning Wittgenstein 
proposes when he says, “ what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a property 
of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects” (Wittgenstein, 1953, 
p. 212). 
The aspects of materiality that I mention in this section I classify under the 
general categories of: temporality, homogeneity/heterogeneity, symmetry/asymmetry, 
plasticity, tangibility, and autopoeticity. These categories themselves represent only one 
of a plurality of potential classification schemes for aspects of materiality. There is 
significant crossover between these categories and the aspects I place within each 
category may as easily find a home in another category. I do not present this scheme as a 
static formal framework, but rather as a snapshot of a dynamic paradigm construction 
project. 
Temporality, as an aspect of materiality, describes, from the point of view of an 
external observer, how a material changes over time. I emphasize that temporality is an 
effect of the act of observation, not an inherent property of material itself, which I am 
seeing as a structurally determined system (Maturana, 2002). Maturana (2002) 
emphasizes the instantaneousness of structurally determined systems in his basic 
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definition: “a system in which all that happens with it and to it is determined at every 
instant by the way it is made (its structure) at that instant” (Maturana, 2002, pp. 5–6). 
Temporality is nevertheless an extremely useful abstraction when considering materiality. 
The degree to which we see a material as static or dynamic depends of course on the time 
and spatial scale on which we observe it.  
A consequence of seeing material as dynamic is the production of a material 
history. Hysteresis is the technical term that describes the effect that the history of a 
system has on its current state, and thereby on how it will respond while in that state. 
Hysteresis is observed in physical materials: foam rubber is seen as storing a record of 
prior structural couplings with materials that compress its form, aluminum may fold once 
but fracture with a subsequent attempt to replicate the same fold. Hysteresis is explicitly 
engineered into electronic devices such as thermostats and Schmitt triggers. It is observed 
in biological systems (Darlington & others, 1937; Rieger, Michaelis, Green, & others, 
1976) and in economic systems (Ball, 2009; Blanchard & Summers, 1986). Hysteresis 
can be seen as a general from of memory in material computational systems. It can also 
function in culturally poetic forms as is exemplified by Willie Nelson and his guitar 
named Trigger. Michael Hall (2012) writes, 
Most guitars don’t have names. This one, of course, does. Trigger has a voice and 
a personality, and he bears a striking resemblance to his owner. Willie’s face is 
lined with age and his body is bent with experience. He’s been battered by 
divorce, the IRS, his son Billy’s suicide, and the loss of close friends like Waylon 
Jennings, Johnny Cash, and his longtime bass player Bee Spears. In the past 
decade, Willie has had carpal tunnel surgery on his left hand, torn a rotator cuff, 
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and ruptured a bicep. The man of flesh and bone has a lot in common with the 
guitar of wire and wood. (Hall, 2012) 
The script from a recent guitar advertisement summarizes a perspective from a 
cultural point of observation of the effects of history on Willie’s guitar. It reads, “It left 
the factory perfect 46 years ago. Then it got better. Willie Nelson’s beloved Martin N-20” 
(C F Martin & Co, 2014).  
For any system that is observed as dynamic, one may ask whether its dynamics 
are reversible. Reversibility is a further abstraction from that of temporality and still a 
product of observation, not, properly speaking, an aspect of a structurally determined 
system. Setting aside the obvious, and important questions about what it would truly 
mean for something to be reversible, reversibility, as we generally conceive and 
experience it, is interesting to imagine as defining aspect of material. For autopoetic 
systems, at least observed on a macro-time scale, reversibility does not seem like a 
possibility. Water undergoing state changes from solid, to liquid to gas is, at least when 
viewed at a macro-spatial scale is reversible. Are cultural systems reversible? Are belief 
systems reversible? If reversibility is considered as an absolute, binary system that either 
is, or is not, such questions are not very fruitful, but if reversibility is considered as a 
spectrum of possibilities that can be partial, then these and similar questions become far 
more interesting. Thought of in this way, one can ask, in what ways a system can be 
observed as reversible?  These questions are beyond the scope of the dissertation, but I 
pose them to emphasize the generalizability of seeing systems as material. 
Another important aspect of materiality is its homogeneity or heterogeneity. This 
aspect of material may be genuinely considered as a fundamental description of the 
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system’s instantaneous structure (Maturana, 2002), not merely an abstraction constructed 
by an observer, however it is only through the organization that results from this structure 
that this aspect of structure becomes relevant. Earlier in this chapter I called attention to 
the differences between the characteristics of wood, a natural element, and MDF, a 
technical element, emphasizing the relatively high isotropy of MDF and the anisotropy of 
natural wood. The significance of homogeneity and heterogeneity depends on the specific 
example considered and the examples that could be provided to illustrate this aspect of 
material are endless, however I see this significance manifesting itself in two distinct, but 
interrelated levels. It may be considered in terms of how it, as an aspect of the structure 
of a structurally determined system, affects the organization of that system within the 
boundaries of that system. Or it may be considered in terms of how this structural 
characteristic manifests itself through structural couplings with other structurally 
determined systems. From the point of observation of an external observer, structural 
couplings take place over a span of time and space. The structural inconsistencies, in the 
case of a heterogeneous structure, may result in varying energetic interactions with and 
corresponding varying structural changes in a coupled system. I offer two examples, both 
music related, that illustrate homogeneity and heterogeneity as an aspect of materiality, in 
intangible systems.  
The first of these examples are energy signals, which may be sonically perceived. 
I argue that a simple sinusoidal wave may be seen as a homogeneous material. This 
waveform is, by definition, fully consistent and predictable. By contrast, a complex 
signal, perhaps of the same fundamental frequency as the sinusoidal wave, that includes 
additional repeating and non-repeating waves of various frequencies and shapes may be 
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seen as a heterogeneous material. Homogeneous and heterogeneous signals both have 
practical and aesthetic utility for artistic and engineering applications.  
I present musical culture as my second example of intangible systems seen as 
homogeneous or heterogeneous material. Musical culture may be considered at many 
levels, from the structure of individual musical compositions, to marketing 
categorizations, to historically observed transformations of social groups linked to 
musical genres. A serious analysis of musical culture at any of these levels would require 
additional dissertations, but I argue, without supporting evidence, that in all of these 
dimensions of musical culture, heterogeneity plays in important role in providing 
contrasts, richness and evolutionary vitality. 
The next aspect of materiality I will discuss is symmetry or asymmetry of 
systems. Symmetry may be an instantaneous structural characteristic of a structurally 
determined system, or it may be a product of observation of a system. I’ve already 
emphasized the structural asymmetry of natural wood in contrast to the relative symmetry 
of synthetic technical elements such as MDF. I described the significance of wood grain 
shape and orientation in my description of building a guitar neck, noting the anisotropic 
permeability of wood. Anisotropy also clearly plays a role in Pye’s (1968) prototypical 
example of self-jigging, a wood surface shaped with an adze (Pye, 1968, pp. 34–35). The 
structure of wood, its grain orientation being a critical component of this structure, 
dramatically affects how it will respond to structural couplings with a chisel or other 
similar cutting tool.  
Anisotropy is a significant factor in many other systems as well. It is a 
fundamental characteristic of polarized light and the technologies used to generate and 
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manipulate it (Huard, 1997). It is essential for the functioning of certain types of 
biomedical imaging technologies which exploit the anisotropic characteristics of 
biological structures and magnetic fields (Basser, Mattiello, & LeBihan, 1994). LaLonde 
et al. (2007) show that social systems may exhibit anisotropy in their studies of the 
effects of "social dominance orientation" on attitudes towards interracial dating and 
adoption (Lalonde et al., 2007). Anisotropy is exhibited in ecological systems. Bélisle 
(2005) observes,  
Polarized or anisotropic flows of individuals may not only result from different 
abundances of dispersers that depend on the structure of the landscape, but also 
from variations in the ease of movement along the different axes and directions of 
movement. (Bélisle, 2005, p. 1991) 
Chirality emphasizes a particular characteristic of some asymmetrical systems. 
Chirality is sometimes expressed as handedness, in reference to the qualities of our hands 
having a left and right form. I considered achiral forms for Vox Curio to remove 
handedness of musicians as a variable for research studies, but elected to proceed with a 
chiral form that could be, with some effort and additional production of components, be 
transformed from right-handed to left-handed form. Chirality is a fundamental aspect of 
nature with many examples from physics, chemistry, biology and mathematics 
(Wikipedia, 2015a). I will highlight an example from my personal experience and another 
from mathematics to emphasize the potential for this aspect to play an important role in 
immaterial domains.  
The importance of chirality became clear in my early teenage years when I was 
working as a bicycle mechanic (although I did not learn the term chirality till many years 
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later). The pedals on a bike are chiral forms. Pedals come in pairs with left-handed 
threads on one pedal and right-handed threads on the other. This chirality is necessitated 
by the presence of mechanical friction generated when the rider presses down on the 
pedals. If the left-hand pedal did not have a left-handed thread, the friction in the pedal 
would generate a mechanical force as the pedal was pushed down and around in a 
circular arc that would eventually loosen and unthread the pedal. This effect is easier to 
imagine if one envisions a solid cylindrical shaft as the pedal rather than the traditional 
pedal with bearings, which lessen, but by themselves do not fully eliminate the problem. 
The technical term for this effect is precession (Wikipedia, 2014c). 
Brandom (1996) underscores the chirality inherent in complex numbers, noting, 
"Frege reminds us in the passage about the geometrical interpretation of complex 
numbers quoted above, multiplication by the imaginary basis i and its complex conjugate 
-i correspond to counterclockwise and clockwise rotations, respectively" (Brandom, 
1996, p. 305). I remind the reader again of what Wittgenstein (1953) had to say about the 
dawning of an aspect. He said, “what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a 
property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects” 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 212). “-i ” is understood in relation to “i”. Chirality is 
meaningless without reference to a mirror image object.  
The next aspect of materiality that I will discuss is plasticity. To be clear, I am 
referring to plasticity as it is defined in physics and material science domains. I do not 
intend any reference to the “plastic arts.” Plasticity refers generically to the ease with 
which a material may be reshaped without breaking. The physics definition of plasticity 
is more complex and far richer, emphasizing that “the physical mechanisms that cause 
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plastic deformation can vary widely” (Wikipedia, 2015g). In my practice as a sculptor, 
understanding the relative plasticity of materials, and how to permanently or temporarily 
modify a material to change its plasticity, is essential for many operations. The example 
of bending wood that I detailed earlier in this chapter is a perfect example of this aspect 
of materiality. As a general principle, the concept of plasticity invites the question of: 
what conforms to what? The mode of conformance may not always be, in technical 
terms, a plastic deformation, but I find the general notion of a relative hardness and 
softness of a system and the consequences of this difference in their potential structural 
coupling a useful way of seeing systems. Simondon’s use of the phrase “margin of 
indetermination” (Simondon, 1958, pp. 4–5, 24, 88) implies something akin to a 
plasticity or degree of conformance. This suggests a way of seeing concretization as a 
process of reducing plasticity of a system.  
Tangibility is an aspect of materiality that is seemingly essential to haptic 
systems. I introduce tangibility as an aspect of materiality with the implied question of 
whether tangibility is essential for a haptic experience. I raise this question as a way of 
revisiting essential properties of structurally determined systems, the properties of being 
organizationally closed and interactionally open (Maturana, 2002; Varela & Goguen, 
1978). I see our human experiences of interacting with physical, tangible objects as an 
example of structural coupling, and see the energetic exchanges from this structural 
coupling as modifying our structure. We learn how to interact with tangible objects and 
our haptic sensorimotor systems evolve. In the Background chapter of this dissertation I 
present many examples of haptic illusions and discuss the sensory fusion of multimodal 
information. These examples provide evidence that a haptic sensation is not essentially 
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dependent on the structure of the object one interacts with; it is instead dependent on the 
structure of the person experiencing the sensation. This way of seeing tangibility has 
implications for several of the most interesting questions that have emerged from this 
research. These include: How soft can the boundaries of structurally determined systems 
be? What happens in the gradient areas of such systems? Is code material? Does self-
jigging occur in non-physical media? 
The final aspect of materiality that I present is autopoeticity. Simply stated, a 
material that is autopoetic is alive (Maturana & Varela, 1980; Maturana, 2002). Maturana 
recognized people’s adoption of autopoiesis to describe social and other non-biological 
systems, but continues to argue that only living biological systems are truly autopoetic 
(Maturana, 2002). Living matter comes with a host of ethical, social, emotional, health, 
energetic and environmental concerns on top of any more basic physical engineering 
issues. As Marder (2013) points out however, these concerns are clearly on a sliding scale 
depending on the nature and perceived level of cognitive function of the living system in 
question (Marder, 2013). Autopoetic materials, in spite of the potential concerns with 
their use, offer characteristics that no non-living systems can match. They excel in self-
assembly and self-organization (these attributes define them) and cognition is a result of 
this organization (Maturana & Varela, 1980; Maturana, 2002). Living systems inspire, 
among other things, materials, robots and artificial intelligence systems. Simondon 
(1958) identifies natural objects as the only purely concreted objects, objects not divided 
against themselves. In this respect, autopoiesis is the gold standard of aspects of 
materiality.  
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It is fitting that I end this chapter, and the main body of this dissertation where it 
began, with a consideration of living systems and what it is that makes a living system a 
living system (Maturana & Varela, 1980; Maturana, 2002). This chapter presented a view 
of technical objects, seen as structurally determined systems, from the perspective of their 
modes of determination. I considered the role and presence of the human in the technical 
ensemble and the characterization of modes of production as either industrial or artisanal. 
I discussed attributes of both of these modes of production and suggested ways in which 
they complement and merge with one another. I argued that making is a form of 
structural coupling, discussed material computation, and presented examples from my 
personal material studio practice to illustrate these points and illuminate other theories 
presented in this document. I outlined a theory of conceptual plurifunctionality and 
concluded with a presentation of aspects of materiality, showing how these aspects may 
reveal attributes of a wide range of material and immaterial systems. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation project, which I identify as a ‘paradigm construction project’, I 
asked as my primary research question: How is structure seen as determining the 
organization of systems, and making seen as a process in which the resulting structures of 
technical objects and the maker are co-determined? My secondary question was: How 
might an understanding of structure and organization be applied to the invention of 
contemporary experiential media systems? I identified a series of questions that emerged 
from these primary questions. I will address each of these questions individually in this 
chapter.  
Maturana’s (2002), in his work on the theory of autopoiesis, defines systems as 
structurally determined. This definition poses the question I frame as: How does structure 
determine the organization of a system? Maturana’s answer to this question is complex 
and nuanced, but the essential definition is primarily rooted in the second question I pose: 
Is the organization of a system maintained when the structure of that system changes? 
According to Maturana’s definitions, the structure of a system may continuously change, 
with energy and matter coming and going from the system. These structural changes may 
occur such that the organization of the system is maintained or destroyed. It is the 
organization of the system, determined at every instant by the structure of the system that 
defines the class and bounds of the system. Maturana defines structurally determined 
systems as organizationally closed (Maturana, 2002). This leads to the next question: 
How can organizationally closed systems interact with systems external to themselves? 
As already stated, structurally determined systems are open to energetic and material 
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exchanges, but these exchanges only occur as a result of the instantaneous structure of the 
system and the instantaneous structure of a system it is observed to interact with. The 
process by which this occurs is defined by Maturana as structural coupling (Maturana, 
2002).  
Maturana’s (2002) theories, briefly summarized above, represent a paradigm, a 
useful paradigm, but only one of manifold possibilities. On my first reading of Maturana, 
my paradigm as a maker of physical-digital systems shaped my perception of his theories. 
I contemplated the systems of my own creation as structurally determined but recognized 
that Maturana’s theories were based in biology, not in non-biological or technical 
systems. I turned to Simondon (1958) for a perspective on the technical and saw parallels 
in his theories with those of Maturana, and concluded that I could see technical objects as 
structurally determined as defined by Maturana. This led to a question that is addressed 
by Simondon: Can technical objects be seen as natural objects? Simondon defines 
technical elements, individuals and ensembles with reference to natural elements, 
individuals and ensembles, but does not see technical objects as natural objects 
(Simondon, 1958).  
Simondon (1958) answers the question: How can technical objects be seen in 
terms of their evolution? He defines technical objects, not with respect to their 
characteristic attributes or functions, but in terms of their evolutionary genesis. 
Specifically he looks at this evolution in terms of what he calls, concretization or 
abstraction. Concretization is a unification of the system; abstraction implies a division 
within the system. Simondon claims that only natural objects are purely concrete 
(Simondon, 1958).  
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I identified, in Simondon’s (1958) writing, a concept that helped me see a 
mechanism by which the information exchange through structural coupling (Maturana, 
2002) could be understood. Simondon proposed a “margin of indetermination” in 
technical objects and claimed, “It is such a margin that allows for the machine's 
sensitivity to outside information” (Simondon, 1958, p. 4). This suggests the question: 
How can margins of indetermination in structurally determined systems be seen as 
opportunities for information transfer? I argued that this was a general way of seeing 
variables and constraints in systems. I also presented an extended literary comparison of 
Reddy’s (1979) linguistic framings of information transfer and Simondon’s theories, 
concluding that Reddy’s toolmaker’s paradigm was consistent with Simondon’s and 
Maturana’s conceptions of information transfer (Maturana, 2002; Reddy, 1979; 
Simondon, 1958). 
The topics represented in the previously addressed questions set the stage for the 
subsequent questions, which more fully represent my paradigm as a maker. I begin by 
asking: How can making be seen as a structural coupling between a maker, her tools and 
her media? I argue that each of the component systems in this relationship, as well as all 
those connected systems ignored in this simplified presentation of this relationship, can 
all be seen as structurally determined, as such any interactions between these systems 
must, by Maturana’s (Maturana, 2002) definition, be through structural coupling. My 
next question focuses on what I see as the most important ramification of this structural 
coupling between the maker, her tools and her media. That question is: How does making 
result in a co-determination of the structure of the maker and the technical object 
produced? This question is a major part of what I identify as my primary research 
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question. Maturana provides a basic answer to this question in his definition of structural 
coupling. He says, 
As a consequence, in this process the structure of the living system and the 
structure of the medium change together congruently as a matter of course, and 
the general result is that the history of interactions between two or more structure 
determined systems becomes a history of spontaneous recursive structural 
changes in which all the participant systems change together congruently until 
they separate or disintegrate. (Maturana, 2002, p. 16) 
As I describe in Chapter 6 in the section entitled Seeing making as structural 
coupling, for the maker, the structural changes they undergo may be described as 
learning. I describe in the section Self-jigging, in the same chapter, the result that 
structural changes to the material may have on the subsequent structural coupling of 
maker, tool and material. The learning that the maker may experience leads to the next 
question: How can a maker know their material? 
I argue that a maker comes to know their material through their structural 
coupling with that material and with similar materials. I also argue that these making 
experiences prepare the maker to construct more significant information from indirect 
sources of knowledge about a making process such as listening to a description or 
watching a video of someone else engaging in the same process. I claim that what a 
maker comes to know is not merely how to modify the structure of a technical object. 
The maker, in Simondon’s terms, develops a “sensitiveness to the technicality of 
elements” (Simondon, 1958, p. 87); they can be seen as understanding the organization of 
the system (Maturana, 2002). 
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If a maker can be said to know their material, as I have argued they can, we can 
ask: How can structure and organization be employed as material computation? In the 
section in Chapter 6 entitled Material computation, I claim that fundamentally, digital 
computational systems are no different than any other computational systems; they are 
simply constrained, through concretization, to binary states that enable the systems to 
function as symbolic processing systems.  I argue that material computational systems 
can take advantage of attributes such as hysteresis and bounce that are engineered out of 
digital systems. I claim that modifying the structure of materials may be seen as a form of 
programming because it results in a changed response to a subsequent structural 
coupling.  
I address at length the question: How can making and invention be seen as either 
industrial or artisanal modes of production? I describe Simondon’s (1958) view of the 
artisanal mode of production as abstracting and the industrial mode as concretizing. I 
present evidence that a contemporary small group or individual studio, which would 
traditionally be seen as artisanal, provides the maker access to many tools that represent 
high levels of concretization and allow the worker to evolve system in a manner 
consistent with Simondon’s view of the industrial mode of production (Simondon, 1958). 
This fact suggests an answer to my next question: Are distinctions between modes of 
production still valid? I do not directly answer this question in this dissertation, but 
suggest that such divisions are certainly less clearly bounded than they may have been in 
earlier times.  
I argue that the important question to ask on the subject of modes of production 
is: In what ways do these modes of production inform and complement one another? I 
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already emphasized the concretization that the industrial mode of production has brought 
to the artisanal studio. I offer Pye’s (1968) theories on the ‘workmanship of risk’ as an 
important way in which the practices of the artisanal studio may positively impact the 
industrial mode of production.  
In the context of this consideration of material practice, I ask: How can my 
material practice illustrate and reveal the theoretical constructs and philosophical basis of 
this dissertation? I present detailed descriptions of several stages of my production of my 
Vox Curio instrument. In these descriptions I explain the structures of the materials with 
which I am working and the organization that these structures produce. I describe why I 
define the relations between structures in the way that I do to achieve a desired structural 
coupling between technical elements. I also describe my structural coupling with these 
materials and explain how my structure is modified in these couplings and how these 
changes may be seen as learning.  
From my point of observation as an artist, I see a potential extension to 
Simondon’s (1958) theory of concretization through plurivalence or plurifunctionality. 
This potential is expressed in my question: Can conceptual function be considered 
alongside physical function as an integral part of a structurally determined system? I 
conclude, in the section entitled Conceptual Plurifunctionality that such an extension to 
Simondon’s theory is valid but must be considered as a construction by the observer, 
dependent on their structure and the dynamic culturally defined meaning of the material 
or form that is considered from a conceptual, aesthetic or artistic perspective. I argue that 
conceptual plurifunctionality may enhance invention by suggesting non-obvious 
alternatives to problems.   
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Chapter 6 of this dissertation concludes with a discussion that addresses the 
question: How can aspects of materiality shape the paradigms through which immaterial 
systems are viewed? In this section I present descriptions of aspects of materiality, many 
of which emerged through my descriptions of my material practice. I offer examples of 
how these aspects of materiality inform a wide range of applied and theoretical domains 
of knowledge and practice. I state that this categorization of aspects of materiality 
represents a static snapshot of a singular point of observation, and is not presented as a 
formal framework. I again remind the reader that I have approached this research as a 
‘paradigm construction project’ in the spirit of Wittgenstein’s (1953) philosophical 
concepts of the ‘dawning of an aspect’ and ‘seeing it as’ (Wittgenstein, 1953). This 
philosophical paradigm is embedded in both the theory and the language of this 
dissertation. 
A practical takeaway for experiential media system designers from my synthesis 
of theories and philosophies is the paradigm that when we create systems, it is the 
organization or technicality that through structural coupling, results in what we observe 
as functionality, but it is only the structure of systems that we can modify, therefore we 
should not focus on either structure or organization independently, but see them as a 
mutually dependent unity. I emphasize the intelligent selection of traditional and material 
computational solutions and remind makers of the potential advantages of natural 
elements, individuals and ensemble in addition to their technical brethren.  
The bounds of my paradigm construction project do not stop at the boundaries of 
this document, but include the wide range of experiential media systems and technical 
elements that I produced throughout my career in the School of Arts, Media and 
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Engineering. I argue that these projects can be seen as an embodiment of my knowledge 
and my evolving paradigm. Each physical object, max patch and electronic circuit is a 
tangible record of a structural coupling I had with this media. Retracing their history 
would reveal my paradigm in various stages of construction, and perhaps, deconstruction. 
The making of these systems can be seen as changing my structure as a human 
individual, and providing the foundation for my reading and understanding of the theory 
and philosophy that I reference in this dissertation. On a practical level, these systems 
serve as research instruments for AME, Synthesis Center, Topological Media Lab, and a 
growing community of researchers.  
When I described my abductive research methodology, I emphasized that the end 
result of abductive logic was a conclusion that was probable based on the evidence 
presented, and that this conclusion should be seen as a question to investigate, not a 
definitive answer to a question. The abductive logical structure seems absurd with simple 
examples like Peirce’s bags of white beans, but it is perfectly appropriate and practical 
when the domain is complex and no single answer is expected. I generated questions 
through the application of this research methodology that I could not have postulated at 
the outset of this process. These questions include:  
How soft can the boundaries of structurally determined systems be?  
What happens in the gradient areas of such systems? 
Is code material? 
Does self-jigging occur in non-physical media? 
Does structural determinism equate to a clockwork universe, or preclude free 
will? 
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Can Simondon’s theory of plurivalence be expanded to include conceptual, 
aesthetic and artistic functionality?  
I present an informal discussion of some of these questions in Appendix A of this 
document.  
Final Thoughts/Next Action 
Many stimulating questions are raised by the modes of seeing that I present in this 
document. At the heart of the most compelling of these is what many consider to be 
Simondon’s main philosophical topic: the process of individuation (Simondon, 
1964/1992, 1964/2005). When and how does something become an individual? What 
does it mean for something to be an individual?  These questions promise to transition 
from pure philosophy, to practical concerns when we look at advances in robotics, 
prosthetics, augmented reality, artificial intelligence, wearable and implanted technology, 
and other rapidly evolving fields of study. Regardless of what one may think of his 
theories, it is difficult to deny that Raymond Kurzweil (2005) is on track with his use of 
the term ‘singularity’ to identify the essence of a real and significant technical and 
cultural process. Without significant study of Kurzweil’s theory, I can only speculate, but 
my instinct suggest that where his theory goes awry, and why it is often criticized, is that 
it ignores what Simondon (1958) labels the “law of relaxation”. Simondon believes that 
technical individuals and ensembles come and go, and that it is the technical elements 
that ultimately persist and continue the evolutionary process (Simondon, 1958, pp. 75–
76).  But this debate is an aside from my main point, that being, that the theory of 
individuation has much to tell us about our emerging reality.  
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I am particularly interested in the question of individuation as it applies to what 
are now frequently called digital-physical systems, or physical-computing systems. The 
hyphenated names suggest a conjunction, but in practice this conjunction is typically 
juxtaposition, not fusion. Synthesizing physical systems with computational systems in a 
manner consistent with Simondon’s (1958) philosophical principles of concretization and 
individuation presents significant challenges, but challenges with significant promise. 
This philosophy, applied as a design methodology, runs in opposition to the current 
vogue of absolute universality and modularity (as typified in our smart phones with an 
app for every application). Concrete and individual physical-computing systems would 
be profoundly individualized in their purpose. Their structure would define their 
organization; plurifunctionality would be a guiding design specification; material 
computation would be their essence.  
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In this appendix, I highlight some of the implications and big questions that 
emerge from this research. I submit these, not as well-structured propositions, but as 
freeform presentations of exciting research directions. I emphasize that these are 
unformed possibilities for future practical and philosophical investigation, not fully 
formed hypotheses stemming directly from my conclusions. 
Is code material? 
If code, by which I mean the symbolic language that exercises the affordances of 
computer hardware, is considered as a material, it should be subject to the same 
structurally determined mechanics as any other objects.  
I answerer this question with an equivocation: I'm not confident that defining 
code as material allows a complete description of its nature. I'm not even sure a 
completeness of definition is possible. Seeing code as material is only one of many ways 
to see it and each way may reveal opportunities and attributes that are masked with 
others. That said, I don't find any logical inconsistency that would preclude identifying 
code as material. The obvious question is "What is material", or more to the point, "What 
do we see as material?” Does materiality imply tangibility? Can we touch it? Is oxygen a 
material? We may not be able to feel it as we feel the bark on a tree, but deprive us of it 
and we will quickly miss its material presence. Do we need to see material? Obviously 
we could use the same oxygen example to refute this requirement, but we may get smart 
and jump straight past the limitations of direct human perceptibility in forming our 
definition of material. If we exploit the full complement of scientific instruments to 
identify matter at every scale of physical and temporal dimension, at some point, matter 
itself disappears. Poof! It's gone!  At this point I'm pushing past the limits of my 
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understanding of theoretical physics, but it seems that we are left with probability fields 
and other mysterious phenomena that don't seem much like material in our everyday 
experience and understanding of it. If what we thought was material turns out to be 
nothing more than a particular composition of energy and probability, perhaps everything 
and nothing is material. In either case, the playing field is fairly level for what can be 
defined as material. 
Stepping back a few steps in the line of reasoning, I point to a primary example of 
a technical object from Simondon's 'Mode of Existence of Technical Objects'. He used 
the electronic tube as an example of the concretization that happens through the 
convergence of functions in material structures. (Simondon, Du Mode, pg. 22) His 
description of the changing structural configurations and the additions of various anode-
grid components are all emphasizing clearly material components. However for any of 
these components to have any meaning, an electrical current, a flow, or potential flow, of 
electrons, must be present. The electricity in a tube is every bit as material (or immaterial 
if you prefer) as that in the vast majority of our computing devices. The fact that we 
constrain, with great effort, the electrical energy to what we call off or on states doesn't 
change this in the least. It doesn't matter whether our code is ultimately instantiated and 
interacts through electricity, light, air pressure, or any other means of representation, if 
we accept Simondon's example as a technical object, we should accept code on equal 
terms. 
Let us look at the question from another perspective. What if we assume that code 
doesn't have anything to do with its physical format, but instead is defined by the ideas 
that are symbolically represented? Lets also assume that the symbolic representation is 
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arbitrary and can be discounted as part of the definition of code. If we are left with the 
ideas "contained" in the code as its essence, then we should now as what the idea is. If an 
idea requires a cognizing agent to generate it, then we must inquire about the nature of 
agent. We could take Braitenberg's (1986) theoretical journey of building artificial brains 
as an imagining of such possible agents. Or we could assume an immaterial cognizing 
agent, but this seems to lead to an endless recursion problem. Even if we only require an 
organization of energy to constitute the information of code, this constitution on some 
level, feels analogous to material. 
The most compelling argument I can make at the moment in support of the 
proposition that code is material, is to reframe the question and ask: is code a structure 
determined system? I intend Maturana's definition of a structurally determined system 
(Maturana, 2002, pg. 5-6) as I pose this question. I suggest that his definition of a 
structure determined system is a very reasonable definition for material. Specifically I'm 
referring to his concept of "organizational closure", the idea that the dynamic relations 
within a system define the "operational boundaries" of the system (Maturana, 2002, pg. 
14-15). Seeing code as a structurally determined system that is defined by its operational 
boundaries, we dismiss concerns about its representational format (whether we think of it 
in terms of a semantic structure, or as an electrical pattern, etc.). Its structure remains 
essential, for this is what determines, at every instant, its organizational dynamics, but, as 
Maturana argues, its structure can change, while its "organization is conserved" 
(Maturana, 2002, pg. 16). 
My interest, finally, is pragmatic. I argue that seeing code as material may be 
useful. The utility of this perspective may include: discovering that we've only been using 
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one type of material-code, identifying material properties in the material-code that we've 
overlooked or suppressed up to this point, discovering material combinations and alloys 
through the conjoining of varying types of material-code, and realizing the potential of a 
synthesis of material-code and physical material. 
These suggested utilitarian functions of seeing code as material are fundamentally 
conceptual exercises. They invite new ways of thinking about code, but not merely from 
the perspective of generating more creative algorithms and frameworks with existing 
forms of code. They invite seeing the structure of code and its representational forms 
differently. For example, identifying different code-materials may suggest revisiting 
continuous, rather than discrete state systems of representation and logic. Suppressed 
material properties may include bouncing and hysteresis. We do sometimes "compress 
our code" and say, for example, that "my operating system froze." What would it mean 
for an operating system to boil, become saturated, to undergo a change of elastic 
modulus? 
If we want to look for opportunities to develop material-code, in Simondon's 
terms, to increase its concretization, we need only look at all the existing abstract 
elements required to support the desired functionality of our existing code. In other 
words, look at the systems that are put in place to insure the viability of code that 
represent compromises, situations where you have to accept negative side effects of these 
life-support systems to enjoy their benefits. Our existing code is viable, but from the 
perspective of a highly evolved concrete object, just barely so. If we could start to find 
multiple structures in code that currently each fulfill only an individual function (which 
in many cases will only be to help maintain the viability of another part of the code) and 
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find ways of merging these functional requirements into individual structural elements, 
we would be on our way to one of the fundamental characteristics of concrete objects, the 
presence of plurivalent or plurifunctional structures.     
Does self-jigging occur in non-physical media? 
The notion is simple enough; a system of structural coupling, once initiated more 
readily follows a trajectory of structural change that is established through this initiation, 
as a result of structural changes that occur in either or both systems. I can imagine coding 
a system that would simulate this, but am not sure it would match the definition I just 
spelled out (which may need refinement). More thought will be required on this one. 
Ideally an answer would not propose a system to be created to conform to these rules, but 
rather explain how an existing system is already such an example. 
My advisors suggested interesting ways of seeing this question, suggesting auto-
calibration and feedback loops as potential instances of self-jigging in non-physical 
media.  
Does structural determinism equate to a clockwork universe? 
From a practical standpoint, this is certainly not something we would directly 
perceive or be able to test, but more importantly, I also don't believe it theoretically 
follows if we accept the Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. 
More interesting to me than a theoretical debate, on either physical or 
philosophical grounds, about the possibility of a clockwork universe existing as a 
consequence of structurally determined systems, is the role uncertainty is said to play in 
these very systems. Simondon identifies margins of indetermination as the enabling 
characteristic that allows for "sensitivity to outside information" (Simondon, 1958, p. 4). 
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In other words, we don't have to worry about the consequences of absolute structural 
determinism, because any fully structurally determined objects would exist as an 
anomaly. It would face a lonely existence, isolated completely from the environment in 
which it existed. Whether such an object could in some way exert change on its 
environment is an interesting question, but, if we accept Simondon's argument, and take 
it to the extreme, this object would not be able to be affected in any way by its 
environment. An object of this nature is more mysterious and thought provoking to me 
than a clockwork universe, in which everything interacts predictably, but at least 
interacts. 
